ORDERS:
ORDER
GRIEVANCE NO. MSU 0071-01
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division) pursuant to the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Appellant Lumumba K. Incumaa
appeals the decision of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC or Department) to place him in the Maximum
Security Unit (MSU) at the Kirkland Correctional Institution. Having reviewed the record, applicable law, and the briefs
filed by the parties in this matter, I conclude that the decision of the Department must be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
On March 26, 2001, Appellant filed a grievance with the Department challenging his placement in the Maximum Security
Unit (MSU) at the Kirkland Correctional Institution. Appellant contends that the Department has arbitrarily disapproved
his release from the MSU five times and that his continued placement in the MSU is not justified. Therefore, Appellant
maintains that he should be released from the MSU. The Department found Appellant's confinement in the MSU to be
proper and denied his grievance. Appellant appealed that decision to this tribunal. On appeal, Appellant argues that the
Department has improperly continued his confinement in the MSU.
Appellant, while incarcerated with the Department for murder and armed robbery, was involved in a prison riot at the
Broad River Correctional Institution in 1995. During the riot, Appellant took several DOC staff members hostage and
assaulted them, inflicting severe injuries. As a result of his actions, Appellant was placed in the MSU. (1) In reviewing
subsequent recommendations for Appellant's release from the MSU, the MSU Review Committee found-on December 18,
1998, August 8, 2000, and February 13, 2001-that, given the nature and severity of Appellant's assaults on staff members
during the 1995 riot, Appellant should remain in the MSU. Appellant contends that these decisions were not justified.
ANALYSIS
In Al-Shabazz, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that inmates may seek review of final decisions of the Department
in certain "non-collateral" or administrative matters (i.e., those matters in which an inmate does not challenge the validity
of a conviction or sentence) by appealing those decisions to the ALJD pursuant to the South Carolina Administrative
Procedures Act (APA). Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 376, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of
Corrections, a majority of the judges of the ALJD, sitting en banc, held that this tribunal's jurisdiction to hear inmate
appeals under Al-Shabazz is limited to: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status, and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an
inmate's created liberty interest as punishment in a major disciplinary hearing. McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No.
00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, slip op. at 4-5 (S.C. Admin. Law Judge. Div. Sept. 5, 2001) (en banc). In the case at hand,
Appellant contends that the Department has improperly determined his custody status; accordingly, this tribunal has
jurisdiction over this matter.
When reviewing the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 377, 527 S.E.2d at 754. Consequently, this tribunal's review of inmate appeals is confined to the
record presented, id., and its inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has
granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at
750; McNeil, No. 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP, at 5 ("[O]ur review is limited solely to the determination of whether the
Department granted 'minimal due process' in reaching [its] decisions . . . ."). Further, recognizing that prison officials are
in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, this tribunal will adhere to the traditional "hands off" approach to
internal prison disciplinary policies and other internal prison affairs when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the
traditional "hands off" approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy). However,
notwithstanding this deferential standard of review, this tribunal must conduct meaningful review of the Department's
actions to ensure that inmate grievances are addressed in a fair, reasonable, and efficient manner. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at
383, 527 S.E.2d at 757.
In the present case, Appellant contends that the Department's decision to place him in the MSU was made in violation of
his due process rights. However, "[t]he requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests
encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Id. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750 (quoting
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). An inmate does not have a protected liberty interest in his custody status
unless such an interest is created: (1) by the Due Process clause of its own force because the challenged custody status is
not "within the sentence imposed upon him" or is "otherwise violative of the Constitution," Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,
468 (1983), see also Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994); or (2) by state law because the challenged custody status
"imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
Here, Appellant has no protected liberty interest in his custody status. Appellant's placement in the MSU is "well within
the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence," Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468, so as not to implicate a
liberty interest under the Due Process clause of its own force. And, placement in the MSU "does not present the type of
atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486.
Thus, as Appellant has no constitutionally-recognized liberty interest affected by the Department's decision to place him in
the MSU, he cannot challenge the procedure used by the Department to reach that decision on due process grounds. See
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-58 (1974).
Beyond the requirements of due process, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that an inmate may challenge his
custody status, even if he has no protected liberty interest at stake, if "prison officials have acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
from personal bias" in determining his custody status. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 381, 527 S.E.2d at 756 (citing Crowe v.
Leeke, 273 S.C. 763, 259 S.E.2d 614 (1979)). But, while review of these Crowe-based claims is not "improper or
unavailable," id., the level of scrutiny devoted to such claims is limited. Accordingly, where, as here, the record suggests
that the Department's decision to place an inmate in a particular custody status involved the "good faith exercise of the
discretionary power of the prison officials in the maintenance of order, discipline, and security among the prison
population," Crowe, 273 S.C. at 764, 259 S.E.2d at 615, the Department's decision will not be disturbed on appeal. See
Memorandum from Montgomery to Appellant of Feb. 14, 2001 ("T]he [MSU] Review Committee met on February 13,
2001, and disapproved you for release from MSU based on the number of assaults on staff and the severity of injuries
inflicted during the hostage-taking situation.")
Appellant has no ground upon which to assert the due process claim found in his grievance. Nor is there any evidence to
suggest that the Department acted arbitrarily or from personal bias in placing him in the MSU. Accordingly, the
Department's decision to deny Appellant's grievance is affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Department's denial of Appellant's grievance is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
June 27, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina
1. For his role in the riot, Appellant was also convicted of taking hostages and assault and battery with intent to kill. |
