South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
Edgar A. Brown building 1205 Pendleton St., Suite 224 Columbia, SC 29201 Voice: (803) 734-0550

SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
Belinda Lloyd, d/b/a Lloyd's Quick Stop vs. SCDOR

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Revenue

PARTIES:
Petitioners:
Belinda Lloyd, d/b/a Lloyd's Quick Stop

Respondents:
South Carolina Department of Revenue
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
95-ALJ-17-0145-CC

APPEARANCES:
James H. Harrison, Esquire
Attorney for the Petitioner

William Todd, Esquire
Attorney for Respondent
 

ORDERS:

ORDER AND DECISION

This matter comes before me pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 61-1-55 (Supp. 1994) and S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310, et seq. (Supp. 1994) for a hearing pursuant to the application of Belinda Lloyd for an off-premises beer and wine permit (AI 101021) for a convenience store located at 644 Rock Hill Highway, Lancaster, South Carolina.

After timely notice to the parties, a hearing was held at the Administrative Law Judge Division in Columbia, South Carolina. The off-premises beer and wine permit is hereby granted, with conditions and restrictions.

STIPULATIONS

1. The parties stipulate that the only statutory criterion for holding an off-premises beer and wine permit in dispute is the moral character of the applicant's spouse, the current manager of the convenience store.

2. If this tribunal determines that it will deny the permit due to the moral character of the applicant's spouse, the parties agree that as a condition to the issuance of the permit, Ronald A. Lloyd will not have any partnership or other ownership interest in Lloyd's Quick Stop or participate in the management or day to day operation of Lloyd's Quick Stop. The parties further agree that Ronald A. Lloyd will not serve as an employee or agent of the applicant in any capacity, paid or otherwise, as it relates to the permitted premises.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Having carefully considered all testimony, exhibits, and arguments presented at the hearing of this matter, and taking into account the credibility and accuracy of the evidence, I make the following Findings of Fact by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. The applicant seeks an off-premises beer and wine permit for a convenience store located at 644 Rock Hill Highway, Lancaster, South Carolina.

2. The South Carolina Department of Revenue and Taxation 's ("DOR") file was made a part of the record by reference with the consent of the parties.

3. The proposed location is leased to the applicant by Harold Crenshaw. 4. The applicant's spouse, Ronald A. Lloyd, is currently operating the leased premises as a convenience store which sells beer and wine under the previous owner's permit. The hours of operation are Monday through Sunday from 6:30 a.m. to 10:30 p.m.

5. The applicant's spouse, Ronald A. Lloyd, was convicted in 1990 for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 18 U.S.C. § 1951. These offenses involved extortion and acceptance of money by Ronald A. Lloyd while he was a Lieutenant at the Lancaster County Sheriff's Department. He used his office to inform video poker operators about investigations and furnish favorable treatment to certain persons. Ronald A. Lloyd was fined $5,000.00 and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of thirty-seven (37) months and three (3) years supervised probation. He was released from federal prison in April 1994 and from a half-way house in July 1994.

6. The applicant is of good moral character.

7. The applicant is at least 21 years of age, a U.S. citizen, a citizen of the State of South Carolina, and has maintained her principal residence in the state for at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of making application for an off-premises beer and wine permit.

8. There are no churches, schools, or playgrounds in close proximity to the proposed location.

9. Notice of the application appeared in The Lancaster News, a newspaper of general circulation in the area of the proposed location, for three (3) consecutive weeks and notice was posted at the proposed location for fifteen (15) days.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, I conclude, as a matter of law, the following: 1. S.C. Code Ann. § 61-1-55 (Supp. 1994) authorizes the South Carolina Administrative Law Judge Division to hear this case pursuant to Chapter 23 of Title I of the 1976 Code, as amended.

2. S.C. Code Ann. § 61-9-320 (Supp. 1994) establishes the criteria for the issuance of a beer and wine permit.

3. S.C. Code Ann. § 61-9-320(1) (Supp. 1994) provides that in order to obtain and maintain a beer and wine permit, the holder must be of good moral character. This section provides that no permit authorizing the sale of beer or wine may be issued unless: the applicant, any partner or co-shareholder of the applicant, and each agent, employee, or servant of the applicant to be employed on the licensed premises, are of good moral character.

4. In South Carolina, there is no single criterion by which to determine whether or not one is possessed of good moral character. 1969 Op. S.C. Att'y. Gen. No. 2709 at 159. Generally, good moral character means that one should possess all elements essential to make up that character, such as honesty and veracity . Id.; See also Zemour, Inc. v. State Division of Beverage, 347 So.2d 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Broers v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 773 P.2d 320 (Mont. 1989).

5. Moral turpitude is "an act of baseness, evilness, or depravity in the private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man or society in general, contrary to the customary and accepted rule of right and duty between man and man." State v. Perry, 294 S.C. 311, 364 S.E.2d 201 (1988). Acts of moral turpitude are antithetical to what is considered good moral character. 1989 OP. S.C. Att'y Gen. No. 89-89. Moreover, acts of moral turpitude imply the absence of good moral character. Id.

6. The law is silent on whether a criminal act violative of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 18 U.S.C. § 1951 which involve "conspiracy to obstruct by exhortation, aiding, and abetting" is a crime of moral turpitude. Nonetheless, given the definition of "moral turpitude" set forth in Perry, the crime for which Ronald A. Lloyd was convicted while a Lieutenant at the Lancaster County Sheriff's Department equates to an act of depravity in the social duties which man owes to his fellow man or society in general. Even if the crime for which Ronald A. Lloyd was convicted is not a crime of moral turpitude, it involved "conspiracy to obstruct by exhortation, aiding, and abetting" and is indicative of a person deficient in honesty and veracity, thus dispossessed of good moral character.

7. It is a generally recognized principle that an alcoholic beverage permit or license may be refused a person who has been previously convicted of a crime. Wall v. South Carolina ABC Comm'n., 269 S.C. 13, 235 S.E.2d 806 (1977).

8. Because of Ronald A. Lloyd's conviction for the above stated crime, he does not meet the good moral character requirement of S.C. Code Ann. § 61-9-320(1) (Supp. 1994).

9. The applicant satisfies the statutory requirements for the issuance of an off-premises beer and wine permit with various restrictions, and stipulations as set forth herein, and accordingly, the proposed location is a proper one for granting an off-premises beer and wine permit.

10. Beer and wine permits are neither contracts nor property rights, but are mere permits issued or granted in the exercise of the State's police power, and are to be enjoyed only so long as the restrictions and conditions governing their continuance are complied with. Feldman v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 203 S.C. 49, 26 S.E.2d 22 (1943).

11. 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7-88 (1976), authorizing the imposition of restrictions to permits, provides:

Any stipulation and/or agreement which is voluntarily entered

into by an applicant in writing for a beer and wine permit between

the applicant and the South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control

Commission, if accepted by the Commission, will be incorporated

into the basic requirements for the enjoyment and privilege of

obtaining and retaining the beer and wine permit and which shall

have the same effect as any and all laws and any and all other

regulations pertaining to the effective administration of beer and

wine permittee.

In the event that evidence is presented to this Commission that

any part of the stipulation or agreement is or has been knowingly

broken by the permittee will be a violation against the permit and

shall constitute sufficient grounds to suspend or revoke said beer

and wine permit.

ORDER

Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby:

ORDERED that the off-premises beer and wine permit at 644 Rock Hill Highway, Lancaster, South Carolina, is granted upon the applicant signing a written agreement to be filed with DOR to adhere to the stipulations previously set forth herein and the following restrictions:

1. Ronald A. Lloyd may not have any partnership or other ownership interest in Lloyd's Quick Stop or participate in the management or day to day operation of Lloyd's Quick Stop. Further, he may not serve as an employee or agent of the applicant in any capacity, paid or otherwise, as it relates to the permitted premises.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a violation of any of the above stated stipulations or restrictions is considered a violation against the permit and license and may result in a fine, suspension, or revocation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Department of Revenue and Taxation issue an off-premises beer and wine permit upon the payment of the required fee(s) and cost(s) by the applicant.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________________

JOHN D. GEATHERS

Administrative Law Judge

Edgar A. Brown Building

1205 Pendleton Street

Columbia, South Carolina 29201



May 30, 1995


Brown Bldg.

 

 

 

 

 

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