ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
Grievance No. MacD 57-99
I. Introduction
Kelly Anderson, #211947 (Anderson) brings this appeal challenging a decision by the South Carolina Department of
Corrections (DOC) which convicted Anderson of possession of a weapon, possession of contraband, and use of obscene,
vulgar, or profane language or gestures for which he lost 120 days of good time credit. Jurisdiction is invoked in the instant
case since this matter is a disciplinary hearing in which Anderson was punished by the loss of good time credits, a loss
which impacts a created liberty interest. Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742, 750 (2000); McNeil v. South
Carolina Department of Corrections, 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP (September 5, 2001). After a review of the record and the
arguments, the DOC decision is AFFIRMED.
II. Scope of Review
In this review, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) acts "in an appellate capacity" and is "restricted to reviewing the
decision below." Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742, 754 (2000). The review must apply the criteria of
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2000). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2000) (where an ALJ is
directed to conduct a review "in the same manner prescribed in [§ 1-23-380](A)."). Section 1-23-380(A)(6) establishes the
following:
The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
In this case, Anderson argues that the DOC decision is made upon unlawful procedure and is clearly erroneous in view of
the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.
III. Analysis
A. Unlawful Procedure
Anderson argues the hearing was carried out under unlawful procedure since DOC has no authority to take his good time
credit in the absence of promulgated regulation. In particular, Anderson explains that DOC has only policies but no
regulations allowing the removal of good time credit for
possession of a weapon, possession of contraband, and use of obscene, vulgar, or profane language or gestures. I cannot
agree.
The General Assembly expressed its intent not to rigidly bind inmate policy decisions by a duty to promulgate regulations.
Rather DOC is exempt from the duty to promulgate regulations dealing with the supervision of inmates. See S.C. Code
Ann. § 1-23-10(4) (Supp. 2000) (where DOC has no duty to issue inmate supervision "regulations" since such does not
include "orders of the supervisory or administrative agency of a penal, . . . institution, in respect to the institutional
supervision, custody, control, care, or treatment of inmates, [or] prisoners, . . . ."). Accordingly, DOC policy positions are
proper means for an inmates basis for loss of good time credits.
B. Substantial Evidence
Anderson argues the DOC decision must be reversed since the decision is not supported by the evidence. I cannot agree.
In examining a DOC determination for the presence of evidentiary support, an ALJ must review the matter in an appellate
capacity. Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742. In that capacity, an ALJ reviewing factual disputes between
DOC and the inmate "will not substitute [the ALJ's] judgment for that of the [DOC Hearing Officer] as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact." S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2000).
Thus, once the facts are established by the Hearing Officer, the ALJ will not re-weigh the evidence in an attempt to come to
an independent conclusion on the factual dispute. Rather, the ALJ will rely upon the Hearing Officers factual
determinations unless such those determinations are "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence on the whole record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23- 380(A)(6)(e) (Supp. 2000). In determining if substantial evidence
supports the Hearing Officer's factual determinations, the ALJ does not look for "a mere scintilla of evidence nor evidence
viewed blindly from one side, but [rather looks for ] evidence which, when considering the record as a whole, would allow
reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the agency reached." Palmetto Alliance, Inc. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 282 S.C. 430, 432, 319 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1984). Accordingly, if such evidence is present, substantial evidence is
present and the factual determinations will not be overturned.
Here, substantial evidence supports the factual determinations made below. The testimony stated that Anderson had
contraband consisting of a cooler. He had a weapon consisting of a box cutter razor blade. Further, Anderson admitted that
he used profanity to an officer. In addition, Anderson entered a guilty pleas to each charge. These determinations would
allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that Anderson committed the acts here in dispute. Thus, substantial
evidence supports the DOC decision.
IV. Conclusion
The guilty verdict entered by DOC against Kelly Anderson, #211947 is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: April 23, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina |