South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
Edgar A. Brown building 1205 Pendleton St., Suite 224 Columbia, SC 29201 Voice: (803) 734-0550

SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
Joette and E. Keith Johnson vs. Oconee County Assessor

AGENCY:
Oconee County Assessor

PARTIES:
Petitioners:
Joette and E. Keith Johnson

Respondent:
Oconee County Assessor
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
02-ALJ-17-0134-CC

APPEARANCES:
For the Petitioners:
E. Keith Johnson, Pro Se

For the Respondent:
Karen F. Ballenger, Esquire
 

ORDERS:

FINAL ORDER AND DECISION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a contested case brought by the Petitioners concerning the valuation of his property for the 2001 tax year. The Petitioners exhausted their prehearing remedies with the Oconee County Assessor (Assessor) and the Oconee County Board of Assessment Appeals (Board) and sought a contested case hearing before the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD or Division).[1] A hearing was held at the offices of the Division in Columbia, South Carolina on February 18, 2003.

ISSUES

1. Have the Petitioners met their burden to have this case reopened?

2. If so, what is the fair market value of the subject property for the 2001 tax year?

MOTION TO REOPEN


After the Board found the value of the subject property to be $123,800.00, the Petitioners further appealed their case to the Division. A hearing was scheduled into this case on September 4, 2002 at the offices of the Division. The Petitioners were notified of that hearing at their address by a Notice of Hearing dated June 17, 2002, and the hearing went forward on September 4, 2002. The Assessor and the Respondent’s attorney were present at the hearing. However, the Petitioners did not appear at the hearing and did not notify the Division that they would not be appearing. The Respondent moved to dismiss the case and the Division entered an Order of Dismissal stating that the case had been dismissed in accordance with ALJD Rule 23. Subsequently, the Petitioners contacted the Division by letter stating that they never received the Notice of Hearing and requested that the case be reopened. This letter was construed as a Motion to Reopen and a motions hearing was scheduled to consider the Petitioners’ arguments. In the notice to the parties, the Court advised them to be prepared to proceed forward on the merits if the Petitioners’ Motion to Reopen was granted.

The Petitioners argued that they never received the Notice of Hearing for the September 4, 2002 hearing. Petitioner Keith Johnson testified that he was the primary person responsible for getting the mail and that he did not receive the Notice of Hearing sent by the ALJD. He also testified that the Petitioners have lived at the same address for many years. ALJD Rule 29(D)(1) sets forth that “[a]ny party may move for reconsideration of a final decision of an administrative law judge in a contested case, subject to the grounds for relief set forth in Rule 60(B)(1 through 5), SCRCP. . . .” SCRCP Rule 60(b)(2) provides, in part, that a motion for reconsideration may be based upon “mistake” or “inadvertence.” In determining whether to grant a motion under Rule 60(b), the trial judge should consider: “The promptness with which relief is sought, the reasons for the failure to act promptly, the existence of [a] meritorious defense, and the prejudice to the other parties are relevant.” New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Bey Corp., 312 S.C. 47, 50, 435 S.E.2d 377, 379 (Ct. App.1993) (quoting Harry M. Lightsey & James F. Flanagan, South Carolina Civil Procedure 82 (1985)). Furthermore, in Columbia Pools, Inc. vs. Galvin, 288 S.C. 59, 339 S.E.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1986), the Court of Appeals held that a “good faith mistake of fact” alone may constitute sufficient grounds for vacating a default judgment.


Here, the Petitioners promptly notified the Division of their claim and reason for not attending the hearing. Furthermore, the Petitioners established a basic meritorious claim and the prejudice to the Assessor was slight.[2] Finally, though unusual, I find that the Petitioners contentions were credible. Morever, I recognize that the Petitioners are placed in the awkward position of proving a negative in establishing that they did not receive the Notice of Hearing. Therefore, I find sufficient grounds to reopen the case.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Having observed the witnesses and exhibits presented at the hearing and closely passed upon their credibility, taking into consideration the burden of persuasion by the parties, I make the following Findings of Fact by a preponderance of evidence:

1. Notice of the date, time, place and nature of the hearing was timely given to all parties.

2. The Petitioners are the owners of Lot 33, Coneross Point Subdivision, located in Oconee County, South Carolina. The property is also identified on the Oconee County Tax Map as Tax Map #302-01-01-033. The Assessor appraised the subject property for $138,800.00 for the 2001 tax year. In determining the value of the Petitioners’ property, the Assessor used the market sales analysis approach utilizing three comparables. Comparable One was Lot 6 located in Snug Harbor Subdivision, which sold for $225,000.00 on August 9, 2001. The adjusted sales price of this comparable (after adjustments were made for a boat dock and square footage) was $212,000.00. Comparable Two was Lot 22 situated Coneross Point Subdivision which sold for $215,000.00 on December 19, 2000. The adjusted sales price of this comparable (after adjustments were made for a boat dock and square footage) was $170,000.00. Comparable Three was Lot 9 located in Webb Subdivision which sold for $160,000.00 on May 29, 2001. The adjusted sales price of this comparable (after adjustments were made for the age of the home and square footage) was $184,400.00.


The Petitioners presented no sales of comparable properties. In fact, in his testimony, Petitioner Keith Johnson did not even testify as to his opinion of the value of the subject property. He simply argued that since the assessed value of the property in the former assessment was $57,600.00, given normal inflation, his property should be appraised at not more than $65,550.00.[3] The Petitioner also compared the difference in the sales price of Lot 32 in the same subdivision at the time that he purchased the subject property and the difference in the assessed values (only land values) of the property in 2001. He argues that the price and assessed value of Lot 32, which was a much better lot than his property, should also have been considered. He contends that the terrain of Lot 33 is not nearly as steep as his property and, therefore, his property should be valued less that the value of Lot 32. However, the Petitioner testified that since purchasing his property, he has spent a considerable amount of work to grade the land. Moreover, the Petitioner did not know when Lot 32 was sold or what that purchase price was.

The Petitioners also argued that no representative of the Assessor’s office ever entered their home or considered repairs needed to the home. However, the appraiser did take age into account when valuing the Petitioners’ property and made adjustments to the comparables accordingly. Furthermore, requiring the Assessor to enter and evaluate each home during a reassessment is too cumbersome and is not statutorily required. Finally, the Petitioners presented no specific evidence that the internal characteristics of his home is not comparable to the other homes to which his property was compared.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based upon the above Findings of Fact, I conclude the following as a matter of law:

1. S.C. Code Ann. §12-60-2540 (2000) authorizes the Division to hear this contested case pursuant to Chapter 23 of Title 1 of the 1976 Code of Laws, as amended. The taxable status of real property for a given year is to be determined as of December 31 of the preceding tax year. S.C. Code Ann. §12-37-900 (2000); Atkinson Dredging Company v. Thomas, 266 S.C. 361, 223 S.E.2d 592 (1976).

2. In S.C. Code Ann. §12-37-930 (2000), the legislature set forth how real property must be valued:


All property must be valued for taxation at its true value in money which in all cases is the price which the property would bring following reasonable exposure to the market, where both the seller and the buyer are willing, are not acting under compulsion, and are reasonably well informed of the uses and purposes for which it is adapted and for which it is capable of being used.

“Under this statute there is no valid distinction between market value for sales purposes and market value for taxation purposes.” S.C. Tax Comm’n v. S.C. Tax Board of Review, 287 S.C. 415, 339 S.E.2d 131 (Ct. App.1985). Therefore, fair market value is the measure of true value for taxation purposes. Lindsay v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 302 S.C. 504, 397 S.E.2d 95 (1990). While not conclusive, comparisons of the sale price of other properties of the same character, location, and physical characteristics may be utilized to determine this fair market price. See Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate 367 (10th ed. 1992)[4]; Cloyd v. Mabry, 295 S.C. 86, 367 S.E. 2d 171 (Ct. App. 1988); See 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 411 (1954). Furthermore, in estimating the value of property, all of the factors which affect market value or would influence the mind of a purchaser should be considered, such as location, quality, condition and use. See 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 410 at 784; § 411 at 794 (1954).

3. An Assessor’s valuation is presumed correct and the property owner bears the burden of proving the Assessor’s determination is not correct. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 410 (1954). Ordinarily, this is done by proving the actual value of the property. The taxpayer may, however, show by other evidence that the assessing authority’s valuation is incorrect. If he does so, the presumption of correctness is removed and the taxpayer is entitled to appropriate relief. Cloyd v. Mabry, 295 S.C. 86, 367 S.E.2d 171 (Ct. App. 1988).


4. In the instant case, the Petitioners failed to meet their burden of proof of showing that the property is only worth no more than $65,500.00. The Petitioners presented no evidence as to the value of the property at the time of assessment. Rather, their case is based upon the change in the value of the Petitioners’ property between the two assessments. However, the change in property values over time is not evidence of the proper value that should be placed upon the property. The fair market value of the property at the time of the assessment for the tax year 2001 is the issue. I find that the Assessor’s Comparable Two is the best comparable to the Petitioners’ property and its adjusted sales price supports a valuation of at least $138,800.00.

ORDER

Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Assessor shall value the Petitioners’ property for the tax year 2001 at $138,800.00.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________________

Ralph King Anderson, III

Administrative Law Judge

May 12, 2003

Columbia, South Carolina



[1]After the hearing before the Oconee County Board of Assessment Appeals, the Board lowered the assessment of the subject property to $123,800.00. However, at the hearing into the merits of this matter, that evaluation was never addressed by the parties and no evidence was presented in support of this $15,000.00 reduction from the Assessor’s original valuation of $138,800.00. Rather, the Petitioners argued that the valuation should be $65,500.00 while the Assessor argued for its original valuation of $138,800.00. This Final Order and Decision is issued consistent with those facts.

[2] “[A] meritorious defense need not be perfect nor one which can be guaranteed to prevail at a trial. It need be only one which is worthy of a hearing or judicial inquiry because it raises a question of law deserving of some investigation and discussion or a real controversy as to real facts arising from conflicting or doubtful evidence.” Graham v. Town of Loris, 272 S.C. 442, 453, 248 S.E.2d 594, 599 (1978).

[3] This argument is supported by the Petitioners’ Preliminary Tax Statement and Exchange of Evidence filed with the Division prior to the hearing into this matter.

[4] The S.C. Court of Appeals has recognized the Appraisal Institute’s The Appraisal of Real Estate as an authoritative text. See South Carolina Tax Commission v. South Carolina Tax Board of Review, 287 S.C. 415, 339 S.E.2d 131 (Ct. App. 1985).


Brown Bldg.

 

 

 

 

 

Copyright © 2024 South Carolina Administrative Law Court