ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This property tax valuation matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division ("Division") upon the
request of Richard Joel McAbee and Mary McAbee ("Petitioners") for a contested case hearing pursuant to
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-310 to -400 (1986 & Supp. 2000) and S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2540(A) (2000).
Petitioners are contesting the Spartanburg County Assessor's valuation of their real property located at 8780
Highway 221, Woodruff, Spartanburg County, South Carolina (tax map number 4-20-00-002.00) for the tax
year 2000. Petitioners exhausted all administrative remedies with the Assessor and the Spartanburg County
Board of Assessment Appeals ("Board").
After notice to the parties, a hearing was held on March 22, 2001, at the offices of the Administrative Law
Judge Division in Columbia, South Carolina. The caption of the case was amended at the hearing to reflect
the correct name of Mr. McAbee and to add Mrs. McAbee, the joint owner of the real property, as a
Petitioner. Richard McAbee was present, representing himself and his wife. Guilford Bulman, the
Spartanburg County Assessor ("Assessor"), was present, representing his office. Upon a thorough review of
all relevant and probative evidence and testimony presented at the hearing and the applicable law, I find the
assessment value of the Petitioners' property for the tax year 2000 is $141,880.00.
PRETRIAL MOTIONS
Prior to the date of the hearing, Petitioners subpoenaed various individuals to testify. After a thorough review
of the file and several motions to quash the subpoenas, I issued two orders on March 20, 2001, quashing the
subpoenas served on Sarah Broyles, who is the Spartanburg County Auditor, H. Cullen Reed, Rand Petersen,
B. Rodgers Berry, and Anthony J. Regan, who are private citizens appointed to the Spartanburg County Board
of Assessment Appeals, and Diane Knox, who is Secretary to the Spartanburg County Assessor.
I determined that Ms. Broyles had no statutory duties to appraise Petitioners' real property, determine its
assessed value, nor assign any assessment ratio to the property. She, therefore, had no interest in this case nor
any duty to perform. I also determined that requiring her to travel more than fifty miles from her county of
residence would impose an undue burden or expense upon her, particularly when her attendance at the
hearing would serve no useful purpose.
Regarding Mr. Reed, Mr. Petersen, Mr. Berry, Mr. Regan, and Ms. Knox, I determined Petitioners had not
complied with ALJD Rule 22(A), which requires that a party requesting the service of a subpoena must be
responsible both for the service of the subpoena and the payment of fees and mileage costs in accordance with
Rule 45, SCRCP.
Furthermore, with respect to all of the subpoenas, Petitioners failed to comply with ALJD Rule 22(A) in that
Petitioners failed to file the returns of service with the Clerk of the Division. As of March 20, 2001, no
returns of service had been filed with the Division for any of the referenced subpoenas. After Petitioners
were notified of the orders granting the motions to quash, Petitioners filed proof of service of the subpoenas
with the Division.
I then issued a supplemental order on March 22, 2001, which again quashed the subpoenas. In that order, I
held that the witness fees had not been paid, the individuals would have to travel more than 50 miles from
Spartanburg County, and requiring the individuals to attend the hearing would present an undue hardship on
each of them.
At the hearing, the orders were read into the record, or summarized thereto, prior to the receipt of any
evidence.
EXHIBITS
At the hearing, I admitted into the record the following documents:
- Issues and Evidence Presented to the Board, filed with the Division on December 4, 2000;
- Addendum to Issues and Evidence Presented to the Board, filed with the Division on December 11,
2000; (1)
- Petitioners' Exchange of Evidence and Foundation for Documents, filed with the Division on March 2,
2001;
- Assessor's Exchange of Evidence and Foundation for Documents, filed with the Division on March 2,
2001;
- Petitioners' Exhibit 1: A Guide to Understanding Reassessment in Spartanburg County, dated February 1,
1998;
- Petitioners' Exhibit 2: Photograph of the residence located on the property identified as tax map number
7-18-06-030.00;
- Petitioners' Exhibit 3: Photograph of the residence located on the property identified as tax map number
7-18-06-035.00;
- Petitioners' Exhibit 4: Page 2 of Assessor's Office Worksheet dated February 28, 2001, for the property
identified as tax map number 7-18-06-035.00;
- Petitioners' Exhibit 5: Page 1 of Assessor's Office Worksheet dated February 28, 2001, for the property
identified as tax map number 7-18-06-035.00;
- Petitioners' Exhibit 6: Page 1 of Assessor's Office Worksheet dated February 28, 2001, for the property
identified as tax map number 7-18-06-030.00;
- Petitioners' Exhibit 7: Enlarged photograph of Petitioners' property;
- Petitioners' Exhibit 8: Pages 1 and 2 of Assessor's Office Worksheet dated February 12, 2001, for
Petitioners' property;
- Petitioners' Exhibit 9: Enlarged photograph of the residence located on the property identified as tax map
number 4-09-00-012.02;
- Petitioners' Exhibit 10: Two enlarged photographs of the residence located on the property identified as
tax map number 4-09-00-012.02;
- Petitioners' Exhibit 11: Photograph of the residence located on the property identified as tax map number
4-41-00-050.00;
- Petitioners' Exhibit 12: Enlarged photograph of the residence located on the property identified as tax
map number 4-09-00-012.00;
- Petitioners' Exhibit 13: Photograph of the residence located on the property identified as tax map number
4-09-00-012.01;
- Petitioners' Exhibit 14: Two enlarged photographs of the residence located on the property identified as
tax map number 4-20-00-001.00;
- Petitioners' Exhibit 15: Photograph of the residence located on the property identified as tax map number
4-19-00-044.04; and
- Petitioners' Exhibit 16: Pages 1, 2, and 3 of Assessor's Office Worksheet dated February 12, 2001, for the
property identified as tax map number 4-19-00-045.00.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Having carefully considered the credibility of the testimony and accuracy of the evidence presented at the
hearing and taking into consideration the burden of persuasion by the parties, I make the following findings of
fact by a preponderance of the evidence:
- The Division has personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
- Notice of the date, time, place, and nature of the hearing was timely given to the parties.
- Petitioners' property consists of six and one-fourth acres ("lot") and a one-and-a-half story brick family
home ("residence"), known as 8780 Highway 221, Woodruff, Spartanburg County, South Carolina
(cumulatively referred to as the "subject property"). The subject property is located at the intersection of
Highway 221 and Waddell Road and is designated as tax map number 4-20-00-002.00. Petitioners live in
the subject property and make it their family home.
- During 1998, the Assessor engaged in a countywide reassessment program for all real properties in
Spartanburg County. The reappraisal program was approved by the South Carolina Department of
Revenue ("Department") on January 27, 1998.
- As a result of the reassessment, the Assessor notified Petitioners that the value of the subject property had
increased from $98,377 to $145,980. Petitioners filed an appeal of the valuation with the Assessor's
Office.
- On September 23, 1998, Sara H. Hamilton, an appraiser with the Spartanburg County Assessor's Office,
prepared a written appraisal of the subject property, using both the cost approach and the sales comparison
analysis. Her analysis and all information she used in arriving at the valuation were written on the
Uniform Residential Appraisal Report dated September 23, 1998.
- Based on the cost approach and using the Marshall and Swift Residential Cost Handbook as a guide, Ms.
Hamilton determined the value of the subject property was $173,100.
- When conducting the sales comparison analysis, Ms. Hamilton used three comparables. The following
table reflects her evaluation and the results of her study:
|
Subject Property |
Comparable 1 |
Comparable 2 |
Comparable 3 |
Address: |
8780 Hwy. 221 |
148 Oakwood Dr.
(0.5 miles east of SP) |
309 Country Estates
(1.5 miles east of SP) |
252 Hoylanda Rd.
(1 mile north of SP) |
Sales Price: |
N/A |
$129,000 |
$179,900 |
$182,000 |
Price Per Square
Foot of Living Area: |
N/A |
$61.28 |
$56.27 |
$77.45 |
Sales Date: |
N/A |
11/25/1997 |
4/2/1997 |
8/29/1997 |
Location: |
Rural |
Suburban |
Suburban |
Rural |
Site: |
6.25 acres |
Typical Residential
Lot |
3.92 acres |
River Front |
Design: |
Cape Cod |
Two-story Traditional |
Ranch |
Two-story Traditional |
Quality of
Construction: |
Brick/Average |
Vinyl/Average |
Brick/Average |
Wood/Average |
Age: |
12 years |
8 years |
22 years |
19 years |
Total Rooms/
Bedrooms/
Bathrooms: |
7/3/3 |
7/3/2 |
9/4/3 |
10/4/3 |
Gross Living Area: |
2,526 sq. ft. |
2,105 sq. ft. |
3,197 sq. ft. |
2,350 sq. ft. |
Basement & Finished
Rooms below grade: |
1,395 sq. ft.
Unfinished |
Crawlspace Only |
Crawlspace Only |
750 sq. ft.
Finished |
Functional Utility: |
Average |
Average |
Average |
Average |
Heating/Cooling: |
Elec FWA/CAC |
Elec FWA/CAC |
Elec FWA/CAC |
Elec FWA/CAC |
Energy Efficient
Items: |
Storm W/D |
Thermal W/D |
Thermal W/D |
Thermal W/D |
Garage/Carport: |
Two Car Garage
Attached |
Two Car Garage
Attached |
Two Car Garage
Attached |
Two Car Garage
Built-In |
Porches: |
Two Covered |
One Covered |
One Covered |
One Covered, One
Screened |
Patio/decks: |
None |
Deck |
Patio |
Deck |
Fireplace: |
One |
One |
One |
One |
Workshop: |
No |
No |
Yes |
No |
Adjusted Sales Price
of Comparables: |
N/A |
$165,530 |
$169,220 |
$177,380 |
- Ms. Hamilton ultimately determined that, based on the sales comparison analysis, the market value of
Petitioners' property was $170,000 as of September 23, 1998.
- Regarding Comparable 1, Ms. Hamilton applied plus adjustments of $6,450 for quality of construction,
$1,500 for room count, $12,630 for square footage, $13,950 for crawlspace, and $2,000 for only having
one covered porch, equating to an increase of $36,530. After the adjustment, the value of Comparable 1
was increased to $165,530.
- Regarding Comparable 2, Ms. Hamilton applied minus adjustments of $20,130 for square footage and
$7,000 for the workshop and plus adjustments of $13,950 for crawlspace and $2,500 for only having one
covered porch, equating to a decrease of $10,680. After the adjustment, the value of Comparable 2
decreased to $169,220.
- Regarding Comparable 3, Ms. Hamilton applied minus adjustments of $15,000 for being a river front lot
and $5,000 for having a screened porch and plus adjustments of $9,100 for quality of construction, $5,280
for square footage, and $1,000 for having a built-in garage, equating to a decrease of $4,620. After the
adjustment, the value of Comparable 3 decreased to $177,380.
- According to the Uniform Residential Appraisal Report, the adjusted sales prices of the three comparables
ranged from 83% to 95% of their respective sales prices in 1997. The Assessor, therefore, applied the
lowest percentage to the market value of the subject property to determine its assessment value, i.e., 83%
of $170,000 is approximately $141,880. The Assessor then issued a final assessment of the subject
property in the amount of $141,880, calculated as follows:
- Land on which the residence is located at $5,000;
- Residence/Improvements on the subject property at $126,380; and
- Remaining land utilized for agricultural purposes at $10,500.
- Petitioners argued the value of the subject property was $147,250, calculated as follows:
- Land on which the residence is located at $5,000;
- Residence/Improvements on the subject property at $116,000; and
- Remaining land utilized for agricultural purposes at $26,250.
- Petitioners appealed the final assessment to the Spartanburg County Board of Assessment Appeals. The
Board held a hearing on November 17, 1998, and issued its written decision on November 24, 1998. The
Board affirmed the Assessor's valuation of the subject property in the amount of $141,880.
- Petitioners appealed the Board's decision by filing a request for a contested case hearing with the
Division. Judge Ralph K. Anderson, III conducted a hearing and issued an order dated August 5, 1999,
wherein he determined that the 1998 tax assessment of the subject property in fact was $141,880.
- Petitioners appealed Judge Anderson's order to the Spartanburg County Circuit Court, docket number 99-CP-42-2686. The circuit court affirmed Judge Anderson's order and denied a motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial.
- Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2510(A)(4), on February 29, 2000, Petitioners filed a written notice
of objection to the tax year 2000 assessment of the subject property, alleging the property was appraised
at more than its fair market value and was not equitably appraised as compared with similar properties.
Petitioners again asserted the residence should be valued at $116,000 and the land should be valued at
$31,250.
- On April 24, 2000, Petitioners met with an appraiser from the Assessor's Office. Petitioners asserted their
home should be valued at $10,000 less than the appraised value because it needs an exterior paint job and
a new roof.
- On April 28, 2000, the appraiser conducted a field review of the subject property. The appraiser
determined that no change needed to be made to the assessment of the subject property because the subject
property "is appraised well below fair market value."
- On May 5, 2000, the Assessor issued a written decision (2) indicating there had been no change in the
assessment value of the subject property. The Assessor again issued a final assessment of the subject
property in the amount of $141,880, calculated as follows:
- Land on which the residence is located at $5,000;
- Residence/Improvements on the subject property at $126,380; and
- Remaining land utilized for agricultural purposes at $10,500.
- On June 5, 2000, Petitioners submitted to the Assessor a written notice of intent to appeal the final
assessment of the subject property for the tax year 2000.
- On June 28, 2000, the Assessor's Office mailed three copies of the "Application for Appeal to the
Spartanburg County Board of Assessment Appeals" and a copy of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2530 to
Petitioners.
- On July 10, 2000, Petitioners filed the Application for Appeal with the Assessor's Office. (3)
- On September 1, 2000, the Board notified Petitioners that a hearing would be held on October 3, 2000.
- The Board conducted a hearing on October 3, 2000. Petitioners were present as well as representatives of
the Assessor's Office. (4)
- On October 5, 2000, the Board issued its written decision signed by Chairman B. Rodgers Berry. The
Board's decision provided Chairman Berry, Vice Chairman Glenn L. Gowan, Charles B. Stewart, H.
Cullen Reed, Bruce Johnson, Gene Collins, and Anthony J. Regan were present at the hearing. The
decision also provided, "[a]fter consideration of the testimony and exhibits submitted, the motion was
made by Mr. Collins and seconded by Mr. Reed that to uphold the Assessor. The vote was unanimous."
- On October 30, 2000, Petitioners filed a request for a contested case hearing with the Division. In
appealing the Board's final decision, Petitioners alleged:
- Petitioners have not been treated fairly and equitably and property throughout the county is
not being assessed uniformly as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-210;
- The Board did not explain the basis for its decision as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2530(J)(3)(a); (5) and
- Charles B. Stewart was not present during the hearing before the Board, as stated in the
decision of October 5, 2000.
- Petitioners allege that various other property owners should have their properties assessed higher due to
errors on the part of the Assessor or that Petitioners should have the appraised value on their property
reduced.
- According to the document entitled "2000 Tax Year Estimated Property Tax," Petitioners were given a
$50,000 reduction on the value of the residence and residential lot as a homestead exemption. The total
tax value based on the Assessor's appraisal is $81,810 while the total tax value based on Petitioners'
requested value is $71,430. After applying the 4% assessment, the total assessed value based on the
Assessor's appraisal is $3,280 and the total assessed value based on Petitioners' requested value is $2,860.
After applying the millage rate of 0.2396, the total tax amount based on the Assessor's appraisal is
$785.88 and the total tax amount based on Petitioners' requested value is $685.25. After subtracting an
amount for education tax relief and adding the land fill amount, the estimated tax bill based on the
Assessor's appraisal is $469.40 and the estimated tax bill based on Petitioners' requested value is $415.60.
The difference between the estimated tax bills is $53.80, which is the amount in controversy in this case.
- A hearing was held on March 22, 2001.
- Sarah Hamilton, an appraiser with the Spartanburg County Assessor's Office since 1996, prepared a
written Uniform Residential Appraisal Report regarding the subject property on September 23, 1998. See
Findings of Fact 6 through 10. Ms. Hamilton testified at the hearing that she revisited the subject property
prior to the hearing on October 3, 2000, and determined there was no need to change the assessment.
- With regard to the argument that residential properties in Spartanburg County were intentionally and
systematically undervalued and Petitioners were being discriminated against, Petitioners made the
following contentions:
- Regarding Document 1 (tax map number 7-18-06-030.00), Petitioners argue this property should
be appraised as a two-story house;
- Regarding Document 2 (tax map number 7-18-06-035.00), Petitioners question whether this is a
two-story house and whether it is listed as a brick house on the tax rolls;
- Document 3 refers to the subject property;
- Regarding Document 4 (tax map number 4-09-00-012.02), Petitioners argue a basement should
also be assessed;
- Regarding Document 5 (tax map number 4-09-00-012.00), Petitioners argue the valuation is too
low because the one acre on which the house is situated is valued at $3,500;
- Regarding Document 6 (tax map number 4-41-00-050.00), Petitioners question the Assessor's
stated square footage of the house and the value of $4,000 allocated to the one acre on which the
house is situated;
- Regarding Document 7 (tax map number 4-09-00-012.01), Petitioners question whether the
Assessor placed a value on the basement, whether there were two houses on the property. Also, the
land is valued at $3,000 per acre and there is no break-out for the acreage on which the house is
located;
- Regarding Document 8 (tax map number 4-20-00-001.00), Petitioners question the value on the
land, which is $5,000 per acre, and whether all buildings on the property were assessed;
- Regarding Document 9 (tax map number 4-14-00-022.00), Petitioners question why the small
portion of the property encumbered with a communications tower is taxed at the agricultural value;
- Regarding Document 10 (tax map number 4-14-00-020.01), Petitioners question the value on the
land, which is $6,000 for one acre, and whether the property is assessed as containing a brick house;
- Regarding Document 11 (tax map number 5-17-10-005.00), Petitioners question the value on the
land, which is $8,000 for one acre, and whether the house is properly appraised;
- Regarding Document 12 (tax map number 5-17-10-001.00), Petitioners question why the raw tract
containing 0.79 acres is valued at $45,000 as compared to Document 11 where the land is valued at
$8,000;
- Regarding Document 13 (tax map number 5-17-14-031.01), Petitioners question why a raw tract is
valued at $42,000 as compared to Document 11 where a similar lot with a house on it is valued at
$8,000;
- Regarding Document 14 (tax map number 4-20-00-030.00), Petitioners challenge the value of
$15,000 placed on the approximate one acre of land, the allocation of square footage to each floor,
and the allocation of a different tax rate to each floor;
- Regarding Document 15 (tax map number 4-20-00-031.00), Petitioners argue that neither the porch
nor the garage are taxed;
- Regarding Document 16 (tax map number 4-19-00-039.06), Petitioners argue that the addition to
the house is not taxed;
- Regarding Document 17 (tax map number 4-19-00-039.07), Petitioners challenge the value
allocated to the house and the value of $4,000 placed on the one acre on which the house is situated;
- Regarding Document 18 (tax map number 4-19-00-044.04), Petitioners argue the house contains
two apartments and is not properly classified as such;
- Regarding Document 19 (tax map number 4-19-00-045.00), Petitioners question the agricultural
valuation placed on the fifty-three-acre tract;
- Regarding Document 20 (tax map number 4-14-00-024.02), Petitioners question why the entire
14.83 acre tract was not assessed at the 4% agricultural rate;
- Regarding Document 21 (tax map number 2-52-02-028.00), Petitioners question whether the
Assessor taxed the bath house and the shop;
- Regarding Document 22 (tax map number 4-20-00-175.00), Petitioners question why this house,
which has more square footage than their home, is valued less;
- Regarding Document 23 (tax map number 3-33-03-039.01), Petitioners question why the one acre
upon which the house is situated is only valued at $2,500 rather than $4,000 or $5,000 as other lots
in the general vicinity;
- Regarding Document 24 (tax map number 3-21-00-043.01), Petitioners question the value of
$2,520 allocated to 1.2 acres of land;
- Regarding Document 25 (tax map number 4-33-01-022.00), Petitioners question the square footage
of the finished area and the allocation of $16,000 to the lot;
- Regarding Document 26 (tax map number 4-26-00-136.00), Petitioners question why the owners
were given a refund;
- Regarding Document 27 (tax map number 4-26-00-134.00), Petitioners again question why a
refund has been authorized for this property.
- The Assessor responded to each of the inquiries by Petitioners, stating that some properties had additions
added since the reassessment in 1998 and such would be picked up later, that lesser rates are added for
upstairs areas, and that basements are sometimes not included since the Assessor does not have the legal
authority to go into the houses for assessment purposes. Further, the Assessor answered that some of the
houses are modular homes and therefore their value may be lessened. The Assessor also testified that all
of these valuations were made in 1998 and many have changed since then. Some valuations are higher on
lots because of their size and their location. During the reassessment in the next several years the
valuations will be changed. As to the queries on a storage building and pool house, those had already been
picked up the Assessor's office.
- The Assessor made it clear at the hearing that it is the intent of his office to review each of these queries,
to ensure that any additions or improvements would be included in the valuation in future years, and to try
to have equitable valuations on farmland. However, some land is valued more because it has other
potential values. I realize the effort by the Assessor to respond forthright at the hearing and to answer as
truthfully as possible to each query addressed to him by Petitioners. I believe the Assessor explained any
potential inconsistencies between valuations and he is aware of the need to appraise and assess comparable
properties fairly and equitably. In a county as large as Spartanburg County, there will be errors and
oversights which need to be corrected and I feel that the Assessor is making an excellent effort to address
such routinely.
- Petitioners' property is located approximately four miles east of the central business district of the town of
Woodruff in Spartanburg County, South Carolina. The homes in the general area are of brick, wood
frame, or vinyl exteriors. They are not homogeneous in design or quality of construction.
- The area is convenient to schools, shopping, and other conveniences in the town of Woodruff and is
approximately 15 minutes from the downtown area of the city of Spartanburg.
- I find the appraisal was performed in a proper manner and is an accurate reflection of the value of
Petitioners' house and land. The comparables were reliable and convincing comparables since all the
properties were located in the general rural area of the subject property and were sufficiently similar in
construction to allow the comparison for adjustments and for assessment purposes.
- I also find the sales comparison analysis is the most reliable indicator of value for residential properties in
the general area of Petitioners' property.
- Although I agree the 5.25 acres of farmland could have been allocated a higher value based upon other
farmland being valued in the $4000 to $5,000 range, it is of little consequence. The Assessor has already
reduced the valuation determined by Ms. Hamilton in the Uniform Residential Appraisal Report which
utilized the sales comparison analysis, reducing the value from $170,000 to $141,880.
- I further find the process utilized by the Assessor was fair, equitable, and a studied valuation of
Petitioners' property. The appeal completely lacks merit and is a waste of the resources of the Assessor's
office in preparing for the appeal. Although I am not willing to assess any penalties for what amounts to a
waste of judicial resources, I am concerned with appeals which involve such minuscule differences in
valuation and the costs which the county and state incur in hearing and resolving them.
- I find the Assessor's valuation of the subject property in the amount of $141,880, as affirmed by the
Board, should be affirmed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, I conclude, as a matter of law, the following:
- S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2540 (2000) authorizes the Division to hear this contested case pursuant to
Chapter 23 of Title 1 of the 1976 Code of Laws, as amended. The taxable status of real property for a
given year is to be determined as of December 31 of the preceding tax year. S.C. Code Ann. §12-37-900
(2000); Atkinson Dredging Co. v. Thomas, 266 S.C. 361, 223 S.E.2d 592 (1976).
- In S.C. Code Ann. § 12-37-930 (Supp. 2000) the Legislature set forth how real property must be valued:
All property must be valued for taxation at its true value in money which in all cases is the price which the
property would bring following reasonable exposure to the market, where both the seller and the buyer are
willing, are not acting under compulsion, and are reasonably well informed of the uses and purposes for
which it is adapted and for which it is capable of being used.
Fair market value, therefore, is the measure of true value for taxation purposes. Lindsey v. S.C. Tax
Comm'n, 302 S.C. 504, 397 S.E.2d 95 (1990). There is no valid distinction between market value for sales
purposes and market value for taxation purposes under S.C. Code Ann. § 12-37-930. S.C. Tax Comm'n v.
S.C. Tax Board of Review, 287 S.C. 415, 339 S.E.2d 131 (Ct. App. 1985).
- An Assessor's valuation is presumed correct with the burden being on the property owner to disprove the
Assessor's valuation. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 410 (1954). While the taxpayer ordinarily would meet this
burden by proving the actual value of the property, the taxpayer may show by other evidence that the
valuation is incorrect. If the taxpayer proves the valuation is incorrect, the presumption of correctness is
revoked and the taxpayer is entitled to appropriate relief. Cloyd v. Mabry, 295 S.C. 86, 367 S.E.2d 171
(Ct. App. 1988).
- Our state supreme court has held that "a taxing statute must be construed most favorably to the taxpayer,
and that any doubt should be resolved against the taxing authority." Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. S.C. Tax
Comm'n, 248 S.C. 148, 152, 149 S.E.2d 435, 437 (1966).
- While not conclusive, market sales of comparable properties present probative evidence of the fair market
value of similar property. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 451 (1954); Cloyd v. Mabry, 295 S.C. 86, 367 S.E.2d 172
(Ct. App. 1988).
- In estimating the value of property, all of its elements or incidents which affect market value or would
influence the mind of a purchaser should be considered, such as location, quality, condition, and use.
1969-70 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., No. 3045 at 337; see also 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 410 at 784; § 411 at 794
(1954).
- Complete equity and uniformity are not practically attainable when valuing property. Wasson v. Mayes,
252 S.C. 497, 167 S.E.2d 304 (1967). What is proscribed, however, is the intentional and systematic
undervaluation of certain properties while other properties in the same class are valued at fair market
value. Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Township, 247 U.S. 350 (1918).
- The burden of proving an intentional and systematic undervaluation rests with the complaining party.
Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Township, 247 U.S. 350 (1918). This burden is not met by a mere
showing that some properties are undervalued. See Owen Steel Co., Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 287 S.C.
274, 337 S.E.2d 880 (1985). Whether some properties in the general vicinity are undervalued or
overvalued does not prove that the valuation placed on the complaining party's property lacks merit and is
not a reasonable valuable. The complaining party instead must demonstrate that the Assessor deliberately
established a countywide procedure whereby all property values were intentionally and systematically
undervalued based upon their most recent purchase price. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County
Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989). What is required in equitably valuing property "is the seasonable
attainment of a rough equality in tax treatment of similarly situated property owners." Allegheny, 488
U.S. at 343.
- Unlike Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, there has been no showing in the instant case that the Assessor has
intentionally and systematically undervalued property in Spartanburg County. Petitioners failed to show
that their property has not been equitably valued. The value placed thereon by the Assessor is fair and
equitable based on the valuations of improvements, lots, and farmland in the general vicinity.
- I conclude that the subject property has a market value of at least $141,880, which is the value used for
assessment purposes for the tax year 2000.
- Any issues raised in the proceedings or hearing of this case but not addressed in this order are deemed
denied. ALJD Rule 29(B).
ORDER
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Spartanburg County Assessor must value Petitioners' property,
identified as 8780 Highway 221, Woodruff, Spartanburg County, South Carolina, tax map number 4-20-00-002.00, at $141,880.00 for the tax year 2000.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
MARVIN F. KITTRELL
Chief Administrative Law Judge
August 15, 2001
Columbia, South Carolina
1. Petitioners took several documents to the hearing before the Board. Petitioners, however, never offered the
documents into evidence. Petitioners' documents instead were left in the hearing room and were forwarded by the
Board to the Division on December 11, 2000. Petitioners asked me to consider these documents in making my
decision. When a party to the case seeks to introduce evidence not considered by the Board in making their decision,
the case should be remanded to the Board for reconsideration "unless the representative of the county at the hearing
elects to forego the remand." S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2540(B) (2000). In this case, the Assessor agreed at the
beginning of the hearing to forego a remand to the Board. I, therefore, will consider this evidence here.
2. The written decision of the Assessor satisfies the statutory requirements for the Assessor's written response to
Petitioners' written protest. See S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2520(C) (2000). In this case, however, Petitioners did not
file a written protest. According to § 12-60-2520(B), the Assessor should have told Petitioners at the conference about
the decision not to change the assessment, informed Petitioners of the right to protest, and provided Petitioners the
form on which to file the protest. Because the Assessor failed to do this and Petitioners failed to file a protest, the
question is raised regarding whether Petitioners exhausted their administrative remedies. Although § 12-60-2540(B)
requires the case to be dismissed without prejudice for failure to file a protest, I find that it would be futile to remand
this case for such failure. See Ward v. State, 343 S.C. 14, 538 S.E.2d 245 (2000) (when the statutorily-mandated
exhaustion of remedies would be futile, legislative intent will not require the futile exhaustion).
3. According to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2530(B) (2000), "[a]n appeal to the board begins by giving written notice of
intent to appeal to the assessor." Based on this language, it appears Petitioners satisfied this obligation on June 5,
2000. The request for an appeal filed on July 10, 2000, was redundant to the extent that Petitioners already had
requested an appeal before the Board. This is important because the Board must conduct a conference on the appeal
"within thirty days after the date of receiving a notice of appeal, or as soon thereafter as practical." S.C. Code Ann. §
12-60-2530(C).
4. After reviewing the tapes of the hearing held by the Board, I find the Board treated Petitioners with respect and
conducted a fair and proper hearing. Several times during the hearing, the Board members asked Petitioners to explain
why the subject property should be assessed at a value different from the Assessor's value. I find Petitioners were
provided due process.
5. According to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2530(J)(3) (2000), the written decision of the Board must explain the basis
for the decision, state the decision must be certified to the county auditor for entry upon the property tax assessment
rolls or tax duplicate if not appealed, and inform the parties of their right to request a contested case hearing before the
Division. The Board failed to explain the basis for its decision and failed to require the decision to be certified to the
county auditor. I conclude, however, that remanding this case to the Board for an explanation of its decision would
most likely waste time and would be an inefficient utilization of judicial resources. See Ward v. State, 343 S.C. 14,
538 S.E.2d 245 (2000) (when the statutorily-mandated exhaustion of remedies would be futile, legislative intent will
not require the futile exhaustion). I have sufficient testimony and evidence to rule on the issue of the proper
assessment of the subject property.
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