ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
Grievance No. BRCI 596-02
I. Introduction
Kenneth Green, #161009 (Green) brings this appeal challenging a decision by the South Carolina Department of
Corrections (DOC) which convicted Green of sexual misconduct. Jurisdiction is invoked in the instant case since this
matter is a disciplinary hearing in which Green was punished by the loss of good time credits, a loss which impacts a
created liberty interest. Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742, 750 (2000); McNeil v. South Carolina
Department of Corrections, 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP (September 5, 2001). After a review of the record and the arguments,
the DOC decision is AFFIRMED.
II. Scope of Review
In this review, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) acts "in an appellate capacity" and is "restricted to reviewing the
decision below." Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742, 754 (2000). The review must apply the criteria of
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2000). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2000) (where an ALJ is
directed to conduct a review "in the same manner prescribed in [§ 1-23-380](A)."). Section 1-23-380(A)(6) establishes the
following:
The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
In this case, Green argues that the DOC decision is in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions and is clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.
III. Analysis
A. Unlawful Procedure
Green argues the hearing was carried out under unlawful procedure since DOC failed to follow procedural due process.
Due process for an inmate subjected to the loss of good time credits requires the following procedures:
(1) that advance written notice of the charge be given to the inmate at least twenty-four hours before the hearing; (2) that
factfinders must prepare a written statement of the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that the
inmate should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided there is no undue hazard to
institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that counsel substitute (a fellow inmate or a prison employee) should be
allowed to help illiterate inmates or in complex cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5) that the persons hearing the
matter, who may be prison officials or employees, must be impartial. Wolff, 418 U.S. 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2978-82, 41 L.Ed.2d
at 954-60.
Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742, 751 (2000)
In the instant case Green argues he was not granted procedural due process since the prison officials are not impartial. The
basis for the allegation is that the classification of the offense may be by an officer of higher rank that the hearing officer.
Thus, the hearing officer is a subordinate to the classification officer.
Certainly, an impartial hearing board is required. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 539, 572 n.20. However, proof of a due process
violation requires specific acts of lack of neutrality. For example, having the hearing officer being substantially involved
with the investigation. See Merritt v. De Los Santos, 721 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 1983) (due process violated only if officer
substantially involved with investigation of charges against inmate, but not violated if officer's involvement at hearing is
only tangential); see, e.g., Diercks v. Durham, 959 F.2d 710, 713 (8th Cir. 1992) (due process violation when complainant
was member of board hearing the case). Here, no specific act is alleged and none has been shown. Rather, the rank of the
officer making the classification does not impact the decision of a subordinate officer on the issue of innocence or guilt.
Thus, no impartiality is shown here, and no procedural due process violation is established.
B. Substantial Evidence
While not explicitly argued, Green appears to argue that the DOC decision must be reversed since the decision is not
supported by the evidence. I cannot agree.
In examining a DOC determination for the presence of evidentiary support, an ALJ must review the matter in an appellate
capacity. Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742. In that capacity, an ALJ reviewing factual disputes between
DOC and the inmate "will not substitute [the ALJ's] judgment for that of the [DOC Hearing Officer] as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact." S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2000).
Thus, once the facts are established by the Hearing Officer, the ALJ will not re-weigh the evidence in an attempt to come to
an independent conclusion on the factual dispute. Rather, the ALJ will rely upon the Hearing Officers factual
determinations unless those determinations are "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence on the whole record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23- 380(A)(6)(e) (Supp. 2000). In determining if substantial evidence
supports the Hearing Officer's factual determinations, the ALJ does not look for "a mere scintilla of evidence nor evidence
viewed blindly from one side, but [rather looks for ] evidence which, when considering the record as a whole, would allow
reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the agency reached." Palmetto Alliance, Inc. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 282 S.C. 430, 432, 319 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1984). Accordingly, if such evidence is present, substantial evidence is
present and the factual determinations will not be overturned.
Here, substantial evidence supports the factual determinations made below. An officer of DOC observed Green standing on
his bed with his penis in his hand, stroking it in a back and forth motion. These observations would allow reasonable
minds to reach the conclusion that Green committed the act here in dispute. Thus, substantial evidence supports the DOC
decision.
IV. Conclusion
The guilty verdict entered by DOC against Kenneth Green, #161009 is AFFIRMED
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: October 17, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina |