South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
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SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
Charleston County Assessor vs. William and Lona Hardy

AGENCY:
Charleston County Assessor

PARTIES:
Petitioners:
Charleston County Assessor

Respondents:
William and Lona Hardy
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
01-ALJ-17-0296-CC

APPEARANCES:
n/a
 

ORDERS:

FINAL ORDER AND DECISION

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

These cases come before me pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2540 (2000) and S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-310 et seq. (1986 & Supp. 2000). In each of the above-captioned cases, the respondent taxpayer wife (resident or resident wife) is domiciled in South Carolina and her husband is domiciled in another state. Each resident seeks the 4% legal residence property tax assessment ratio for her home in Charleston County, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c) (2000). The Charleston County Assessor appeals from the Board of Assessment Appeals decision granting the respective resident taxpayers the legal residence ratio. The Assessor contends that because the resident in each of these cases is legally married to a spouse who is not domiciled in South Carolina, the resident does not qualify for the legal residence assessment ratio. Specifically, the Assessor argues that, under South Carolina common law, a wife is deemed to be domiciled with her husband, so long as they are not legally separated. Thus, the Assessor deems the resident wives in these cases to be domiciliaries of their husbands' home states and not of South Carolina.

After timely notice to the parties, a hearing was conducted on September 19, 2001, at the Administrative Law Judge Division, Columbia, South Carolina. Based on the evidence presented and the relevant statutes and case law, I find that the resident wife in each of the respective cases is entitled to the 4% legal residence tax assessment on their respective properties at issue.

II. STIPULATED FACTS

At the hearing of these cases, counsel for the litigants submitted the following written stipulated facts:

1. With the exception of the undisputed fact that Mr. Hodges was domiciled in Maryland, Mrs. Hodges presented evidence sufficient to satisfy the Assessor that she satisfied the domicile requirements of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c).

2. The sole basis for denial of Mrs. Hodges' 4% Special Assessment Ratio application was the undisputed fact that Mr. Hodges was domiciled in Maryland during tax year 2000.

3. With the exception of the undisputed fact that Mr. Hardy was domiciled in Maine, Mrs. Hardy submitted evidence sufficient to satisfy the Assessor that she satisfied the domicile requirements of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c).

4. The sole basis for denial of Mrs. Hardy's 4% Special Assessment Ratio application was the undisputed fact that Mr. Hardy was domiciled in Maine during tax year 2000.

5. With the exception of the undisputed fact that Mr. Snelling was domiciled in Ohio during tax year 2000, Mrs. Snelling presented evidence sufficient to satisfy the Assessor that she satisfied the domicile requirements of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c).

6. The sole basis for denial of Mrs. Snelling's 4% Special Assessment Ratio application was the undisputed fact that Mr. Snelling was domiciled in Ohio during tax year 2000.

7. It is the policy of the Charleston County Assessor's Office that legal residence status shall not be granted unless both spouses are domiciled at the property for which the classification is sought. This policy does not apply in the case of legal separation where proof of such is submitted by the applicant.

8. The documents previously submitted to the Court through the parties' respective "Exchange of Evidence and Foundation for Documents" are true and accurate copies of the material submitted to the Board of Assessment Appeals, and may be admitted as evidence in the captioned matter without objection by either party.

III. FINDINGS OF FACT

Having carefully considered the exhibits (1) and arguments presented at the hearing of these cases, I make the following Findings of Fact by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. Charles H. and Susan W. Hodges jointly own the property at 2655 Gnarled Pine, Seabrook Island, South Carolina; for tax purposes, the property is identified as parcel # 147-08-00-088. Ms. Hodges possesses a valid South Carolina driver's license and is a registered voter in Charleston County.

2. William and Lona Hardy jointly own the property at 16 Airy Hall, Kiawah Island, South Carolina; for tax purposes, the property is identified as parcel # 264-01-00-013. Ms. Hardy possesses a valid South Carolina driver's license, is a registered voter in Charleston County, and is licensed as an Licensed Independent Social Worker in South Carolina.

3. Barbara A. Snelling is the sole owner of the property at 73 Spotted Sandpiper Court, Kiawah Island, South Carolina; for tax purposes, the property is identified as parcel # 207-08-00-053. She possesses a valid South Carolina driver's license and is a registered voter in Charleston County.

4. On May 1, 2001, and June 18, 2001, the Charleston County Board of Assessment Appeals issued decisions in the respective cases, finding that the properties at issue qualified for the 4% legal residence assessment ratio for tax year 2000.

IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based on the Stipulated Facts and Findings of Fact above, I conclude the following as a matter of law.

In order to qualify property for the legal residence assessment ratio, a taxpayer must establish that the property is the "domicile of the owner-applicant," S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c)(1) (2000), and satisfy the provisions of Section 12-43-220(c)(2), which require, in pertinent part, that the owner-applicant: (1) "have actually owned and occupied the residence as his legal residence and been domiciled at that address for some period during the applicable tax year," S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c)(2)(i), (2) (2) certify under penalty of perjury that the residence is the applicant's legal residence and domicile, S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c)(2)(ii), and (3) likewise certify that neither the applicant nor any other member of his or her household "is residing in or occupying any other residence in South Carolina which [the applicant or any member of his or her family] has qualified for the special assessment ratio allowed by this section." Id. (emphasis added). Section 12-43-220(c)(2) further provides that the burden of proof for eligibility for the legal residence assessment ratio is on the owner-applicant, who must provide the proof the assessor requires, including, but not limited to, a copy of his or her most recently filed South Carolina income tax return, copies of South Carolina motor vehicle registrations for all motor vehicles registered in the name of the applicant, and any other proof required by the assessor in order to determine the applicant's true legal residence. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c)(2)(iv).

In the cases at hand, the Assessor denied the Respondents' applications for the legal residence assessment ratio solely on the ground that, under his interpretation of South Carolina common law, the law presumes that the resident wives cannot be domiciled in South Carolina because their husbands are domiciled in other states. Aside from the question of legal domicile, the Assessor and Respondents agree that the resident wives have satisfied the other requirements of Section 12-43-220(c). They owned and occupied the residences in question during tax year 2000. They have certified that the residences are their legal residences and domiciles and that neither they nor any members of their immediate families are residing in another residence in South Carolina that qualifies for the legal residence assessment ratio. Further, the resident wives have submitted evidence of their residency in South Carolina, including driver's licenses, voter registrations, and tax returns, to the Assessor sufficient to qualify for the special assessment ratio but for the legal question of their separate domicile from their husbands. Thus, this question of whether a wife can maintain a separate legal residence from a husband to whom she is amicably married is the only issue remaining in these cases.

The term "domicile" is not defined in Section 12-43-220(c). But, "[w]here the legislature elects not to define a term in a statute, the courts will interpret the term in accord with its usual and customary meaning," Ogburn-Mathews v. Loblolly Partners, 332 S.C. 551, 574, 505 S.E.2d 598, 610 (1998), and "where a statute uses a term that has a well-recognized meaning in the law, the presumption is that the General Assembly intended to use the term in that sense." State v. Bridgers, 329 S.C. 11, 13, 495 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1997). South Carolina courts have defined one's domicile as "the place where a person has his true, fixed and permanent home and principal establishment, to which he has, whenever he is absent, an intention of returning." Gasque v. Gasque, 246 S.C. 423, 426, 143 S.E.2d 811, 812 (1965). "The true basis and foundation of domicile is the intention, quo animo, of residence," id., and thus the question of domicile "is largely one of intent to be determined under the facts and circumstances of each case." Id. at 427, 143 S.E.2d at 812.

Beyond these questions of fact, the determination of where an individual has his domicile is governed by several legal principles. First, it is well-settled that every person must have a domicile somewhere. See 28 C.J.S. Domicile § 5 (1996). It is also an "elementary proposition" that a person can have only one domicile at a time. Ravenel v. Dekle, 265 S.C. 364, 379, 218 S.E.2d 521, 528 (1975). It follows, therefore, that "a person may have more than one residence, but cannot have more than one domicile or be a citizen of more than one state at the same moment." Id. Other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion as to the singularity of one's domicile under the law. See, e.g., Haggard v. Graham, 236 S.E.2d 92, 94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) ("One may, for purposes of convenience, maintain a residence at a place not intended as a permanent abode without affecting any change in legal domicile."); Bearman v. Camatsos, 385 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Tenn. 1964) ("A person may have two or more residences but only one domicile, or legal residence."); 28 C.J.S. Domicile § 4(a) (1996) (noting that a person "may have more than one residence at the same time, but . . . only one domicile").

Thus, at first glance, the resident wives appear to have met the domicile requirement of Section 12-43-220(c). They have certified under penalty of perjury that their South Carolina residences are their legal residences and intended domiciles. The residences they share with their husbands in other states can reasonably be considered secondary residences that do not affect the status of their established domiciles in South Carolina. Moreover, the Assessor does not dispute that the resident wives intend to be domiciled in South Carolina. The Assessor's only argument is that South Carolina common law prohibits these wives from maintaining separate domiciles from their husbands and therefore prevents them from qualifying for the legal residence assessment ratio under Section 12-43-220(c). This tribunal, however, finds that the Assessor's policy on this point is based on an obsolete understanding of the rights of married women and violates the equal protection guarantees of both the United States and South Carolina constitutions.

In the memorandum from the Charleston County Attorney to the Assessor that formed the basis for the Assessor's decision in these cases, Phillips v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 195 S.C. 472, 12 S.E.2d 13 (1940) is cited as controlling authority on the issue of whether a married couple can maintain separate domiciles. As part of an extended discussion of the meaning of residence and domicile under the tax laws, the Phillips court recited the common law doctrine of matrimonial domicile, noting that "the law is clear that except in certain unusual circumstances the domicile of the husband is the domicile of the wife." Id. at 483, 12 S.E.2d at 18.

The Phillips opinion, now over sixty years old, relied upon a 1901 case, Cone v. Cone, 61 S.C. 512, 39 S.E. 748 (1901), for this common law fiction of matrimonial domicile. See Phillips, 195 S.C. at 483, 12 S.E.2d at 18. In Cone, the South Carolina Supreme Court justified the "well-settled doctrine" that the domicile of the husband is the domicile of the wife on the grounds that "[t]he husband has the right, without the consent of the wife, to establish his domicile in any part of the world; and it is the legal duty of the wife to follow his fortunes, wheresoever he may go." Cone, 61 S.C. at 520, 39 S.E. at 751 (quoting Hair v. Hair, 31 S.C. Eq. (10 Rich. Eq.) 163, 176 (1858)). (3) One hundred years ago, this common law fiction was undisputedly the prevailing viewpoint, and was firmly rooted in the common law of England and Blackstone's Commentaries. See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 21 Domicil of Married Persons cmt. a (1988) ("[T]he view, as expressed by Blackstone, [was] that 'the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband.'"). Yet, even at the time the Cone opinion was written, many courts in the United States had begun to question this common law fiction that bound husband and wife at the hip. (4)

As women's rights progressed throughout the early part of the twentieth century, the common law doctrine of the singular matrimonial domicile further eroded. The comments to the Restatement section cited above trace the modern evolution and eventual rejection of the fiction of the matrimonial domicile:

At common law a married woman had no capacity to acquire a domicil of choice and was assigned that of her husband by operation of law. This rule has been abandoned. The ordinary rules for the acquisition of a domicil of choice are now applied to a married woman whether or not she is living with her husband. . . . The common law rule that a wife takes the domicil of her husband by operation of law so long as she lives with him is clearly inconsistent with contemporary views relating to the legal position of married women. Nonetheless, the rule has rarely been reexamined by the courts. Undoubtedly, this is because in the vast majority of situations a wife who lives with her husband in a certain place will regard that place as her home. Under these circumstances, the wife's domicil will be in that place by application of the rules for the acquisition of a domicil of choice. . . . The harshness of the common law rule that a married woman could have no domicil apart from that of her husband first became apparent in the field of divorce. It was unfair that a deserted wife could bring suit for divorce only in the state, however distant it might be, where her husband had chosen to establish his new home. The first step in modifying the rule was to say that a husband, once he had given his wife cause for divorce, no longer enjoyed the power to change her domicil. Her domicil remained in the state where the spouses had last lived together as man and wife, and accordingly the wife could there bring suit for divorce or separate maintenance. The rule was then further liberalized by permitting the wife under such circumstances to acquire a new domicil of her own in any state where she might choose to go. It was also made clear that her power in this regard was not restricted to the bringing of marital actions; if she could acquire a domicil of choice for one purpose, she could do so for any purpose. Gradually, the same power was accorded the wife in situations where the spouses had separated by mutual consent rather than because of the fault of the husband. During this period, therefore, the wife could have a domicil of her own provided that she was dwelling apart from her husband and was doing so justifiably, or, as stated in the original Restatement of this Subject, which appeared in 1934, if she had not been guilty of desertion in leaving him. Today, the power of the wife has been broadened still further. If there has been an actual rupture of marital relations, she may acquire a separate domicil even though she was the party at fault. And she may likewise do so if for any reason she is living apart from her husband even though her relations with him are entirely amicable.



Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 21 Domicil of Married Persons cmt. a, cmt. d (1988) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Green v. Comm'r of Corp. & Taxation, 305 N.E.2d 92 (Mass. 1973) (tracing the erosion of the fiction of matrimonial domicile and holding that an amicably married couple could have separate domiciles for tax purposes).

A survey of authorities from the last fifty years supports the conclusion that the common law fiction of the matrimonial domicile is no longer accepted in the United States. As early as 1942, the United States Supreme Court stated that "[n]or is there any doubt that a married woman may acquire a domicil separate from her husband." Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 n.9 (1942) (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court again rejected the concept of matrimonial domicile in 1956, holding that "[t]he fiction that a woman cannot have a separate 'domicile' from that of her husband is a relic of the old discredited idea that women must always play a subordinate role in society; it does not justify a departure from settled constitutional principles." Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 577 (1956). (5) This rejection of the fiction of matrimonial domicile and recognition of the right of married women to establish their own domicile has been followed by other jurisdictions in the United States, and has clearly become the dominant position on the issue. See, e.g., In re Ring, 144 B.R. 446, 450 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992) ("This Court disagrees with the principle that a woman's domicile follows that of her husband. . . . This Court believes the principle . . . is outdated and declines to apply it to the instant case."); In re Marriage of Hudson, 434 N.E.2d 107, 111 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (finding the principle "unseemly reminiscent of the long discredited fictional identity of husband and wife," and noting that "[t]he majority of jurisdictions, including Indiana, have therefore concluded a married woman may establish a residence or domicile separate from her husband for whatever reason, and the usual test for determining a party's residence may apply"); Reierson v. Comm'r of Revenue, 524 N.E.2d 857, 859 (Mass. Ct. App. 1988) ("A wife who lives apart from her husband can acquire a separate domicil.") (citing the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 21); 28 C.J.S. Domicile § 26 (1996) ("A wife has the same capacity to acquire a domicile of choice as does her husband . . . . and a married woman may acquire a domicile separate from her husband."); see also Brown v. TranSouth Fin. Corp., 897 F. Supp. 1398 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Wilson v. Pickens, 444 F. Supp. 53 (D. Okla. 1977); Blount v. Boston, 718 A.2d 1111 (Md. 1998); Psaty v. Psaty, 402 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1978). Several states have gone one step farther and codified this repudiation of the common law notion of matrimonial domicile. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-210 (1997) ("[T]he common law rule that the domicile of a married woman is that of her husband shall no longer be in effect in this state."); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-2-3 (1982) ("The domicile of a married person shall not be presumed to be the domicile of that person's spouse."); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 37:2-3 (West 1968) ("The domicile of a married woman shall be established by the same facts and rules of law as that of any other person."); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 61 (McKinney 1999) ("The domicile of a married man or woman shall be established for all purposes without regard to sex.").

The Assessor's position that the domicile of a married woman follows the domicile of her husband is plainly against the great weight of American jurisprudence. This common law fiction is based on a long outdated and widely discredited conception of the status of married women, and it has been rejected by virtually every jurisdiction that has had occasion to reexamine the doctrine in recent years. There is nothing in the language of Section 12-43-220(c) or in recent South Carolina case law (6) to suggest that the Assessor's policy on the matrimonial domicile of married women is required by, or even accepted under, South Carolina law. The Assessor has rummaged through the dust bin of legal history and has found nothing but an outmoded common law fiction to justify his construction of Section 12-43-220(c). This tribunal will not permit the Assessor to deny Respondents a benefit that is otherwise rightly theirs under the law on such weak grounds. As noted by Justice Holmes nearly one hundred years ago, the position asserted by the Assessor is "a pure fiction, and fiction is always a poor ground for changing substantial rights." Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 630 (1906) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

The Assessor's policy holding married women to be domiciled with their husbands is not only based on an outdated understanding of the marital relationship, but also denies the resident wives in these cases equal protection of the laws in violation of the United States and South Carolina constitutions. One of the foundations of our system of laws is that "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; accord S.C. Const. art. I, § 3 ("[N]or shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."). Under the Assessor's interpretation of Section 12-43-220(c), married women are treated differently than married men, solely on the basis of their gender. The stated position of the Assessor, and the actions taken by the Assessor in these cases, are in direct contravention of the United States and South Carolina constitutions. (7)

Generally, to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause, a classification must (1) bear a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be achieved, (2) members of the class must be treated alike under similar circumstances, and (3) the classification must rest on some rational basis. See Lee v. S.C. Dept. of Natural Res., 339 S.C. 463, 467, 530 S.E.2d 112, 114 (2000). However, "[n]either federal nor state government acts compatibly with equal protection when a law or official policy denies women, simply because they are women, full citizenship stature-equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society based upon their individual talents and capacities." United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 530 (1996). Accordingly, courts have reviewed gender-based classifications with more scrutiny than the rational basis test, and require a stronger showing by the state to support such classifications. "Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action." Id. In addition to the requirement that the State's justification be exceedingly persuasive, the Supreme Court found that this "demanding" burden "rests entirely on the State." Id. at 533. Furthermore, the State must show "at least that the classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'" Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). Thus, for the Assessor to apply the domicile requirement of Section 12-43-220(c) differently to married women than to married men (i.e., to apply a "gender-based" classification), the Assessor must show some "exceedingly persuasive justification" for his action.

It is evident that the Assessor's policy rests upon a gender-based classification. Married men are not held to be domiciled wherever their wives might be, whereas married women are told that their domicile follows that of their husbands. The Assessor argues, however, that his application of Phillips is gender-neutral. This argument cannot be sustained. The rule established in Phillips is explicitly gender-based, and can only be applied with reference to gender. If the domicile of one spouse is to follow the domicile of the other on purely legal grounds, i.e., without reference to factual circumstances, then some sort of gender classification must be employed: either the wife must follow the husband, or the husband follow the wife. A determination of matrimonial domicile that depended on a fact-based analysis could be made in a gender-neutral fashion, by looking not to the gender of the spouse living in each residence, but to which residence is the true marital domicile. There is no evidence in these cases, however, that the Assessor used such a fact-based method to determine the domicile of Respondents; rather, in each, the Assessor relied solely on the legal conclusion that a wife cannot establish a domicile separate from her husband. This conclusion can only be reached using a legally suspect gender-based classification.

Although the Assessor clearly applies a gender-based classification to Section 12-43-220(c), no "exceedingly persuasive justification" is provided for the policy. In fact, no justification at all is provided, with the exception of the common law fiction of the matrimonial domicile. As noted above, this fiction has largely been discredited. Although the burden of persuasion rests with the Assessor, he has made little effort to justify his gender-based discrimination. Accordingly, the actions of the Assessor cannot satisfy the equal protection test set forth in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan and United States v. Viriginia.

Respondents in these cases are entitled to the 4% legal residence assessment ratio under Section 12-43-220(c). Both the Assessor and Respondents agree that the resident wives meet all of the qualifications for the special assessment ratio except for the domicile requirement of Section 12-43-220(c)(1). But, it is clear that the resident wives meet this requirement as well. Indeed, the Assessor only disputes their domicile in South Carolina under his policy denying married women domicile separate from that of their husbands-a policy that this tribunal finds not only to be based on obsolete law, but also to violate these women's right to equal protection of the law under both the state and federal constitutions. The decision of the Charleston County Board of Assessment Appeals in each of these cases is therefore affirmed.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Charleston County Assessor assess the Respondents' properties in dispute at the 4% legal residence tax assessment ratio as provided under Section 12-43-220(c) (2000).

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.





______________________________

JOHN D. GEATHERS

Administrative Law Judge





October 19, 2001

Columbia, South Carolina

1. No testimonial evidence was offered, as no material issues of fact are in dispute and these cases present a question of law.

2. The ownership requirement of Section 12-43-220(c) is met if the occupant owns the claimed residence "totally or in part in fee or by life estate." § 12-43-220(c) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the fact that Ms. Hodges and Ms. Hardy jointly own their properties with their husbands does not preclude them from qualifying for the legal residence assessment ratio.

3. The Chancellor in Hair, in turn, supported his conclusion with the principle that "[c]ertainly the husband, by our laws, is lord of his own household, and sole arbiter on the question as to where himself and family shall reside." Hair, 31 S.C. Eq. (10 Rich Eq.) at 175.

4. See, e.g., Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 625-26 (1914) ("However it may be in England, that in this country a wife [seeking divorce] may get a different domicil from that of her husband is not disputed and is not open for dispute. This she may do without necessity and simply from choice, as the cases show, and the change that is good as against her husband ought to be good as against all."); Gould v. Crow, 57 Mo. 200, 204 (1874) ("Some courts hold that the wife cannot have a separate domicile from her husband; but this doctrine has been exploded and the current of authorities is that she may have a separate domicile for the purposes of divorce.").

5. The Supreme Court in Armstrong upheld the ruling of the Ohio Court of Appeals, which had expressly rejected "the common-law fiction that the wife's identity was merged in that of her husband and that the domicile of his choosing was her domicile" as relying upon a "monolithic conception of the relation between husband and wife [that] has long since ceased to be valid." Armstrong v. Armstrong, 130 N.E.2d 710, 715 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954).

6. While admitting that "the law pertaining to this area is less than clear within this State," the Attorney General's Office, apparently finding no controlling authority on the point, issued an opinion in 1976 that recognized the ability of an amicably married woman to establish her own domicile for the purpose of voting in South Carolina. 1976 S.C. Op. Atty. Gen. 145. In reaching this decision, the Attorney General's Office noted that "the trend in the law is to abandon the common law theory of merging the identity of the husband and wife to allow married women to establish their own domicile separate from their husbands for any reason." Id.

7. In addition to the equal protection provision of Article I, § 3, the South Carolina Constitution specifically provides that a married woman "shall have all the rights incident to [real and personal property] to which an unmarried woman or a man is entitled." S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 9.


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