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Administrative Law Court
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SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
Terry Cooper, #118061 vs. SCDOC

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Corrections

PARTIES:
Appellant:
Terry Cooper, #118061

Respondent:
South Carolina Department of Corrections
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
00-ALJ-04-00751-AP

APPEARANCES:
n/a
 

ORDERS:

ORDER

STATEMENT OF CASE

This matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD) pursuant to the appeal of Terry Cooper, (Appellant) an inmate incarcerated with the Department of Corrections (Department). On June 13, 2000, the Appellant was convicted of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code 1.04, Threatening to Inflict Harm on an Employee after a hearing on the charge. As a result of his conviction, the Appellant lost 40 days of "good-time" credit. He also received a reprimand and was placed on a 30-day phone suspension. Cooper filed a grievance with the Department and

received the Department's final decision on September 6, 2000. On September 22, 2000, Cooper filed this appeal.

BACKGROUND

On June 8, 2000, the Appellant was charged by Lt. L. Farris of the Department of Corrections with a violation of SCDC Disciplinary Code 1.04, Threatening to Inflict Harm on an Employee. Lt. Farris and Appellant were having a discussion in which the Appellant admits to being angry and upset. Lt. Farris charged Appellant after alleging he said, "I'm good with knives and I'm prepared to go to supermax. I'll do what I have to do. I ain't handicapped and I don't need to be here. I want to go to lock up. The next one that fucks with me is going to get it." Appellant denied making all of those statements, but did admit he said he was good with knives and wanted to go to lock up. The hearing officer concluded that statements about violence were made, that the officer felt threatened by the statements made and the charge is supported by the evidence. Before the hearing started, Appellant stated that he wished to go forward without his accuser present. He also stated he wished assistance from Counsel Substitute which was made available. At the conclusion of the hearing he was asked if he wished to have his appeal rights to which he replied, "No ma'am."These statements are in the certified transcript of the hearing.

In his Notice of Appeal and his Appellate Brief, the Appellant alleges that (1) he was denied the right to face his accuser (2) he was denied the right to present evidence that would contradict the officer and (3) at the conclusion of the hearing he did not receive any appeal rights. He contends his right to Due Process was violated.

ANALYSIS

The Division's jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision

of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). In McNeil v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP (September 5, 2001) the Division issued an En Banc Order interpreting the breadth of its jurisdiction pursuant to Al- Shabazz. That decision holds that the Division's appellate jurisdiction in inmate appeals is limited to two types of cases: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in which the Department has taken an inmate's created liberty interest as

punishment in a major disciplinary hearing.

In this case, the Department revoked 40 days of good time as punishment in a major disciplinary action.. Inmates have a protected liberty interest in their earned statutory good-time credits under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, when, as here, the Department revokes an inmate's good-time credits as punishment in a "major disciplinary hearings" involving "more serious rule violations," prison officials must provide that inmate with "minimal due process." Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 370, 527 S.E.2d at 750. Consequently, specific administrative procedures must be followed before depriving an inmate of statutorily granted earned credit, including adequate advance notice of the charges, adequate opportunity for a hearing in which the inmate can present witnesses and documentary evidence, and an impartial hearing

officer who prepares a written statement of all the evidence presented and the reasons for his decision. Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 751, citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2978-82 (1974).

In Al-Shabazz, the Court held that inmates may seek review before this Division to ensure that the Department's revocation of good-time credits as punishment in a "major disciplinary hearing" involving "more serious rule violations" comports with "minimal due process." The ALJD inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department has granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. When reviewing the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Id. Consequently, the review in these inmate grievance cases is limited to the record presented. Furthermore, an Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment for that of an agency unless the agency's determination is arbitrary, affected by error of law, or is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and

substantial evidence in the whole record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23- 380(A)(6)(1986 & Supp. 2001); Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 380, 527 S.E.2d at 756.

"'Substantial evidence' is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action." Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). Furthermore, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461 S.E.2d 388 (1995). Additionally, in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that "the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Moreover, in Al-Shabazz, the Court underscored that since prison officials are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, that the Courts and therefore this Division adhere to a "hands off" approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; See also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional "hands off" approach of South Carolina Courts regarding internal prison discipline

and policy).

I find that the Appellant was afforded all process due him pursuant to Al- Shabazz.

The Record indicates that the Appellant received written notice of the charges against him in excess of twenty-four (24) hours prior to a hearing that was held before an impartial Disciplinary Hearing Officer. At the hearing, the Appellant was given the opportunity to offer evidence, call witnesses, and he affirmatively waived his right to confront his accuser. In addition, although not constitutionally required, the Appellant was afforded the right to counsel substitute to assist him in his defense which he was provided. The record does not reflect Appellant's contention that the DHO denied him the right to present contradictory evidence. After the DHO determined that the Appellant was guilty of the charged offense, he prepared a written report detailing the evidence he relied upon and the penalty assessed in finding the Appellant guilty of the disciplinary infraction. When asked if he would like the appeal process explained to him, he replied that he did not. Finally, the Appellant was permitted to appeal the DHO's decision through the inmate grievance process.

Moreover, I find that there is substantial evidence to support the Appellant's conviction of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code 1.04, Threatening to Inflict Harm on an Employee. The record reflects that the Appellant admitted to statements that he could use knives and wanted to go to lock up. The evidence of the officer was that the statements were even more threatening.

Those facts establish substantial evidence that Appellant communicated his intent to commit a violent act dangerous to human life.

ORDER

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the appeal of the Appellant is DISMISSED and the Final Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.



______________________________

CAROLYN C. MATTHEWS

Administrative Law Judge



This 29th day of August, 2002

Columbia, South Carolina


Brown Bldg.

 

 

 

 

 

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