South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
Edgar A. Brown building 1205 Pendleton St., Suite 224 Columbia, SC 29201 Voice: (803) 734-0550

SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
SCDOR vs. Plez U Stores, Inc.

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Revenue

PARTIES:
Petitioners:
South Carolina Department of Revenue

Respondents:
Plez U Stores, Inc.
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
02-ALJ-17-0194-CC

APPEARANCES:
Carol I. McMahan, Esq.
For Petitioner

James H. Harrison, Esq.
For Respondent
 

ORDERS:

FINAL ORDER AND DECISION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter comes before this tribunal pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 61-2-260 (Supp. 2001) and S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-310 et seq. (1986 & Supp. 2001). The South Carolina Department of Revenue (Department) contends that Respondent Plez U Stores, Inc. (Plez U) knowingly allowed an underage individual to purchase beer from Respondent's licensed premises located at 1502 Blue Ridge Boulevard, Seneca, South Carolina, in violation of 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7-9(B) (Supp. 2001). For this third violation of Regulation 7-9(B) in as many years, the Department seeks to impose a 45-day suspension of Respondent's off-premises beer and wine permit for the location. In response, Plez U concedes that the alleged violation did occur, but further contends that the proposed penalty for the violation is excessive in light of its efforts to prevent such sales.

After timely notice to the parties, a hearing on the propriety of the Department's proposed penalty was held on September 10, 2002, at the Administrative Law Judge Division in Columbia, South Carolina. Based upon the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, I find that the appropriate penalty for Respondent's violation is a thirty-day suspension of Respondent's permit and the imposition of a $400 fine upon Respondent.



STIPULATED FACTS

Pursuant to ALJD Rule 25C, the parties stipulated to the following facts regarding this matter:

1. Plez U Stores, Inc. (Plez U) holds a beer and wine permit at the location 1502 Blue Ridge Boulevard, Seneca, South Carolina, authorizing it to sell beer and wine for off-premises consumption. It held this permit on January 28, 2002. The permit number is 32015829-PBG.

2. On January 28, 2002, at this Seneca location, Plez U's employee, Tonya Coleman, permitted the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division's youthful-looking underage cooperating individual (UCI), Chad May, to purchase a 24-ounce Icehouse beer.

3. Chad May's birth date is July 14, 1982. He was nineteen years of age on January 28, 2002.

4. Tonya Coleman did not request identification from Chad May prior to permitting him to purchase the beer.

5. Plez U has committed prior violations at this location within a three-year period. On August 10, 2001, Plez U permitted a person under twenty-one years of age to purchase beer at this Seneca location. The clerk did not request identification prior to permitting the purchase. Plez U paid a fine of $800.00 for this violation. On December 14, 2000, Plez U permitted the purchase of beer by a person under the age of twenty-one at the Seneca location. The clerk on duty did not request identification prior to permitting the purchase. Plez U paid a fine of $800.00 for this violation.

6. Plez U admits that it violated 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7-9(B) (Supp. 2001) on January 28, 2002, by knowingly permitting Chad May, nineteen years of age, to purchase beer on its licensed premises at 1502 Blue Ridge Boulevard, Seneca, South Carolina.

7. The South Carolina Department of Revenue (Department) issued its final department determination on April 19, 2002. Plez U timely appealed this determination on May 14, 2002. The Department timely transmitted the matter to the Administrative Law Judge Division on May 23, 2002.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Having carefully considered all testimony, exhibits, and arguments presented at the hearing of this matter, and taking into account the credibility and accuracy of the evidence, I make the following Findings of Fact by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. At the hearing of this matter, Irvin Cauthen, who owns Plez U with his wife, testified to Plez U's history of compliance with the alcoholic beverage control laws and to the emphasis Plez U places on preventing the sale of alcohol to minors.

2. Further, David Cauthen, the general manager of Plez U, and Jim Dooley, the Plez U supervisor responsible for the store at which the violation occurred, described Plez U's policies and procedures regarding the sale of alcohol, particularly those related to preventing the sale of alcoholic beverages to underage persons, and explained how those policies and procedures are implemented at Plez U's stores. Mr. Dooley also described the training given to Plez U employees concerning the prevention of the sale of alcohol to underage individuals and the steps taken at the store where the violation occurred to prevent the sale of alcohol to underage individuals.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based upon the foregoing Stipulated Facts and Findings of Fact, I conclude the following as a matter of law:

1. The Department is charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the laws and regulations governing alcoholic beverages, including beer and wine. S.C. Code Ann. § 61-2-20 (Supp. 2001).

2. Regulation 7-9(B) prohibits holders of beer and wine permits from selling beer or wine to persons under twenty-one years of age. The regulation provides that:

To permit or knowingly allow a person under twenty-one years of age to purchase or possess or consume beer or wine in or on a licensed establishment which holds a license or permit issued by the [Department] is prohibited and constitutes a violation against the license or permit. Such violation shall be sufficient cause to suspend or revoke the license or permit by the [Department].



23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7-9(B) (Supp. 2001). Respondent Plez U concedes and stipulates that it committed a violation of Regulation 7-9(B) as alleged by the Department.

3. The Department has jurisdiction to revoke or suspend permits authorizing the sale of beer and wine. S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-590 (Supp. 2001). Pursuant to such authority, the Department may suspend or revoke a beer and wine permit if the permittee has knowingly sold beer or wine to a person under twenty-one years of age. S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-580 (Supp. 2001); 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7-9(B) (Supp. 2001); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-270 (Supp. 2001) (authorizing the Department to "revoke the permit of a person failing to comply with any requirements" in Chapter 4 of Title 61). Further, the Department may exercise this authority to suspend or revoke a permit for a first violation of the prohibition against selling beer and wine to underage persons. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 61-4-270, 61-4-580, 61-4-590; 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7-9(B). In lieu of such suspension or revocation, the Department may also impose a monetary penalty upon a permittee for selling beer and wine to underage individuals. S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-250 (Supp. 2001). For retail beer and wine permittees, this monetary penalty must be no less than $25 and no greater than $1,000. Id.

4. S.C. Revenue Procedure 95-7 (1995) sets forth the Department's penalty guidelines for violations of the alcoholic beverage control laws. For retail beer and wine permits, Revenue Procedure 95-7 provides for a $400 fine for the first violation by a permittee, an $800 fine for the second violation, a 45-day suspension of the permit for the third violation, and revocation of the permit for the fourth violation. However, this document does not set binding norms for the Department, but rather only provides guidance to the Department in assessing penalties for violations of the alcoholic beverage control laws. See Revenue Procedure 95-7, at ¶ 4 ("These are guidelines only and this advisory opinion does not establish a binding norm."). As such, Revenue Procedure 95-7 is not law and thus is not binding upon this Division. Cf. Home Health Serv., Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 312 S.C. 324, 328, 440 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1994) (holding that "whether a particular agency proceeding announces a rule or a general policy statement depends upon whether the agency action establishes a binding norm") (citing Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 716 F.2d 1369 (11th Cir. 1983)).

5. The weight and credibility assigned to evidence presented at the hearing of a matter is within the province of the trier of fact. See S.C. Cable Television Ass'n v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 308 S.C. 216, 222, 417 S.E.2d 586, 589 (1992); see also Doe v. Doe, 324 S.C. 492, 502, 478 S.E.2d 854, 859 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a trial judge, when acting as finder of fact, "has the authority to determine the weight and credibility of the evidence before him"). Furthermore, a trial judge who observes a witness is in the best position to judge the witness's demeanor and veracity and to evaluate the credibility of his testimony. See, e.g., Woodall v. Woodall, 322 S.C. 7, 10, 471 S.E.2d 154, 157 (1996); Wallace v. Milliken & Co., 300 S.C. 553, 556, 389 S.E.2d 448, 450 (Ct. App. 1990).

6. The facts in this case warrant a lesser penalty than that sought to be imposed by the Department. It is a generally recognized principle of administrative law that the fact finder has the authority to determine an appropriate administrative penalty, within the statutory limits established by the legislature, after the parties have had an opportunity for a hearing on the issues. See, e.g., Walker v. S.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n, 305 S.C. 209, 407 S.E.2d 633 (1991). Further, in assessing a penalty, the finder of fact "should give effect to the major purpose of a civil penalty-deterrence." Midlands Utility, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 313 S.C. 210, 212, 437 S.E.2d 120, 121 (Ct. App. 1993).

7. Nevertheless, Respondent should be reminded that the purpose of the statutory prohibition against selling alcohol to underage individuals is to protect both the underage individuals and the public at large from the possible adverse consequences of such sales. The sale of alcohol to an underage individual is a serious offense and cannot be taken lightly. Further, a permit to sell beer and wine is neither a contract nor a property right. Rather, it is merely a permit to do what otherwise would be unlawful to do, and to be enjoyed only so long as the restrictions and conditions governing its continuance are complied with. Feldman v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 203 S.C. 49, 26 S.E.2d 22 (1943). Accordingly, there are legal consequences for noncompliance with the alcoholic beverage laws of this State. Consequently, Respondent should not expect such leniency for a subsequent violation of those laws at this location.

ORDER

Based upon the Stipulated Facts, Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law stated above,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Department shall suspend Respondent's beer and wine permit numbered 32015829-PBG for the premises located at 1502 Blue Ridge Boulevard, Seneca, South Carolina, for a period of thirty (30) days.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in addition to the suspension, Respondent be fined $400 for its violation of 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7-9(B) (Supp. 2001). Respondent shall remit $400 to the Department within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order to satisfy the fine.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.







______________________________

JOHN D. GEATHERS

Administrative Law Judge

Post Office Box 11667

Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1667



September 16, 2002

Columbia, South Carolina


Brown Bldg.

 

 

 

 

 

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