ORDERS:
ORDER
Grievance No. ACI-1501-99
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Judge Division ("Division") pursuant to the appeal of
Gerald Evans, an inmate incarcerated with the Department of Corrections ("Department") since
December 2, 1994. On December 13, 1999, Inmate Evans pleaded guilty to Disciplinary Offense 2.13,
Refusing to Obey Orders in a major disciplinary hearing. As a result, Inmate Evans was lost twenty
days' good time. On December 15, 1999, Inmate Evans filed a grievance challenging his conviction.
The Department denied his grievance on March 27, 2000. On April 26, 2000, Inmate Evans filed this
appeal with the Division.
In his appeal, Inmate Evans alleges that the Department violated his right of due process with regard to
the December 2 charge. Specifically, Inmate Evans alleges that the Department violated his rights
when the assistant warden, and not a lieutenant as prescribed by Department policy, determined that
Inmate Evans should receive a "major" hearing regarding the charge. In addition, Inmate Evans alleges
that the Department violated his right to due process during the hearing itself. Inmate Evans alleges
that, just prior to entering his guilty plea, the Disciplinary Hearing Officer ("DHO") turned off the tape
recorder. During that period when the tape recorder was off, he alleges, Inmate Evans was "led to
believe" by the DHO and his counsel substitute that his charge would be reduced from a "major" to a
"minor" if he pleaded guilty. After Inmate Evans entered his guilty plea, the DHO accepted his plea,
then took his testimony and the testimony of the charging officer. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
DHO informed him that she would not reduce the charge to a "minor" because it was his second such
offense since October 1999.
The Division's jurisdiction to hear inmate appeals is derived entirely from the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). In its appellate
capacity, the Division is concerned with ensuring that the appellants receive all procedural process they
are due when the constitutional rights of the appellants are implicated. 338 S.C. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at
750. Because statutory right to sentence-related credits is a protected liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment, an inmate is entitled to minimal due process before those credits may be taken
away. Id. However, an inmate may waive his right to due process by knowingly and voluntarily
pleading guilty to a disciplinary charge. See Wykoff v. Resig, 613 F.Supp. 1504, 1507-08 (N.D. Ind.
1985), citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). An inmate's guilty plea is neither knowing nor
voluntary if it is "'induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment),
misrepresentation (including unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature
improper or having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).'" Id. at 1508, quoting Marby v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2547 (1984). An inmate's own testimony is insufficient to
support a claim that a promise was made in exchange for his guilty plea absent any other evidence that
the inmate's plea was solicited. Id.
I find that Inmate Evans has offered no evidence that either the DHO or his counsel substitute promised
him that the charge would be reduced from a major to a minor in exchange for his plea. The Record
contains no evidence that such a promise was made. To the contrary, the hearing transcript reflects that
Inmate Evans gave his guilty plea without the promise of a plea agreement:
DHO: Did anyone force or threaten you for that guilty plea?
Inmate Evans: No, ma'am.
DHO: Did anyone promise you anything for that guilty plea?
Inmate Evans: Nall.
DHO: You're giving of your own free will? Huh?
Inmate Evans: Yes, ma'am.
Because Inmate Evans waived his right to due process when he knowingly and voluntarily pleaded
guilty to Disciplinary Code 2.13, Refusing to Obey Orders, any irregularity in the Department's
disciplinary procedure is without consequence. Accordingly, I hereby AFFIRM the Final Decision of
the Department and DISMISS Inmate Evans' appeal.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Final Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED and the
Appeal of Inmate Evans is DISMISSED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
May 2, 2001
Columbia, South Carolina |
