ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant
to the appeal of Bryson Smith, an inmate incarcerated with the Department of Corrections
(Department). Smith was convicted of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.10, Use or
Possession of Narcotics, Marijuana or Unauthorized Prescription Drugs, after pleading not guilty
to the charge. As a result of his conviction, the Appellant lost ninety (90) days of “good-time”
credit. Smith filed a grievance with the Department and received the Department’s final decision
on October 16, 2002. On November 14, 2002, the Appellant filed this appeal with the Division.
BACKGROUND
On May 29, 2002, the Appellant was administered a drug test while housed at the Union
County Detention Center (Detention Center) by Officer Brackins. The Appellant tested positive
for marijuana. Officer Brackins then performed a confirmation test which further corroborated
the existence of marijuana in the Appellant. Therefore, Charles Coleman, Director of the
Detention Center, contacted Connie Snipes, Designated Facilities Specialist. Ms. Snipes
completed an Incident Report documenting those finding. On June 6, 2002, the Appellant was
given written notice of the charge of violating SCDC Code § 1.10, Use or Possession of
Narcotics, Marijuana or Unauthorized Drugs based upon the above incident.
A hearing was held on June 10, 2002, before a Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO). At
the Appellant’s request, he was provided a counsel substitute. Additionally, the Appellant
requested that his accuser – in this case Specialist Snipes – be present at the hearing. During the
hearing, the DHO read a narrative of Specialist Snipes’s Incident Report into the Record and
received testimony from the Appellant and Specialist Snipes as evidence. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the DHO found the Appellant guilty of violating SCDC Code § 1.10 and sanctioned the
Appellant with the loss of ninety (90) days of “good time” credit. After the hearing, the DHO
completed a Major Disciplinary Report and Hearing Record, which documented the DHO’s
findings based on the Record.
The Appellant filed a grievance appealing his conviction of violating SCDC § 1.10. The
Warden denied the Appellant’s grievance. After he appealed the Warden’s decision, the
Department denied his grievance. This appeal followed. In his Appeal Brief, the Appellant
alleges that his due process rights were violated because the Department did not follow its testing
procedures governing the drug test.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Division’s jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived from the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). In
McNeil v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP (September 5,
2001), the Division issued an En Banc Order interpreting the breadth of its jurisdiction pursuant
to Al-Shabazz. The decision holds that the Division’s appellate jurisdiction in inmate appeals is
limited to two types of cases: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have
erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in
which the Department has taken an inmate’s created liberty interest as punishment in a major
disciplinary hearing.
In this case, the Appellant alleges that the Department improperly revoked Smith’s “good
time” credits Inmates have a protected liberty interest in their earned statutory good-time credits
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, when, as here, the Department revokes an inmate’s
good-time credits as punishment in a “major disciplinary hearing” involving “more serious rule
violations,” prison officials must provide that inmate with “minimal due process.” Al-Shabazz,
338 S.C. at 370, 527 S.E.2d at 750. Consequently, specific administrative procedures must be
followed before depriving an inmate of statutorily granted earned credit, including adequate
advance notice of the charges, adequate opportunity for a hearing in which the inmate can present
witnesses and documentary evidence, and an impartial hearing officer who prepares a written
statement of all the evidence presented and the reasons for his decision. Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d
at 751, citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2978-82 (1974).
In Al-Shabazz, the Court held that inmates may seek review before this Division to ensure
that the Department’s revocation of good-time credits as punishment in a “major disciplinary
hearing” involving “more serious rule violations” comports with “minimal due process.” The
ALJD inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has
granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated.
Id. When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an
appellate capacity. Id. Consequently, the review in these inmate grievance cases is limited to the
record presented. Furthermore, an Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment for
that of an agency unless the agency’s determination is arbitrary, affected by error of law or is
clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the whole record.
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (1986 & Supp. 2001); Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 380, 527
S.E.2d at 756. “‘Substantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed
blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would
allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached or must
have reached in order to justify its action.” Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304,
306 (1981). Further, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence
does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.
Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461 S.E.2d 388 (1995).
Additionally, in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 105 S. Ct. 2768 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the relevant question is
whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the
disciplinary board.” Moreover, in Al-Shabazz the Court underscored that since prison officials
are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, the Courts and therefore this
Division adhere to a “hands off” approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and procedures
when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757;
see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off”
approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy).
DISCUSSION
I find that the Appellant was afforded all process due him pursuant to Al-Shabazz. The
Record indicates that the Appellant received written notice of the charges against him in excess of
twenty-four (24) hours prior to a hearing that was held before an impartial Disciplinary Hearing
Officer. At the hearing, the Appellant was given the opportunity to offer evidence, call witnesses,
and confront his accuser. In addition, although not constitutionally required, the Appellant was
afforded a counsel substitute who assisted him in his defense. After the DHO determined that the
Appellant was guilty of the charged offense, he prepared a written report detailing the evidence he
relied upon and the penalty assessed in finding the Appellant guilty of the disciplinary infraction.
Finally, the Appellant was permitted to appeal the DHO’s decision through the inmate grievance
process.
Nevertheless, I find that the evidence does not support the Department’s determination.
Here, the Appellant complains the Department failed to properly administer the drug test in order
to “setup” a false positive result. I do not find that Officer Brackins “setup” the Appellant.
However, I do find that the Record is simply not sufficient to support the DHO’s determination.
In fact, the Department set forth, itself, that it “acknowledges that Union County may not have
followed SCDC’s procedure when it drug-tested Smith.” More importantly, there was no
evidence offered as to how the test was administered or whether Officer Brackins was qualified to
conduct the test. Rather, the Department relied solely upon Specialist Snipes’s statements who
was not present at the test and who relied upon the statements of Director Coleman that Officer
Brackins stated that the inmate tested positive. This evidence is simply not sufficient to support
the Department’s determination.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Final Decision of the Department is
REVERSED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Ralph King Anderson, III
Administrative Law Judge
August 1, 2003
Columbia, South Carolina |
