ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
I. Statement of the Case
For the tax year 2000, F. Abbot Brown (Brown) seeks a refund on the basis that the 4% assessment
ratio was available to him instead of the 6% ratio since the property in dispute constitutes his legal
residence. The request was denied due to the taxpayer not establishing a legal residence in South
Carolina for the 2000 tax year. The Charleston County Board of Assessment Appeals (Board) agreed
that the denial was proper. After considering the arguments and evidence, I find a remand to the
assessor is required.
II. Analysis
A hearing body always has the duty to determine whether it has jurisdiction of a matter. Bridges v.
Wyandotte Worsted Co., 243 S.C. 1, 132 S.E.2d 18 (1963). In general, subject matter jurisdiction
is met if the case is brought in the court having the authority and power to determine the type of
action at issue. See Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., 314 S.C. 235, 442 S.E.2d 598 (1994).
However, even where the hearing body has the general authority and power to hear the type of action
at issue, the General Assembly can choose to limit that authority by imposing specific requirements
needed to invoke the court's jurisdiction. See McDonald v. Womack, 293 S.C. 61, 358 S.E.2d 705
(1987) (motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), SCRCP
granted where statute required the disputed tax to be paid under protest before the court had the
authority to hear the matter). Thus, while the ALJD has general subject matter jurisdiction over
contested cases involving property tax (see §1-23-600 which places contested cases before the ALJD
and §12-60-20(4) which defines contested case to include challenges of decisions from county boards
of assessments), that jurisdiction is invoked only where the parties satisfy the statutory requirements
permitting the hearing of such cases. Here, two grounds exist casting substantial doubt on whether
the ALJD's jurisdiction can be invoked in the instant case.
First, the current action is a request for a refund since the taxpayer paid his property taxes for tax year
2000 at a 6% ratio and now seeks a refund based on his assertion that he is entitled to a 4% ratio for
that year. The right to recover improperly paid taxes is statutory in nature. C.W. Matthews
Contracting Co., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 267 S.C. 548, 230 S.E.2d 223 (1976).
Indeed, “[a] refund of taxes is solely a matter of governmental grace, . . . and any person seeking such
relief must bring himself clearly within the terms of the statute authorizing the same . . .” Asmer v.
Livingston, 225 S.C. 341, 82 S.E.2d 465 (1954). Thus, authority to dispose of the refund dispute
exists in the ALJD only if the requirements of the refund statute have been satisfied.
For refund claims involving a disputed legal residence, S.C. Code Ann § 12-43-220(3) requires the
claim to satisfy S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-2560. Section 12-60-2560 requires that the refund request
must be made within two years of the payment of the tax except that “county council, by ordinance,
may allow refunds for the county government portion of property taxes for such additional years as
it determines advisable.”
Here, the evidence leaves open the question of whether the specific time frames have been satisfied.
In particular the evidence does not show when the 2000 taxes were paid. Thus, no ability exists to
determine if the refund request was made within the allowable two year window. Further, the
evidence does not show whether any Charleston County ordinance allows a refund for “additional
years.” Without such information no assurance can be given that the ALJD has the authority to hear
the taxpayer’s request.
Second, under § 12-60-2560, the initial determination on the refund request must be made by the
assessor, auditor, and treasurer in a joint meeting. These three individuals decide whether to grant
or deny the refund. A right of review of their decision allows the matter to be brought before the
Charleston County Board of Assessment Appeals.
The evidence here strongly implies that the assessor was the lone official making the decision to deny
the refund. Thus, the authority of an ALJ to hear this disputed refund claim is far from established
since uncertainty exists on whether the taxing authority followed the required statutory route of
review prior to the matter reaching the ALJD.
III. Order
Accordingly, based upon the above, a remand to the assessor is required with the remand to comply
with the following provisions:
1 –The assessor shall treat the taxpayer’s letter to the assessor of January 14, 2002 and
received by the assessor on January 17, 2002 as the taxpayer’s request for a refund
of taxes paid for the 2000 tax year.
2 – The assessor and the taxpayer shall act on the refund request in the manner required
by S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-43-220(3) and 12-60-2560.
3 – While evidence may be submitted by either party on the timeliness of the refund claim,
no additional information shall be submitted as to domicile. Instead, reliance upon the
previously supplied evidence must suffice.
4 – If any party is aggrieved by the decision of the Charleston County Board of
Assessment Appeals, that party shall seek a contested case before the ALJD
consistent with the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. §12-60-2560.
Accordingly, this matter is ended. Future disputes, if any, involving these parties for the 2000 tax
year shall be pursued in the manner established above and as otherwise required by law.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: August 14, 2003
Columbia, South Carolina |
