SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter is before the Administrative Law Judge Division ("Division") pursuant to the appeal of Timothy Miller, an inmate incarcerated with the Department of Corrections ("Department") since January 24, 1998. On November 1, 1999, Inmate Miller was convicted of Department Disciplinary Code 2.24, Any Act Defined as a Misdemeanor in the State of South Carolina, and Disciplinary Code 1.03, Refusing or Failing to Obey Orders, after an incident that occurred on October 21, 1999. As a result of his conviction, Inmate Miller lost 160 days of "good-time" credit. On November 10, 1999, Inmate Miller filed a grievance with the Department, claiming that the conviction violated his due process rights. Inmate Miller received the Department's Final Decision denying his grievance on April 25, 2000. On May 23, 2000, Inmate Miller filed this appeal, alleging that he had not received the requisite notice before facing the 2.24 charge and that the notice of charges he did receive exceeded the time frame set forth in the Department's Inmate Disciplinary Procedures. In addition, Inmate Miller argues that the evidence presented in his disciplinary hearing did not support the charge. Finally, Inmate Miller alleges that the officer responsible for placing him in Pre-Hearing Detention (PHD) improperly presided over his disciplinary hearing.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 21, 1999, Inmate Miller was in his cell on deadlock, a heightened security status, when Officer Miranda Stover was distributing supper trays. After Officer Stover handed either Inmate Miller or his cellmate two "regular" trays, Inmate Miller asked why he had not received a "diet" tray. Officer Stover offered to call down to the cafeteria, but Inmate Miller insisted that he see the lieutenant on duty, David Stamps. When Officer Stover informed Inmate Miller that Lieutenant Stamps was not seeing anyone, Inmate Miller pushed past Officer Stover and headed toward Leiutenant Stamps' office. Despite Officer Stover's repeated directives that he return to his cell, Inmate Miller continued on to the office.

After the incident, Officer Stover completed an Incident Report, which she forwarded to her supervisor, Lieutenant Stamps. A Disciplinary Offense Report was then completed ⁽¹⁾, charging Inmate Miller with Offense 1.3, Striking an Employee With/Without a Weapon, and 2.13, Failing or Refusing to Obey Orders. On the authority of Captain Robert Murray, Inmate Miller was then placed in Pre-Hearing Detention ("PHD"), where he remained for six days prior to his hearing. Inmate Miller received written notice of the charges three days before his hearing, which was held on November 1, 1999. On November 1, Inmate Miller was brought before his Disciplinary Hearing Officer ("DHO"), Captain Murray, the same Captain Murray who had authorized Inmate Miller's placement in PHD. At that time, Captain Murray informed Inmate Miller that he had reduced the 1.3 charge to 2.24, Any Act Defined as a Misdemeanor in the State of South Carolina. During that hearing, Inmate Miller, who was represented by counsel substitute, was permitted to testify and present the testimony of several inmate witnesses. In addition, Inmate Miller's counsel substitute cross-examined Officer Stover regarding the incident. At the conclusion of the hearing, Captain Murray informed Inmate Miller that he had been found guilty of Offense Codes 2.24 and 2.13, and that Inmate Miller would lose 160 days of good time as a result.

On January 31, 2000, Inmate Miller initiated a grievance, in which he complained of several problems with the Disciplinary Report, including the failure of the observing officer, Officer Stover, to complete, date, and sign the Report. In addition, Inmate Miller alleged that he had wrongly been held in close custody prior to his hearing. Finally, Inmate Miller alleged that Captain Murray should have recused himself from Inmate Miller's disciplinary hearing because Captain Murray had authorized Inmate Miller's placement in PHD. On March 25, 2000, the Department rendered its Final Decision denying Inmate Miller's grievance, finding that "the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions..., and the sanction(s) imposed were appropriate for the rules violation(s)." The Department did not address Inmate Miller's concerns regarding Captain Murray's participation in the hearing. This appeal followed.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Division's jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). In Al- Shabazz, the Supreme Court created a new avenue by which inmates could seek review of final decisions of the Department of Corrections in "non-collateral" matters, i.e., matters in which an inmate does not challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence, by appealing those decisions to the Division and ultimately to the circuit court pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act ("Act"). 338 S.C. at 373, 376, 527 S.E.2d at 752, 754. In its appellate capacity, the Division is primarily concerned with ensuring that the appellants receive all procedural process they are due.

Under the Act, the Division may not substitute its judgment for that of a state agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. See Long Cove Home Owners' Assoc. v. Beaufort Cnty. Tax Equalization Bd., 327 S.C. 135, 139, 488 S.E.2d 857, 860 (1997); Marietta Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Pub. Safety, 337 S.C. 133, 522 S.E.2d 605, 607 (Ct. App. 1999). However, the Division may reverse or modify a decision of the Department that is clearly erroneous in light of the substantial evidence in the record. See Long Cove, 327 S.C. at 139, 488 S.E.2d at 860. "Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action." Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981); see Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. 354, 380, 527 S.E.2d at 755-56.

IV. DISCUSSION

The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of procedural due process applies only to the deprivation of a life, liberty, or property interest. Board of Regents of State College v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2705 (1972). The statutory right to sentence-related credits is a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 369-370, 527 S.E.2d at 750. An inmate facing the loss of sentence related credits is entitled to minimal due process to ensure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated. 338 S.C. at 370, 527 S.E.2d at 750. While due process is "flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands," Stono River Envtl. Protection Ass'n v. S.C. Dept. of Health and Envtl. Control, 305 S.C. 90, 94, 406 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1991), certain elements must be satisfied in order for procedural due process requirements to be met, including adequate advance notice of the charges, adequate opportunity for a hearing in which the inmate can present witnesses and documentary evidence, and an impartial hearing officer who prepares a written statement of all the evidence presented and the reasons for his decision. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751, citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2978-82 (1974).

In this case, the Department failed to afford Inmate Miller all process he was due before taking 160 days of good time from him. Instead of providing Inmate Miller with an impartial hearing officer, the Department assigned the very captain responsible for placing Inmate Miller in PHD following the incident. As such, Captain Murray had personal knowledge of the events resulting in the charges against Inmate Miller, rendering him a partial, rather than an impartial, adjudicator, in violation of Inmate Miller's due process rights. Because this ruling is made on due process grounds, I decline to address Inmate Miller's other claims.

Accordingly, the Final Decision of the Department is REVERSED. In addition, this case is REMANDED to the Department to hold a contested case hearing pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, in which the Department shall provide Inmate Miller with at least 24 hours' notice of the charges against him; shall provide Inmate Miller with an impartial hearing officer; shall afford Inmate Miller counsel substitute if necessary; and shall afford Inmate Miller the opportunity to present witnesses and evidence on his own behalf.

V. ORDER

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Final Decision of the Department is REVERSED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is REMANDED to the Department to conduct a contested case hearing pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act as outlined above.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

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C. DUKES SCOTT

Administrative Law Judge

October 19, 2001

Columbia, South Carolina

1. It appears that the Disciplinary Offense Report was not prepared by Officer Stover, despite the listing of her name in the space provided for the accusing official, because her signature is missing from the space provided for the signature of the accusing official.