ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD) pursuant to the appeal of Terry Cooper, (Appellant)
an inmate incarcerated with the Department of Corrections (Department). On June 13, 2000, the Appellant was convicted
of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code 1.04, Threatening to Inflict Harm on an Employee after a hearing on the charge. As a
result of his conviction, the Appellant lost 40 days of "good-time" credit. He also received a reprimand and was placed on a
30-day phone suspension. Cooper filed a grievance with the Department and
received the Department's final decision on September 6, 2000. On September 22, 2000, Cooper filed this appeal.
BACKGROUND
On June 8, 2000, the Appellant was charged by Lt. L. Farris of the Department of Corrections with a violation of SCDC
Disciplinary Code 1.04, Threatening to Inflict Harm on an Employee. Lt. Farris and Appellant were having a discussion in
which the Appellant admits to being angry and upset. Lt. Farris charged Appellant after alleging he said, "I'm good with
knives and I'm prepared to go to supermax. I'll do what I have to do. I ain't handicapped and I don't need to be here. I want
to go to lock up. The next one that fucks with me is going to get it." Appellant denied making all of those statements, but
did admit he said he was good with knives and wanted to go to lock up. The hearing officer concluded that statements
about violence were made, that the officer felt threatened by the statements made and the charge is supported by the
evidence. Before the hearing started, Appellant stated that he wished to go forward without his accuser present. He also
stated he wished assistance from Counsel Substitute which was made available. At the conclusion of the hearing he was
asked if he wished to have his appeal rights to which he replied, "No ma'am."These statements are in the certified
transcript of the hearing.
In his Notice of Appeal and his Appellate Brief, the Appellant alleges that (1) he was denied the right to face his accuser (2)
he was denied the right to present evidence that would contradict the officer and (3) at the conclusion of the hearing he did
not receive any appeal rights. He contends his right to Due Process was violated.
ANALYSIS
The Division's jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision
of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). In McNeil v. South
Carolina Department of Corrections, 00-ALJ-04-00336-AP (September 5, 2001) the Division issued an En Banc Order
interpreting the breadth of its jurisdiction pursuant to Al- Shabazz. That decision holds that the Division's appellate
jurisdiction in inmate appeals is limited to two types of cases: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials
have erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in which the Department
has taken an inmate's created liberty interest as
punishment in a major disciplinary hearing.
In this case, the Department revoked 40 days of good time as punishment in a major disciplinary action.. Inmates have a
protected liberty interest in their earned statutory good-time credits under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, when, as
here, the Department revokes an inmate's good-time credits as punishment in a "major disciplinary hearings" involving
"more serious rule violations," prison officials must provide that inmate with "minimal due process." Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C.
at 370, 527 S.E.2d at 750. Consequently, specific administrative procedures must be followed before depriving an inmate
of statutorily granted earned credit, including adequate advance notice of the charges, adequate opportunity for a hearing in
which the inmate can present witnesses and documentary evidence, and an impartial hearing
officer who prepares a written statement of all the evidence presented and the reasons for his decision. Al-Shabazz, 527
S.E.2d at 751, citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2978-82 (1974).
In Al-Shabazz, the Court held that inmates may seek review before this Division to ensure that the Department's revocation
of good-time credits as punishment in a "major disciplinary hearing" involving "more serious rule violations" comports
with "minimal due process." The ALJD inquiry into these matters is primarily concerned with ensuring that the Department
has granted aggrieved inmates the process they are due when their constitutional rights are implicated. Id. When reviewing
the Department's decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Id. Consequently, the
review in these inmate grievance cases is limited to the record presented. Furthermore, an Administrative Law Judge may
not substitute his judgment for that of an agency unless the agency's determination is arbitrary, affected by error of law, or
is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence in the whole record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23- 380(A)(6)(1986 & Supp. 2001); Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at
380, 527 S.E.2d at 756.
"'Substantial evidence' is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is
evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the
administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action." Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276
S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). Furthermore, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Grant v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461 S.E.2d 388 (1995). Additionally, in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution,
Walpole
v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that "the relevant question is whether there is
any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Moreover, in Al-Shabazz,
the Court underscored that since prison officials are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, that the
Courts and therefore this Division adhere to a "hands off" approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and procedures
when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757; See also Pruitt v. State,
274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional "hands off" approach of South Carolina Courts regarding
internal prison discipline
and policy).
I find that the Appellant was afforded all process due him pursuant to Al- Shabazz.
The Record indicates that the Appellant received written notice of the charges against him in excess of twenty-four (24)
hours prior to a hearing that was held before an impartial Disciplinary Hearing Officer. At the hearing, the Appellant was
given the opportunity to offer evidence, call witnesses, and he affirmatively waived his right to confront his accuser. In
addition, although not constitutionally required, the Appellant was afforded the right to counsel substitute to assist him in
his defense which he was provided. The record does not reflect Appellant's contention that the DHO denied him the right
to present contradictory evidence. After the DHO determined that the Appellant was guilty of the charged offense, he
prepared a written report detailing the evidence he relied upon and the penalty assessed in finding the Appellant guilty of
the disciplinary infraction. When asked if he would like the appeal process explained to him, he replied that he did not.
Finally, the Appellant was permitted to appeal the DHO's decision through the inmate grievance process.
Moreover, I find that there is substantial evidence to support the Appellant's conviction of violating SCDC Disciplinary
Code 1.04, Threatening to Inflict Harm on an Employee. The record reflects that the Appellant admitted to statements that
he could use knives and wanted to go to lock up. The evidence of the officer was that the statements were even more
threatening.
Those facts establish substantial evidence that Appellant communicated his intent to commit a violent act dangerous to
human life.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the appeal of the Appellant is DISMISSED and the Final Decision of the
Department is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
CAROLYN C. MATTHEWS
Administrative Law Judge
This 29th day of August, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina |