ORDERS:
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division ("Division") pursuant to the appeal of Johnny
Padgett, an inmate incarcerated with the Department of Corrections ("Department") since May 17, 2000. On
July 26, 2000, Inmate Padgett filed a grievance stating that his custody level was reduced without review. The
Department denied his grievance, stating that Inmate Padgett had been recommended for advancement to Close
Custody from SD III; however, before his advancement was approved and he could be moved, Inmate Padgett
was convicted of a disciplinary infraction, which resulted in his reduction to SD II custody level. Inmate
Padgett did not challenge the underlying disciplinary infraction and does not allege that his due process rights
were violated in that proceeding. Dissatisfied with the Department's response, Inmate Townsend filed this
appeal with the Division on November 16, 2000, pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by the South Carolina
Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000).
As in all cases subject to appellate review by the Division, the standard of review in these inmate grievance
cases is limited to the record presented. An Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment for that
of an agency unless the agency's determination is affected by error of law or is clearly erroneous in view of the
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the whole record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp.
1999); Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 380, 527 S.E.2d at 756; Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304
(1981).
The Division's jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision of the South Carolina
Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). In Al- Shabazz, the Supreme
Court created a new avenue by which inmates could seek review of final decisions of the Department of
Corrections in "non-collateral" matters, i.e.,matters in which an inmate does not challenge the validity of a
conviction or sentence, by appealing those decisions to the Division and ultimately to the circuit court pursuant
to the Administrative Procedures Act. 338 S.C. at 373, 376, 527 S.E.2d at 752, 754. In its appellate capacity, the
Division is primarily concerned with ensuring that the appellants receive all procedural process they are due.
"The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750,
citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972). This guarantee of due
process is extended only to deprivations of life, liberty, and property resulting from deliberate decisions of
government officials. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330, 106 S. Ct. 662, 664 (1986), overruling Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981). Nevertheless, an inmate has no liberty interest in his security or
custody classification. Brown v. Evatt, 322 S.C. 189, 470 S.E.2d 848 (1996). Because state law permits such
classifications to be made at the Department's discretion based on security concerns, custody status is not a
constitutional liberty interest and is therefore not subject to review by the Division. As such, Inmate Padgett has
failed to state a cognizable constitutional claim entitling him to review by this Division.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Department's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and Inmate
Padgett's appeal is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
P.O. Box 11667
Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1667
April 9, 2001
Columbia, South Carolina |
