ORDERS:
ORDER OF REMAND
On October 1, 2001, the Director of the South Carolina Department of Insurance issued a default order revoking
Appellant's resident insurance agent and broker licenses for several violations of the Department's regulations. The
Department mailed a copy of this default order to Appellant on January 14, 2002, and Appellant appealed the order to this
tribunal on February 12, 2002. Contending that he never received notice of the Department's intention to revoke his
license, and thus could not have requested a contested case hearing on the charged violations, Appellant filed a Motion to
be Relieved from Default Judgment with this tribunal on May 22, 2002. However, as it appears that this motion is more
properly made to the Department, this matter is hereby remanded to the Department for its consideration of Appellant's
motion.
Generally, the proper procedure for challenging a default judgment is to move the tribunal issuing the default to set aside
the judgment, rather than to directly appeal the default judgment to a higher tribunal. See Winesett v. Winesett, 287 S.C.
332, 334, 338 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1985). If the motion for relief from the default judgment is denied, then an appeal may be
taken. See id. By referring the question of whether to re-open a default judgment to the tribunal originally issuing the
default, this rule comports with sound principles of judicial economy, see id. at 333-34, 338 S.E.2d at 341, and accords
with "South Carolina's policy favoring the disposition of issues on their merits rather than on technicalities." Mictronics,
Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 345 S.C. 506, 511, 548 S.E.2d 223, 226 (Ct. App. 2001). Moreover, because courts favor a
trial on the merits over a judgment by default, "the procedures for allowing relief from a default judgment are liberally
construed to see that justice is promoted and to strive for the disposition of cases on the merits." Alex Sanders & John S.
Nichols, Trial Handbook for South Carolina Lawyers § 4.16, at 217 (2d ed. 2001).
Here, it appears that Appellant is likely entitled to a hearing on the merits of the Department's allegations against him.
Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant's Motion to be Relieved from Default Judgment is REMANDED to the
Department of Insurance for it to determine whether to grant Appellant relief from the default order and thereby allow him
an opportunity to request a hearing on the revocation of his licenses.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in light of this remand, this matter is therefore DISMISSED from the docket of the
Administrative Law Judge Division.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
JOHN D. GEATHERS
Administrative Law Judge
Post Office Box 11667
Columbia, South Carolina 29211-1667
June 12, 2002
Columbia, South Carolina |
