ORDERS:
ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter came before me pursuant to a citation issued by the Department of Revenue
("Department") against Respondent Gateway Enterprises, Inc. for violating S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996), by allowing the use of more than five Class III licenses acquired pursuant to
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2720(A)(3) (Supp. 1996) for machines in a "single place or premises," as
defined in 27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996). After notice to the parties, a hearing was
conducted on August 1, 1997.
Any issues raised or presented in the proceedings or hearing of this case not specifically
addressed in this Order are deemed denied. ALJD Rule 29(B).
FINDINGS OF FACT
I make the following findings of fact, taking into consideration the burden on the parties to
establish their respective cases by a preponderance of the evidence and taking into account the
credibility of the witnesses:
1. On August 29, 1996, Revenue Officer Robert C. Sanders and Lonnie Roberts of the
South Carolina Law Enforcement Division visited a location at 40B Palmetto Parkway, Hilton Head,
South Carolina known as Monte Carlo. The officers conducted an inspection, gathered information,
drew a diagram of the location, and took pictures.
2. The officers entered the location and found a mall-type setting with a common area
and four separate game rooms. A cashier station was located in the common area.
3. Two of the four game rooms were open at the time of inspection, with customers in
each open room playing games. Room 1, Gameroom II, contained five video poker machines
available for play. Room 2, Monte Carlo, contained four video poker machines available for play.
At the time of the inspection, signs were displayed on both room doors indicating the two rooms
were open for business.
4. Respondent Gateway Enterprises, Inc. is the operator and licensee of all the Class III
machines contained in Rooms 1 and 2. Gateway Enterprises, Inc., doing business as Gameroom II
and Monte Carlo is the retailer for the two game rooms.
5. The following Class III licenses were affixed to machines located in the two game
rooms:
Gameroom II Monte Carlo
3805618 3805612
3805617 3805611
3805619 3805613
3805620 3805614
3805610
6. There were no employees in either of the two open game rooms. Two employees
were behind the cashier station.
7. On August 29, 1996, Officer Sanders issued a citation to Respondent Gateway
Enterprises, Inc. for operating the location in violation of the single place or premises requirement
for having more than five video game machines in a single place or premises pursuant to § 12-21-2804(A). Petitioner seeks a $5,000 fine against Respondent Gateway Enterprises, Inc., revocation
of nine Class III machine licenses, and a six-month prohibition on the licensure and operation of
Class III machines at the subject location.
DISCUSSION
Respondent raises several issues relating to the citation: 1) the Department violated its own
longstanding position that it would not write additional violations for infractions of the law and
regulations governing video poker while there is a contested case pending on a previous violation;
2) the Department's interpretation of Regs. 117-190 on "single place or premises" leaves no room
for the trier of fact to determine whether there has been compliance with its provisions; and 3) there
is no statutory authority for the penalty sought by the Department.
A. Department's Policy
With regard to the issue of multiple violations at the same time, Respondent contends that
the Department issued four citations for the same location within a one-year period for violations of
the "single place or premises" requirement of 27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-190. The Respondent
submitted into evidence copies of three citations, dated January 29, 1996, June 13, 1996, and January
21, 1997. The fourth is the citation here at issue dated August 29, 1996. Three of the citations
specifically list Gateway as the taxpayer. The Respondent argues that the practice of issuing more
than one citation contravenes the Department's own policy. An affidavit dated November 22, 1994,
executed by counsel for the Department, states that "once an appeal is filed of a violation of the
Video Game Machines Act, the operator can continue to operate until the matter is heard by the
[Tax] Commission, and an order issued."
The Department stated in a letter to SLED dated May 4, 1997, that "[d]uring the early
implementation phases of the Video Game Machines Act, the Tax Commission permitted locations
to continue to operate while litigation was pending on the issue of whether the particular facts
presented in a specific case constituted a violation of the prohibition against more than five machines
in a single place or premises". Petitioner's Exhibit #8. The Department asserts that, since
Regulation 117-190 was enacted on June 23, 1995, its position has been to not allow locations to
continue to operate in violation while litigation is in process. The Department's former position was
taken due to the great confusion that existed prior to promulgation of the regulation defining the term
"single place or premises."
The Department takes the position that it is authorized to issue violations when facts are
reported that justify violations. The Department further asserts that there is no principle of law that
grants persons immunity for continuing conduct because an appeal of the same conduct is pending.
Respondent contends that issuing subsequent citations for the same violation is prohibited under the
principles set forth in the Midnight Pass and Milliken cases. In Milliken, the S.C. Supreme Court
held "that in the course of one investigation [the Department] cannot repeatedly intrude into the
affairs of the business or person being investigated." Milliken and Co. v. South Carolina Dep't of
Labor, 275 S.C. 264, 269 S.E.2d 763 (Ct. App. 1980) (emphasis added). The Court dealt with the
issue of post-citation investigation in which the investigation revealed additional facts to bolster the
original citation. The Milliken case does not speak to numerous citations for the same type of
violation based upon specific facts discovered at the time of each citation. Further, in South
Carolina Dep't of Revenue v. Midnight Pass, L.P., et al., 96-ALJ-17-0405-CC, (Filed February 7,
1997), the Administrative Law Judge did find that the Department's action conflicted with its own
policy by issuing subsequent citations once an appeal was filed. However, the citation at issue in
Midnight Pass was dated June 3, 1994, prior to enactment of Regulation 117-190. The Department
concedes that its policy prior to promulgation of Regulation 117-190 was not to issue citations for
subsequent violations until pending litigation on outstanding violations was resolved.
The Midnight Pass and Milliken cases offer no basis for finding the Department should not
continue to issue citations for violations of the Video Game Machines Act. The Department is
charged with the administration and enforcement of the Video Game Machines Act. Under this
authority, the Department is empowered to issue citations for conduct which violates the Act.
Notwithstanding a pending appeal, this authority is not limited to the issuance of only one citation
where a subsequent violation is found.
B. Validity of Regulation
The Respondent also alleges that Regulation 117-190 is void because it materially alters or
adds to the law, and secondly, that the Department's interpretation of Regulation 117-190 goes too
far. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2798 (Supp. 1996) gives the Department the authority to promulgate
rules and regulations pertaining to video game machines and persons licensed by the Department.
Pursuant to this statutory authority, the Department proposed Regs. 117-190 in order to clarify the
phrase "single place or premises" contained in S.C. Code Ann. §12-21-2804(A). "Administrative
agencies may be authorized 'to fill up the details' by prescribing rules and regulations for the
complete operation and enforcement of the law with its expressed general purpose." Young v. South
Carolina Dep' t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 287 S.C. 108, 336 S.E.2d 879, 882 (Ct. App. 1985).
However, a regulation may only implement the law; it may not alter or add to a statute. Society of
Professional Journalists v. Sexton, 283 S.C. 563, 324 S.E.2d 313 (1984). An administrative
regulation is valid so long as it is reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation.
Hunter & Walden Co. v. South Carolina State Licensing Bd. for Contractors, 272 S.C. 211, 251
S.E.2d 186 (1978); Young v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., supra. Further,
the South Carolina Court of Appeals, in Norton v. Opening Break, 313 S.C. 508, 443 S.E.2d 406
(1994), recited that "[r]egulations authorized by the Legislature have the force of law." The General
Assembly approved the regulations promulgated by the Department regarding "single place or
premises".
The purpose of the Video Game Machines Act is to prevent large-scale casino type gambling
operations in the State of South Carolina. See 1994 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 94-21 at 51; Reyelt v. South
Carolina Tax Comm'n, No. 6:93-1491-3 and 6:93-1493-3 (U.S. Dist. Ct., Greenville, S.C., Nov. 15,
1993). The requirements of Regs. 117-190, including the requirement that each business have an
employee on the premises at all times during business hours, do not constitute an impermissible
alteration or addition to Section 12-21-2804(A). Instead, the regulation merely clarifies the phrase
"single place or premises" in order to allow for uniform enforcement of the law. Furthermore, the
regulation is reasonably related to and is designed to further the purpose of the Video Game
Machines Act in that it creates an impediment to the establishment of large-scale gambling
operations. Accordingly, the Department acted within its authority when it promulgated Regs. 117-190.
Respondent's argument that the regulation creates a bright line test for what constitutes a
single place or premise which leaves no room for the trier of fact to make a determination is also
without merit. Respondent cites to Miller v. U.S., 294 U.S. 435, 55 S.Ct. 440 (1935). Regs. 117-190
sets forth four questions which must be answered affirmatively in order to comply with the
regulatory scheme. The Department makes its determination based upon its interpretation of the
regulation and its application to the facts as the Department sees them. In a contested case hearing,
the administrative law judge is the trier of fact who takes into consideration all of the facts presented
by the Department and the operator. The answer to each question set forth is the regulation must be
based upon the relevant facts presented. In Miller, the regulation at issue removed any fact finding
from the ultimate legal conclusion. In Miller, the regulation required a determination of total and
permanent disability for the loss of one hand and the sight of one eye. This ruling was conclusive
upon the evidence of the loss without any factual finding regarding the nature of the disability. Here,
facts must be presented on each question and the trier of fact must decide whether those facts fall
within the confines of the inquiry to render an affirmative or negative response. Clearly, the
regulation does not convert a "question of fact requiring proof into a conclusive presumption which
dispenses with proof and precludes dispute." 55 S.Ct. at 442.
C. Penalty
The Respondent also argues that there is no statutory authority for the penalty sought by the
Department. This argument is wholly without merit. The penalty sought by the Department for the
cited violations is outlined and clearly authorized pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A)
(Supp.1996), which states that the penalty for failure to comply with the limitation on the number
of machines permitted within a "single place or premises" is the mandatory revocation of the licenses
of machines located in the establishment. In addition, no license may be issued for a machine in an
establishment in which a license has been revoked for a period of six months from the date of
revocation. Gateway argues that Section 12-21-2804(A) is not a prohibition to operate video
machines at a location in which a license has been revoked, but rather a directive to the Department
not to issue licenses for machines at such a location. Class III licenses are not issued for video poker
machines at specified locations, but the licenses are affixed to the machines which are moveable and
useable at any location within the state not expressly prohibited by law. The clear import of Section
12-21-2804(A) is to revoke licenses for machines in establishments failing to comply with the single
place or premise provisions and to prohibit, for six months, the operation of video machines at any
establishment in which a license has been revoked.
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(F) (Supp. 1996) states that a person who violates Section 12-21-2804(A) may be fined up to five thousand dollars. As the finder of fact, it is the administrative
law judge's prerogative "to impose the appropriate penalty based on the facts presented." Walker
v. South Carolina ABC Comm'n, 305 S.C. 209, 407 S.E.2d 633, 634 (1991). In the present case, the
administrative law judge has the authority to establish the monetary fine within the allowable range
provided for by S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(F) (Supp. 1996). S.C. Code Ann. § 12-4-30(D)
(Supp. 1996).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the Findings of Fact, I conclude as a matter of law, the following:
1. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-4-30(D) (Supp. 1996) and S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-320 (Supp.1996), the Administrative Law Judge Division has jurisdiction to hear this matter.
2. Respondent Gateway Enterprises, Inc. is the licensee of the video game machines in
the two game rooms licensed under S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2720(A)(3) (Supp. 1996).
3. Respondent Gateway Enterprises, Inc. is the operator of the video game machines in
the two game rooms. Gameroom II and Monte Carlo are the retail licensees.
4. Petitioner alleges that on August 29, 1996, Respondent violated S.C. Code Ann. §
12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996) and 27 S.C. Code Regs. 117-190 (Supp. 1996) by operating more than
five Class III video game machines at a single place or premises.
5. Section 12-21-2804(A) prohibits a person from applying for, receiving, maintaining,
or permitting to be used permits for the operation of more than five Class III machines at a single
place or premises.
6. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2798 (Supp. 1996), the Department is authorized
to promulgate regulations to assist in the administration and enforcement of the Video Game
Machines Act.
7. Regulations authorized by the Legislature have the force of law. Norton v. Opening
Break, 313 S.C. 508, 443 S.E.2d 406 (1994).
8. 27 S.C. Code Regs. 117-190 was promulgated to clarify the meaning of the phrase
"single place or premises" as set forth in Section 12-21-2804(A). This regulation, effective June 23,
1995, provides in relevant part:
A "single place" or "premises" means a structure surrounded
by exterior walls or fire walls consistent with the requirements of the
applicable building code (or where no building code is applicable, a
one hour rated firewall), provided such exterior walls and fire walls
may not have any windows, doors or other openings leading to
another area where video game machines are located.
If a structure surrounded by exterior walls has two or more
areas where video game machines are located, each surrounded by
exterior walls or fire walls as defined and required above, the
Department must review all the facts and circumstances to determine
if each area in reality constitutes a single place or premise for video
game machines.
In determining whether each entity is in fact a single place or
premises, the Department of Revenue will consider the following
factors:
(1) Does each entity or business have a separate electric utility
meter?
(2) Does each entity or business have at least one separate
employee on the premises during business hours?
(3) Does each entity or business have a separate local business
license where required?
(4) Does each entity or business have a separate state sales tax
license?
A positive answer to these four questions is required for each
area to be considered a "single place or premise" for purposes of the
Video Game Machines Act.
27 S.C. Code Regs. 117-190 (1995) (emphasis added).
9. An administrative regulation is valid so long as it is reasonably related to the purpose
of the enabling legislation. Hunter & Walden Co. v. South Carolina State Licensing Bd. for
Contractors, 272 S.C. 211, 251 S.E.2d 186 (1978); Young v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways and
Pub. Transp., 287 S.C. 108, 336 S.E. 2d 313 (1984). However, a regulation may only implement
the law; it may not alter or add to a statute. Society of Professional Journalists v. Sexton, 283 S.C.
563, 324 S.E.2d 313 (1984).
10. It is well established that in interpreting a statute, the court's primary function is to
ascertain the intention of the legislature. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991);
First Sav. Bank, Inc. v. Gold Coast Ass'n., 301 S.C. 158, 390 S.E.2d 486 (Ct. App. 1990); State v.
Harris, 268 S.C. 117, 232 S.E.2d 231 (1977). In ascertaining the intent of the legislature, a court
should not focus on any single section or provision but should consider the language of the statute
as a whole. Creech v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 200 S.C. 127, 20 S.E.2d 645 (1942).
Furthermore, in construing statutes, the language used should be given its plain and ordinary
meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation.
Bryant v. City of Charleston, 295 S.C. 408, 368 S.E.2d 899 (1988); Home Health Serv. v. South
Carolina Tax Comm'n, 312 S.C. 324, 440 S.E.2d 375 (1994). Where terms of a statute are clear and
unambiguous, they must be applied according to their literal meaning. Medlock v. 1985 Ford F-150
Pick Up, 308 S.C. 68, 417 S.E.2d 85 (1992); Green v. Zimmerman, 269 S.C. 535, 238 S.E.2d 323
(1977).
11. With respect to the "employee" requirement, Regulation 117-190 requires that each
entity or business have at least one separate employee on the premises during business hours for a
business to comply with the "single place or premises" requirements of Section 12-21-2804(A). If
a game room containing operational Class III video game machines is accessible to customers and
no employee is present in that room, the room is being operated in violation of Section 12-21-2804(A). An employee working in a common area or anywhere else outside the game rooms is not
considered to be "on the premises" of the game room. See South Carolina Dep't of Revenue &
Taxation v. Mickey Stacks, 95-ALJ-17-0742-CC (March 8, 1996), aff'd Court of Common Pleas,
Richland County, Civil Action No. 96-CP-40-0889 (March 21, 1997).
12. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp. 1996) expressly authorizes the
"commission" [Department] to enforce the provisions of this section and also authorizes the
Department to revoke licenses utilized in a fashion that fails to comply with the provisions of this
section.
13. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) (Supp.1996), the penalty for exceeding
the maximum number of video gaming machines permitted in a single place or premises is
revocation of the licenses of the Class III machines located in the establishment. Additionally, no
machine license may be issued for, nor a machine be operated at, an establishment in which a license
has been revoked for a period of six months from the date of the revocation.
14. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(F) (Supp. 1996) provides that a person who violates
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(A) is subject to a fine of up to $5,000.
15. As the finder of fact, it is the administrative law judge's prerogative "to impose the
appropriate penalty based on the facts presented." Walker v. South Carolina ABC Comm'n, 305 S.C.
209, 407 S.E.2d 633, 634 (1991). In the present case, the administrative law judge has the authority
to establish the monetary fine within the allowable range provided for by S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2804(F) (Supp. 1996). S.C. Code Ann. § 12-4-30(D) (Supp. 1996).
16. Respondent's claims relative to multiple citations, validity of the regulation, the
Department's interpretation of the regulation, and the validity of the penalty statutes are without
merit. The language of Regulation 117-190 clearly defines a premises in terms of that area where
five Class III licenses are located. Regulation 117-190 clearly defines the criteria necessary to meet
the "single place or premises" requirement, including the separate employee criteria. Finally, S.C.
Code Ann. § 12-21-2804 clearly establishes the penalty to be imposed for violations. Those who
engage in a particular business bear the responsibility of familiarizing themselves with the applicable
statutes and regulations governing the industry. Cf. South Carolina Wildlife & Marine Resources
Dep't v. Kunkle, 287 S.C. 177 at 179, 336 S.E.2d 468 at 469 (1985) ("[I]t is a well-settled maxim
that ignorance of the law is no excuse.").
17. Respondent Gateway Enterprises, Inc., the licensee and operator of the two game
rooms, permitted the use of more than five Class III machines at a single place or premises.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ORDERED,
that the nine Class III licensed video game machine licenses are revoked. Respondent Gateway
Enterprises, Inc. is fined $5,000.00. Further, the Department may not issue licenses for and
Respondent shall not operate Class III machines at 40B Palmetto Parkway, Hilton Head, South
Carolina, for a period of six months from the date of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
___________________________
ALISON RENEE LEE
Administrative Law Judge
December 5, 1997
Columbia, South Carolina |