ORDERS:
ORDER
GRIEVANCE NO. MCI 0372-01
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant to the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Appellant Paul Jarvis appeals the
decision of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or Department) to revoke 240 days of his "good-time"
credit as punishment for attempting to obtain marijuana in violation of DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.10. Having reviewed
the record, applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the decision of the Department
must be reversed.
BACKGROUND
On September 5, 2001, Sergeant M. Anderson conducted a search of Appellant's locker. During the search, Sergeant
Anderson found two contraband batteries and a note written by Appellant. The note reads as follows:
Hooks,
I might come off lock-up before Friday. I need to know what Roger got busted with. My [stuff] is still stashed. I'm just
hoping I can come off early in the morning so I can get it. I believe I am going to beat the charge because Roger [fouled]
up again. I don't know 'til Thursday. If I'm not off by Thursday, I will tell you where my [stuff] is at, and whom you need
to see so you can handle my business for me. Man, see if you can get me some chicken. See if Miller will let you come in.
P.J.
(Hr'g Tr. at 2.) Based upon this incriminating note, (1) Appellant was charged with attempting to obtain marijuana in
violation of DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.10, the Use or Possession of Narcotics, Marijuana or Unauthorized Drugs,
Including Prescription Drugs.
A hearing of the charge was held on September 12, 2001, before a DOC Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO). At the
hearing, the DHO read the note into the record and took testimony from Sergeant Anderson regarding the circumstances
surrounding the discovery of the note and its possible meaning. At the close of the hearing, the DHO found Appellant
guilty of the charge and revoked 240 days of his good-time credit as punishment for the offense. Appellant appealed his
conviction to the Department and then to this tribunal. On appeal, Appellant primarily contends that there is insufficient
evidence in the record to support his conviction.
ANALYSIS
In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final decisions of the Department
in certain "non-collateral" or administrative matters (i.e., those matters in which an inmate does not challenge the validity
of a conviction or sentence) by appealing those decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative
Procedures Act (APA). Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of
Corrections, a majority of the judges of the ALJD, sitting en banc, held that this tribunal's jurisdiction to hear inmate
appeals under Al-Shabazz is limited to: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status, and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an
inmate's created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing. McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No.
00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, slip op. at 4-5 (S.C. Admin. Law Judge. Div. Sept. 5, 2001) (en banc). In the case at hand,
Appellant contends that the Department improperly revoked 240 days of his good-time credit as punishment in a major
disciplinary hearing; accordingly, this tribunal has jurisdiction over this matter.
When reviewing the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal's review of inmate appeals is confined to the
record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has
granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at
750; McNeil, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, at 5 ("[O]ur review is limited solely to the determination of whether the
Department granted 'minimal due process' in reaching [its] decisions . . . ."). Further, recognizing that prison officials are
in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional "hands off" approach to
internal prison disciplinary policies and procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C.
at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional "hands off"
approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this
deferential standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department's actions to ensure that
inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at
757.
In the present case, Appellant contends that the Department's decision to revoke his good-time credit was made in violation
of his due process rights. Because inmates have a protected liberty interest in their earned statutory good-time credits under
the Fourteenth Amendment, they are entitled to "minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by
the Due Process clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 557 (1974). Thus, where, as here, an inmate faces the revocation of good-time credits as punishment in a disciplinary
hearing, prison officials must provide that inmate with certain procedural safeguards. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 370, 527
S.E.2d at 750. (2) These procedural safeguards include:
(1) that advance written notice of the charge be given to the inmate at least twenty-four hours before the hearing; (2) that
factfinders must prepare a written statement of the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that the
inmate should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided there is no undue hazard to
institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that counsel substitute (a fellow inmate or a prison employee) should be
allowed to help illiterate inmates or in complex cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5) that the persons hearing the
matter, who may be prison officials or employees, must be impartial.
Id. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 (paraphrasing Wolff). Beyond these procedural requirements, the United States Supreme
Court has held that the revocation of an inmate's good-time credits does not comport with Due Process unless "there [is]
some evidence from which the conclusion of the [prison official] could be deduced." Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v.
Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). (3) Thus, if the Department affords the inmate a Wolff-type hearing and has at least some
evidence in the record to support its decision, the Department's revocation of an inmate's good-time credits satisfies the
requirements of due process.
In the disciplinary proceedings underlying the instant appeal, the Department did provide Appellant with a proper Wolff-type hearing before revoking his good-time credits. However, the Department's decision to revoke those credits does not
meet the requirements of due process as there is not sufficient evidence in the record to support the disciplinary conviction.
While Appellant's note clearly indicates that he had hidden something, presumably contraband, (4) nothing on the face of the
note itself suggests what the nature of the contraband was. Moreover, nothing developed in the record at the hearing
provides competent evidence of the nature of the contraband hidden by Appellant. While Sergeant Anderson did allude to
the fact that he received "several bits of information from numerous people" suggesting that Appellant had hidden some
marijuana (Hr'g Tr. at 6), this vague reference to prison rumors does not constitute credible evidence of Appellant's guilt.
It is simply too much of a stretch to conclude from the evidence presented in the instant case that Appellant possessed or
attempted to gain possession of marijuana. As there is not sufficient evidence in the record to support Appellant's
conviction, it must be overturned.
This tribunal is sensitive to and respectful of the demands placed upon the Department in its efforts to maintain order and
control in the prison environment. Nevertheless, to revoke 240 days of Appellant's good-time credit for the attempted
possession of marijuana on such a paucity of evidence is a contravention of Appellant's right to due process. Therefore, as
the Department failed to provide Appellant with the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment before revoking
his sentence-related credits as punishment in a disciplinary proceeding, the Department's decision in this matter must be
reversed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Appellant's September 12, 2001 disciplinary conviction for the attempted
possession of marijuana is REVERSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Department must restore to Appellant all good-time credit taken from or lost by
Appellant as a result of the conviction.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
July 17, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina
1. Sergeant Anderson had also previously been made aware of various prison rumors involving Appellant and an alleged
"stash" of marijuana (Hr'g Tr. at 6), and the inmate referred to in the note as "Roger" had recently been "busted with
marijuana." (Hr'g Tr. at 9.)
2. However, this set of safeguards is necessarily a limited one. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560 ("[I]t is immediately apparent
that one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society . . . to the very different
situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison.").
3. This review "does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or
weighing of the evidence," Hill, 472 U.S. at 455; rather, this standard only requires this tribunal to determine whether
"there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the [prison official]." Id. at 455-56.
4. At the hearing, Appellant implausibly claimed that the hidden items were some personal letters. (Hr'g Tr. at 3.) |