ORDERS:
RECONSIDERATION ORDER
I. Introduction
On September 22, 1997, Stanley Curenton (Curenton) filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Curenton
essentially asserts two reasons for seeking a reconsideration. First, he argues the order is factually
incorrect in that patrons of the former business will not be allowed to create problems for Curenton's
business since Curenton will have security both inside and out and will prohibit loitering. Second,
he argues eleven businesses within a half mile radius have beer, wine or liquor permits and licenses
and two other similar businesses within a fourth of a mile were recently granted permits for which
no protest was filed by the Chief of Police. Based on those locations being proper, Curenton asserts
a denial of his similar location is unfair treatment. After giving due consideration to Curenton's
arguments, no sufficient basis exists to grant the requested permit.
II. Additional Security
A history of police being summoned to a location on prior occasions, even for periods when the
location was licensed to another party, supports denying a permit. Schudel v. S.C. Alcoholic
Beverage Control Comm'n, 276 S.C. 138, 276 S.E.2d 308 (1981). The need for persistent police
intervention at a location presents a strain on law enforcement resources and warrants denying a
request for a permit. Fowler v. Lewis, 260 S.C. 54, 194 S.E.2d 191 (1973).
Here, the previous order found the location was improper due to law enforcement considerations.
The uncontradicted evidence establishes the proposed location is situated in a high crime area. The
undisputed testimony of the Chief of Police is that the proposed location had more calls for police
assistance from the City of Greenwood than any other location within the City's jurisdiction.
Curenton asserted at the hearing, and reasserts now, his intention to employ security both inside and
out as a means of reducing the need for police intervention. While I do not doubt Curenton's ability
to accomplish additional security, such additional security does not offset the unusually high crime
rate associated with this area and the history of this specific location. It is simply inappropriate to
add the on-premises consumption of beer and wine to an area noted for its high crime where the new
business seeks to essentially continue a former owner's business which itself had greatly exacerbated
the already high crime rate. The prior decision considered Curenton's expected security but properly
found the permit should not be granted.
III. Unequal Treatment
In a motion to reconsider a judgment, a party cannot present an issue for the first time when that
issue could have been raised prior to judgment but was not raised. Patterson v. Reid, S.C. 456 S.E.2d
436 (Ct. App. 1995); Anderson Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Hagen, 313 S.C. 497, 443 S.E.2d 399 (Ct.
App.1994). The argument now being made by Curenton is that the denial of his permit coupled with
the granting of others' permits violates his rights to equal protection under the law.
The equal protection argument now being raised is improperly presented since it is raised for the first
time in this motion. At the hearing, no argument presented evidence of the customer base of other
businesses, hours of operation of other businesses, or police intervention at those businesses. Such
information, and more, would be needed to establish a equal protection violation. Accordingly,
having failed to present the issue at the hearing, Curenton may not now present an equal protection
argument in a motion to reconsider.
Additionally, even, if the equal protection argument were properly raised, no violation occurs here.
A violation of equal protection requires that the subject under review be similarly situated with the
subjects with which the comparison is sought. Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council , 319 S.C. 348, 461
S.E.2d 388 (1995); Weaver v. S.C. Coastal Council, 309 S.C. 368, 423 S.E.2d 340 (1992). In this
matter, a major factor requiring denial of the permit is the prior history of the precise location
Curenton seeks to use for his business. Unlike other businesses in the area, the testimony identifies
Curenton's location as the single site having the highest demand on police resources in the city. That
feature alone demonstrates Curenton's location is not similarly situated with other businesses in the
area. Thus, no violation of equal protection is established.
IV. Conclusion
The motion for reconsideration is denied. The obvious, however, must be stated. While Curenton
has satisfied the personal requirements for a permit, he has simply chosen a location that is improper.
Nothing prohibits a new application for a different location where the new location does not present
the same problems as the current one. As to the current location under the current conditions of that
location, no permit can be granted.
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
This 30th day of September, 1997
Columbia, South Carolina |
