ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before me pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 61-2-260 (Supp. 2000), S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310 (Supp.
2000) and S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600 (Supp. 2000) for a contested case hearing. The Petitioner, Keisha Harrison, d/b/a
The Lounge, seeks an on-premise beer and wine permit for an establishment located at 141 Driffin Lane, Salters,
Williamsburg County, South Carolina.
The South Carolina Department of Revenue (Department) filed a Motion to be Excused, stating that the Department would
have granted the permit but for the protests of the application. This Motion was granted by Order dated December 12,
2000.
After timely notice to the parties and protestants, a hearing was held at the Administrative Law Judge Division in
Columbia, South Carolina on February 6, 2001. The Protestants did not move to intervene as a party.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Having carefully considered the testimony and the arguments, and taking into account the credibility of the evidence, I find
the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. Notice of the time, date, place, and subject matter of the hearing was given to all the parties in a timely
manner.
2. The Petitioner, Keisha Harrison, d/b/a The Lounge, seeks an on-premise beer and wine permit for an
establishment located at 141 Driffin Lane, Salters, South Carolina.
3. Petitioner is currently running a seafood restaurant at the proposed location. The days and hours of
operation of the proposed location are Wednesday through Saturday from 8:00 p.m. until 1:00 a.m.
4. The proposed location is a modular home that Petitioner purchased from the school district. The site of the
proposed location consists of two (2) acres owned by the Petitioner. Approximately fifty (50) cars could be parked in the
parking area of the proposed location. There are eight (8) outside lights situated around the proposed location.
5. There is no jukebox at the proposed location, but there is a stereo system. Petitioner testified that the building is
sound proof and that music cannot be heard outside the building.
6. The qualifications set forth in S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-520 (Supp. 2000) concerning the residency and age of the
applicant are properly established. Furthermore, the Petitioner has not had a permit or license revoked within the last two
years. Notice of the application was lawfully posted both at the location and in a newspaper of general circulation.
7. The Petitioner is of sufficient moral character to receive a beer and wine permit.
8. The proposed location is not unreasonably close to any church, school or playground.
9. Mr. Roy Driffin objects to the issuance of this permit because he lives 1/4 of a mile from the proposed location and
is concerned about loud music and littering on the road. Mr. Driffin testified that since the proposed location has been
open there has been an increase in traffic and littering on Driffin Road. Also, Mr. Driffin is concerned about the safety of
the children that live and play on Driffin Road. Ms. Linda Williams testified that she is concerned about loud music
coming from the proposed location and about customers of The Lounge driving through her yard to get to the proposed
location. Ms. Nealia Seals objects to the issuance of this permit and testified that this type of establishment is not
appropriate for their quiet community. Ms. Francine Taylor also testified at the hearing that she objects to the issuance of
this permit. Ms. Taylor lives near the proposed location and is concerned about this type of establishment changing the
nature of their quiet community.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, I conclude, as a matter of law, the following:
1. The South Carolina Administrative Law Judge Division has subject matter jurisdiction to hear and to determine this
contested case pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600 (Supp. 2000) and S.C. Code Ann. § 61-2-260 (Supp. 2000).
2. S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-520 (Supp. 2000) sets forth the requirements for the issuance of an on-premise beer and wine
permit.
3. Under S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-520 (Supp. 2000), the location of the proposed place of business must be proper.
Although "proper location" is not statutorily defined, broad discretion is vested in the trier of fact in determining the fitness
or suitability of a particular location. Fast Stops, Inc. v. Ingram, 276 S.C. 593, 281 S.E2d 118 (1981).
4. As the trier of fact, the Administrative Law Judge is authorized to determine the fitness or suitability of the Petitioner
and the proposed business location for a license or permit using broad, but not unbridled, discretion. Byers v. South
Carolina ABC Commission, 281 S.C. 566, 316 S.E.2d 705 (Ct. App. 1984).
5. The determination of the suitability of a location is not necessarily a function solely of geography. It involves an
infinite variety of considerations related to the nature and operation of the proposed business and its impact on the
community within which it is to be located. Kearney v. Allen, 287 S.C. 324, 338 S.E.2d 335 (1985); Schudel v. South
Carolina ABC Comm'n, 276 S.C. 138, 276 S.E.2d 308 (1981).
6. In considering the suitability of a location, it is relevant to consider the previous history of the proposed location and
to determine whether the testimony in opposition to a permit consists of opinions and conclusions or is supported by facts.
Taylor v. Lewis, 261 S.C. 168, 198 S.E.2d 801 (1973).
7. Without sufficient evidence of an adverse impact on the community, the application must not be denied if the
statutory criteria are satisfied. The fact that a Protestant objects to the issuance of a permit or license is not a sufficient
reason by itself to deny the application. See 45 Am. Jur.2d Intoxicating Liquors § 162 (Supp. 1995); 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating
Liquors § 119 (1981).
In this case, the testimony of the Protestants concerning possible detrimental effects to their community is conjectural and
without any specific factual support. There is no evidence that law enforcement could not provide sufficient protection at
the location and to residents in the general vicinity; there is no evidence of any specific safety problems. If the business at
this location is operated properly, there should be no negative impact upon the community.
8. Permits and licenses issued by the State for sale of beer and wine are not rights or property, but are rather privileges
granted in the exercise of the police power of the State to be used and enjoyed only so long as the restrictions and
conditions governing them are complied with. Because the tribunal authorized to grant the issuance of a permit is also
authorized, for cause, to revoke it, that tribunal is likewise authorized to place restrictions or conditions on the permit or
license. See Feldman v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 203 S.C. 49, 26 S.E.2d 22 (1943).
9. I find that the Petitioner has met the statutory requirements for the on-premise beer and wine permit at the proposed
location. I further find that the location is suitable for the on-premise beer and wine permit with the following restrictions.
ORDER
Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby:
ORDERED that the application of Keisha Harrison, d/b/a The Lounge, for an on-premise beer and wine permit be granted,
subject to the condition that Petitioner or her employees shall prohibit loitering and the consumption of beer or wine in the
parking lot area of the proposed location.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a violation of any of the above restrictions be considered a violation against the permit
and may result in a fine, suspension or revocation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Department of Revenue issue a beer and wine permit upon payment of the required
fees and costs by the Petitioner.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________ C. Dukes Scott
Administrative Law Judge
February 13, 2001
Columbia, South Carolina |
