ORDERS:
ORDER
GRIEVANCE NO. GCI 0036-01
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant to the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Appellant Gregory Collins appeals the
calculation of his sentence and sentence-related credits by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or
Department). Having reviewed the record, applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the
decision of the Department must be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
In this appeal, Appellant contends that the Department has not given him proper credit for the time he has served and that the
Department has not applied the proper amount of "good-time" credit to his sentence. Specifically, Appellant claims: (1) that
the Department has impermissibly calculated his time served based on a 360-day year, rather than a 365-day year, and (2) that
the Department has improperly applied only twenty days of good-time credit to his sentence for every month served, rather
than thirty-five days of credit per month. In response, the Department maintains that it is properly calculating Appellant's
sentence and time served based on a 360-day year and that it is properly crediting Appellant with good-time credits.
ANALYSIS
In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final decisions of the Department in
certain "non-collateral" or administrative matters (i.e., those matters in which an inmate does not challenge the validity of a
conviction or sentence) by appealing those decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative Procedures
Act (APA). Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, a
majority of the judges of the ALJD, sitting en banc, held that this tribunal's jurisdiction to hear inmate appeals under Al-Shabazz is limited to: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously calculated his sentence,
sentence-related credits, or custody status, and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an inmate's created liberty interest
as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing. McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, slip op. at 4-5 (S.C. Admin. Law Judge. Div. Sept. 5, 2001) (en banc). In the case at hand, Appellant contends that the Department
improperly calculated his sentence and sentence-related credits; accordingly, this tribunal has jurisdiction over this matter.
When reviewing the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz,
338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal's review of inmate appeals is confined to the record
presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has granted
aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750;
McNeil, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, at 5 ("[O]ur review is limited solely to the determination of whether the Department
granted 'minimal due process' in reaching [its] decisions . . . ."). Further, recognizing that prison officials are in the best
position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional "hands off" approach to internal
prison disciplinary policies and procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527
S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional "hands off" approach of
South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this deferential standard of
review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department's actions to ensure that inmate grievances are
addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at 757.
In the case at hand, Appellant's arguments must fail. First, the Department's computation of Appellant's time served based
on a 360-day year, rather than on a 365-day year, does not require Appellant to serve any additional time because the length of
Appellant's sentence is also calculated based on a 360-day year. That is, the days "lost" by Appellant when he is credited
with 360 days instead of 365 days of time served per year are equally deducted from the length of Appellant's sentence, which
is "only" 16,200 days under the 360-day year (45 years x 360 days per year), rather than the 16,425 days it would be under a
365-day year (45 years x 365 days per year). The Department's use of a 360-day year in calculating Appellant's sentence and
time served does not require Appellant to serve time beyond the length of his given sentence. (1)
Second, the Department is properly crediting Appellant with twenty, rather than thirty-five, days of good-time credit per
month served. To support his contention that he is entitled to thirty-five days of good-time credit per month, Appellant cites
to a previous version of S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-210 (Supp. 2001). Under that previous version, (2) as well as under the
current version of Section 24-13-210, inmates in the official custody of the Department earn twenty days of credit per month
served, S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-210(a) (1989); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-210(A) (Supp. 2001), and prisoners confined in local
correctional facilities or upon county public works earn one day of credit for every two days served. S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-210(b) (1989); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-210(C) (Supp. 2001). Appellant contends that he is entitled to earn good-time credit
under both of these provisions for a total of thirty-five days of credit for every month served. However, this statute clearly
draws a distinction between the good-time credit awarded to prisoners in the custody of the Department and the credit
awarded to prisoners in the custody of local authorities. Here, Appellant, as a prisoner in the custody of the Department, is
only entitled to earn twenty days of good-time credit per month; he cannot earn both the good-time credits awarded to inmates
in the custody of the Department and the credits awarded to prisoners in the custody of local authorities. The Department has
correctly applied only twenty days of good-time credit toward Appellant's sentence for each month served. See S.C. Code
Ann. § 24-13-210(A) (Supp. 2001).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department's denial of Appellant's grievance is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
July 17, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina
1. At the time of Appellant's sentencing, the Department calculated all inmate sentences under the 360-day year. See
Respondent's Brief at 3. However, since 1996, the Department has been required to compute inmate sentences based upon a
365-day year. See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-175 (Supp. 2001).
2. Despite his assertions, see Brief of Appellant at 7, the version of Section 24-13-210 cited by Appellant was not the statute
in effect and controlling at the time of his sentencing. Compare 1980 Act No. 513, § 1 with 1986 Act No. 462, § 13.
Nevertheless, as substantially similar provisions are contained in the current version of Section 24-13-210, Appellant's
argument will be addressed. |