ORDERS:
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
GRIEVANCE NO. MacD 0033-01
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant to the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Appellant Bernard Taylor appeals
the decision of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or Department) to place him on cell restriction for 45
days, including the confiscation of his television and radio and the restriction of his canteen privileges during that time, and
to revoke 120 days of his "good-time" credit as punishment for threatening to inflict harm upon a Department employee in
violation of DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.04. Having reviewed the record, applicable law, and the briefs filed by the parties
in this matter, I conclude that the decision of the Department must be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
On April 20, 2001, when being released to the cafeteria for a meal by DOC Officer Cecelia Amous, Appellant exited his
unit with his shirt untucked and without his identification card. Officer Amous directed Appellant to tuck his shirt in his
pants and to retrieve his identification card. Appellant refused to comply with Officer Amous' order. In response to
several further orders from Officer Amous to tuck-in his shirt and to get his identification, Appellant again refused to
comply with the orders and responded defiantly to Officer Amous in a loud voice. In response to Officer Amous's fifth
such order, Appellant approached Officer Amous in an aggressive manner, waiving both of his hands in the air, and
shouted: "I'm tired of this damn s__t. You told me to tuck my shirt and I did; keep messing with me and I will f__k you
up." As a result of this incident, Appellant was charged with violating DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.04, Threatening to
Inflict Harm on an Employee and/or Member(s) of the Public.
A hearing of the charge was held before a DOC Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) on April 25, 2001. Officer Amous
testified at the hearing regarding the incident and her incident report was read into the record. At the close of the hearing,
the DHO found Appellant guilty of the charge and placed him on 45 days of cell restriction and revoked 120 days of his
good-time credit as punishment for the offense. Appellant appealed his disciplinary conviction to the Department and then
to this tribunal. On appeal, Appellant contends that the incident was based on a misunderstanding between the officer and
himself and that the officer was biased against him because of a previous incident between the two.
ANALYSIS
In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final decisions of the Department
in certain "non-collateral" or administrative matters (i.e., those matters in which an inmate does not challenge the validity
of a conviction or sentence) by appealing those decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative
Procedures Act (APA). Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of
Corrections, a majority of the judges of the ALJD, sitting en banc, held that this tribunal's jurisdiction to hear inmate
appeals under Al-Shabazz is limited to: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status, and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an
inmate's created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing. McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No.
00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, slip op. at 4-5 (S.C. Admin. Law Judge. Div. Sept. 5, 2001) (en banc). In the case at hand,
Appellant contends that the Department improperly revoked 120 days of his good-time credit as punishment in a major
disciplinary hearing; accordingly, this tribunal has jurisdiction over this matter.
When reviewing the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal's review of inmate appeals is confined to the
record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has
granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at
750; McNeil, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, at 5 ("[O]ur review is limited solely to the determination of whether the
Department granted 'minimal due process' in reaching [its] decisions . . . ."). Further, recognizing that prison officials are
in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional "hands off" approach to
internal prison disciplinary policies and procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C.
at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional "hands off"
approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However, notwithstanding this
deferential standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department's actions to ensure that
inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 383, 527 S.E.2d at
757.
In the present case, Appellant contends that the Department's decision to revoke his good-time credit was made in violation
of his due process rights. Because inmates have a protected liberty interest in their earned statutory good-time credits under
the Fourteenth Amendment, they are entitled to "minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by
the Due Process clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 557 (1974). Thus, where, as here, an inmate faces the revocation of good-time credits as punishment in a disciplinary
hearing, prison officials must provide that inmate with certain procedural safeguards. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 370, 527
S.E.2d at 750. (1) These procedural safeguards include:
(1) that advance written notice of the charge be given to the inmate at least twenty-four hours before the hearing; (2) that
factfinders must prepare a written statement of the evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action; (3) that the
inmate should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, provided there is no undue hazard to
institutional safety or correctional goals; (4) that counsel substitute (a fellow inmate or a prison employee) should be
allowed to help illiterate inmates or in complex cases an inmate cannot handle alone; and (5) that the persons hearing the
matter, who may be prison officials or employees, must be impartial.
Id. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 (paraphrasing Wolff). Beyond these procedural requirements, the United States Supreme
Court has held that the revocation of an inmate's good-time credits does not comport with Due Process unless "there [is]
some evidence from which the conclusion of the [prison official] could be deduced." Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v.
Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). (2) Thus, if the Department affords the inmate a Wolff-type hearing and has at least some
evidence in the record to support its decision, the Department's revocation of an inmate's good-time credits satisfies the
requirements of due process.
In the disciplinary proceedings underlying the instant appeal, Appellant was afforded all the process due him pursuant to
Wolff and Al-Shabazz. The record indicates that Appellant received written notice of the charges against him in excess of
twenty-four hours prior to a hearing that was held before an impartial Disciplinary Hearing Officer. At the hearing,
Appellant was given the opportunity, through a counsel substitute, to offer evidence, call witnesses, and confront his
accuser. The record reflects that Appellant was found guilty of threatening to inflict harm on a Department employee in
violation of DOC Disciplinary Code § 1.04 based on testimony and written report of Officer Amous, and a written
statement to that effect was prepared by the hearing officer. After his conviction, Appellant filed a grievance and received
a prompt response from his warden, which Appellant then appealed to the Department. In its denial of his appeal, the
Department informed Appellant of his right to appeal the Department's final decision under the APA. Further, there is
sufficient evidence in the record to support the decision reached by the Department. (3)
The Department provided Appellant with the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment before revoking his
sentence-related credits as punishment in a disciplinary proceeding. Accordingly, the Department's decision to deny
Appellant's grievance is affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department's denial of Appellant's grievance is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
November 21, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina
1. However, this set of safeguards is necessarily a limited one. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560 ("[I]t is immediately apparent
that one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society . . . to the very different
situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison.").
2. This review "does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or
weighing of the evidence," Hill, 472 U.S. at 455; rather, this standard only requires this tribunal to determine whether
"there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the [prison official]." Id. at 455-56.
3. In fact, contrary Appellant's claims of bias, Office Amous testified that, prior to this incident, she had "never had a
problem" with Appellant. (Hr'g Tr. at 8.) |