ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
This is a contested case brought by Petitioner
James W. Barber challenging the
decision of the South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs (“Department”)
which denied Petitioner’s Originator License for Mortgage Broker Company
Originators based on Petitioner’s application and the South Carolina Law
Enforcement Division’s (“SLED”) criminal records check. A hearing was scheduled
on May 11, 2006, but the Petitioner was mistaken as to the time of the
hearing. The Respondent appeared and the Court dismissed the action due to the
failure of the Petitioner to appear. The Petitioner appeared shortly threreafter
and filed a Motion for Reconsideration. This motion was granted on June 21,
2006 and a hearing on the merits was held before me on Thursday, July 13, 2006 at
the offices of the Administrative Law Court (“ALC” or “Court”) in Columbia,
South Carolina. Based on the evidence before me, I find and order that the
Petitioner be granted his license.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Having
observed the witnesses and exhibits presented at the hearing and closely passed
upon their credibility, taking into consideration the burden of persuasion of
parties, I make the following findings of fact by a preponderance of evidence:
1. Notice
of the time, date, place and subject matter of the hearing was given to
Petitioner and Respondent.
2. When
the Petitioner completed his application, Supplemental Form O for an
originator’s license, he submitted a sworn statement that all information
contained in the application was true, current and correct. Petitioner
answered “No” to the question on the form, “Have you ever been convicted of a
felony or an offense involving breach of trust, moral turpitude or dishonest
dealings within the last ten years?”
3. Petitioner’s
arrest record, Respondent’s Exhibit #2, shows a conviction for Fraudulent
Checks in 1996. The Petitioner had been paid with a bad check by his employer
which caused his personal checks to bounce. The Petitioner paid full
restitution and did not realize that these fraudulent check charges were
consider “convictions” as asked on the mortgage loan originator’s application.
4. The
Court found the Petitioner to be a credible witness. He testified that he paid
restitution on all of the checks. Counsel for the Respondent stated that as of
August 9, 2006, the ten year look back period for the question on the
application will run and the Petitioner’s fraudulent check issue will be moot.
6. The
Petitioner testified that since he had paid full restitution plus the court
fees on the bad check, he was not aware that these convictions would appear on
his record. He would like to be able to return to work.
CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW
Based upon the above
findings of fact, I conclude the following as a matter of law:
1. S.C. Code
Ann. 37-6-414 (2005), S. C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-600, et seq. (2005)
and S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (2005) grant jurisdiction to the Administrative
Law Court to hear this contested case.
2. S.C. Code
Ann. § 40-58-50(C) (2005) sets forth:
The
application for an originator license must designate the employing mortgage
broker and must include descriptions of the business activities, educational
background, and general character and fitness of the applicant as required by
this chapter, including consent to a criminal records check…
3. S.C.
Code Ann. § 40-58-55 (2005) sets forth:
(A) The department may refuse to license an applicant or refuse to renew a license if it
finds, after notice and a hearing pursuant to the Administrative Procedures
Act, that the applicant or his agent has:
(1) violated
a provision of this chapter or an order of the department;
(2) withheld
material information in connection with an application for a license or its
renewal, or made a material misstatement in connection with the application;
(3) been
convicted of a felony or of an offense involving breach of trust, moral
turpitude, fraud, or dishonest dealing within the past ten years.
(B) A person
who was in business as a mortgage broker or is an agent of a broker before
October 1, 1998, and who has been convicted of a felony or an offense involving
breach of trust, moral turpitude, fraud, or dishonest dealing within the past
ten years may continue in business as a mortgage broker or agent, but if a
mortgage broker or an agent of a broker is convicted of an offense enumerated
in item (3) of subsection (A) on or after October 1, 1998, that person is
subject to the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis added.)
4. The record shows
Petitioner’s arrest record has the fraudulent check charges in 1996, which is an offense specifically included in S.C.
Code Ann. § 40-58-55(A)(3) (2005). Although the Petitioner’s
conviction was within the last ten years, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §
40-58-55 (2005), I conclude that the Department’s refusal to license Petitioner
was not proper. The Respondent even admitted that the issue will be moot on
August 9, 2006. In addition, S.C. Code Ann. § 40-58-55 is a permissive, not
mandatory, statute in that the Department “may refuse to license an
applicant.”
"The cardinal rule
of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent
whenever possible." Strother v. Lexington County Recreation Comm'n,
332 S.C. 54, 62, 504 S.E.2d 117, 121 (1998). "All rules of statutory
construction are subservient to the one that the legislative intent must
prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that
language must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the
statute." Kiriakides v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 312
S.C. 271, 275, 440 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1994). The words of the statute must be given
their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced
construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. Hitatchi Data Sys.
Corp. v. Leatherman, 309 S.C. 174, 178, 420 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1992). Marlboro
Park Hospital v. SCDHEC, 257 S.C. ____, 595 S.E. 2d 851 (SC Ct. App.
2004). Here the use of the permissive “may” versus the mandatory “shall”
indicates that the Legislature intended that the application of this statute is
discretionary.
In this matter, I find that the statute should not be
strictly construed against the Petitioner.
ORDER
Based upon the above
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ORDERED that
Petitioner James W. Barber is entitled to an Originator License for Mortgage
Broker Company Originators.
AND IT IS SO
ORDERED.
_________________________________
Carolyn
C. Matthews
SC
Administrative Law Judge
August 8, 2006
Columbia, South Carolina |