SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

On appeal, Appellant raises a number of objections both to the Board’s Order and to the procedures employed by the Board during the disciplinary proceedings. With regard to the procedural grounds for appeal, Appellant contends that the Board violated his due process rights by its failure to compel the presence of certain witnesses requested by Appellant at the hearing and by its failure to provide Appellant with adequate notice of the charges against him. As to the substance of the Board’s Order, Appellant contends that the Board’s conclusions that he unlawfully engaged in the practice of engineering and that he incompetently practiced architecture are both in error as a matter of law and clearly erroneous in light of the substantial evidence in the record.

After timely notice to the parties, oral arguments in this matter were heard at the Administrative Law Judge Division in Columbia, South Carolina, on March 21, 2003. Based upon the briefs filed^[1] and the arguments made in this matter, I find that the Board’s decision must be affirmed in part, reversed in part, and, in light of this holding, remanded to the Board for reconsideration of the sanctions imposed on Appellant.

BACKGROUND

Appellant is an architect duly licensed to practice architecture in South Carolina. In late 2000, Appellant was hired by Pastor MacPhail of the New Hope Christian Fellowship Church in Greenville, South Carolina, and his general contractor, Al Benson, to prepare design documents for the construction of a new church building in Greenville. The building was to be constructed in part from prefabricated structural materials, under engineering plans provided by the manufacturer, to be supplemented by additional systems elements (e.g., electrical systems, heating and air conditioning systems, and the like) and site planning designed by Appellant. As designed, the church consists of a 5000-square-foot building with a foyer, a kitchen, bathrooms, and a large assembly room with movable partitions and seating for 200 persons.

In preparing these design documents, Appellant was placed under certain budgetary, time, and materials constraints by the church and its general contractor. In particular, the church set a firm cost limit of $169,000, asked that the plans be completed “almost overnight” (R. at 160), and required Appellant to make allowances in the plans for certain materials and other items that had already been purchased for the building. Yet, despite these constraints, Appellant agreed to prepare the requested drawings. The design documents created by Appellant included a floor plan, a foundation plan, a site plan, and plans for the plumbing, electrical, and heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems. Appellant placed his seal on these drawings and delivered them to Mr. Benson. The plans were not reviewed or certified by an engineer or any other professional.

In November 2000, Mr. Benson submitted these design documents to James Farrell, the plan examiner for Greenville County, to secure a building permit for the church. In response to a number of code-related deficiencies noted by Mr. Farrell, these drawings were subsequently supplemented with a revised set of plans.^[2] However, Mr. Farrell’s concerns with the drawings were significant enough that, despite these revisions, he contacted the Board regarding the work performed by Appellant.

Following an investigation into the matter, the Board charged Appellant with violating S.C. Code Ann. §§ 40-3-20(6), 40-22-30, 40-22-460(B)(2) (Supp. 2000) and 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 11-12(C)(3), 11-12(E)(1), 11-12(E)(2), and 11-12(E)(3) (Supp. 2000).^[3] At the disciplinary hearing of those charges, the Board received testimony from Mr. Farrell and four expert witnesses regarding whether Appellant’s design work constituted the practice of architecture or engineering and regarding the competence of Appellant’s plans. Mr. Farrell testified that, in reviewing Appellant’s design documents, he noted “a fairly extensive list” of code-related deficiencies that was “at the top of what [he] normally get[s]” and that covered “a pretty vast scope” of the building’s design. (R. at 74.) In addition to Mr. Farrell’s testimony, the Board heard expert testimony from Guy White, an electrical engineer, Zach McGhee, a mechanical engineer specializing in plumbing and HVAC systems, Kenneth Timmerman, a structural engineer, and John Gilmore, an architect, each licensed in South Carolina in his respective profession. These expert witnesses testified that, in their opinion, Appellant’s drawings pertaining to the electrical, mechanical, and structural systems of the church building went beyond the practice of engineering merely incidental to the practice of architecture. However, none of these experts articulated a particular standard or set of criteria for determining whether professional design work constitutes the practice of architecture or the practice of engineering, or for otherwise distinguishing the work of these two professions. Rather, they simply provided conclusory opinions that the work performed by Appellant was engineering work beyond the scope of the practice of architecture.^[4]

In addition to their conclusion that Appellant’s design work constituted the practice of engineering, these expert witnesses also testified to a number of deficiencies in Appellant’s drawings. The deficiencies noted by these experts included the failure to specify the materials to be used in the electrical and plumbing systems,^[5] the failure to provide certain venting and exhausting mechanisms for the plumbing and HVAC systems, the failure to provide a proper foundation for the building, and the failure to satisfy a number of other code-related requirements for the electrical, plumbing, and HVAC systems.^[6] Notably, Mr. Gilmore, the architect called as an expert witness, testified to a number of omissions and deficiencies in Appellant’s plans, including deficiencies pertaining directly to the practice of architecture, such as the failure of the drawings to comply with certain provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act and with certain basic architectural standards. Mr. Gilmore described Appellant’s plans, including the revised drawings, as “incomplete, still ha[ving] some deficiencies” and ultimately concluded that “[t]hat set of plans is not competent.” (R. at 151-52.)

Based upon this testimony, and the testimony offered by Appellant and his two witnesses, the Board concluded that “the foundation, electrical and mechanical drawings provided by [Appellant] on the New Hope project were not incidental to the practice of architecture” and “expanded his practice beyond the scope of the practice of architecture as defined by the Board’s Practice Act.” (R. at 5.) The Board further found that “the deficiencies noted in the drawings, specifically the architectural drawings, raise serious concerns about [Appellant’s] competence in practicing his profession.” (R. at 5.) Accordingly, the Board held that, in submitting the New Hope plans, Appellant had violated: (1) 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 11-12(C)(3) (Supp. 2000), by “fail[ing] to comply with the rules and regulations governing the practice of architecture in this State,” (2) 23 S.C. Code Ann. 11-12(E)(1) (Supp. 2000), by “fail[ing] to act with reasonable care and competence, and fail[ing] to apply the technical knowledge and skill which is ordinarily applied by architects in good standing in South Carolina,” (3) 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 11-12(E)(2) (Supp. 2000), by “fail[ing] to take into account all applicable state and municipal building laws and regulations,” and (4) 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 11-12(E)(3) (Supp. 2000), by “attempt[ing] to perform professional services when he was not qualified by education, training, and experience in the specific technical areas involved.” (R. at 5-6.) As a sanction for these violations, the Board suspended Appellant’s license to practice architecture for one year and further required Appellant to complete twenty-four hours of code-related continuing education, pay a civil penalty of $1500, and pay an additional $4366.35 for the costs of the disciplinary matter before the reinstatement of his license.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This tribunal’s review of a final decision in a contested case decided by a professional or occupational licensing board within the South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation is governed by the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A) (Supp. 2002). S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2002); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 2002). Under the standard of review laid out in Section 1-23-380, this tribunal “shall not substitute its judgment for that of the [Board] as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2002). However, this tribunal

may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the [Board];

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) affected by other error of law;

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(f) arbitrary and capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

Id.; see also Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981). Substantial evidence, as referenced in Section 1-23-380(A)(6)(e), is relevant evidence that, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable mind would accept to support the Board’s decision. See, e.g., Daisy Outdoor Adver. Co. v. S.C. Dep’t of Transp., 353 S.C. 113, 117, 572 S.E.2d 462, 464 (Ct. App. 2002). It exists when, if the case were presented to a jury, the court would refuse to direct a verdict because the evidence raises questions of fact for the jury. Id. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but is something less than the weight of the evidence. Id. Furthermore, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent this tribunal from concluding that substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings. Id.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Whether the Board violated Appellant’s due process rights by failing to subpoena witnesses to the hearing as requested by Appellant.

II. Whether the Board violated Appellant’s due process rights by failing to provide Appellant with adequate notice of the charges against him prior to the hearing.

III. Whether the Board violated Appellant’s due process rights by punishing Appellant for exercising his right to request a hearing of the charges against him.

IV. Whether the Board’s conclusion that Appellant impermissibly practiced engineering beyond the scope of his licensure as an architect is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

V. Whether the Board’s conclusion that Appellant did not practice architecture with reasonable care and competence is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

DISCUSSION

1. Procedural Grounds for Appeal

In the instant appeal, Appellant raises both procedural and substantive objections to the Board’s disciplinary proceedings. As procedural grounds for appeal, Appellant contends that the Board violated his right to due process through its failure to subpoena the presence of approximately thirty witnesses as requested by Appellant and through its failure to provide Appellant with adequate notice of the charges against him before the disciplinary hearing. Appellant also claims, as a third procedural ground, that the Board punished him for exercising his right to a disciplinary hearing. These grounds for appeal are unavailing.

Appellant’s first argument, that the Board violated his due process rights by failing to compel the presence of Appellant’s witnesses, is not preserved for appellate review by this tribunal. It is well-settled that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but rather, an issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by the lower tribunal to be preserved for appellate review. Staubes v. City of Folly Beach, 339 S.C. 406, 412, 529 S.E.2d 543, 546 (2000); see also Holy Loch Distrib. v. Hitchcock, 340 S.C. 20, 24, 531 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2000). Here, Appellant did not raise the issue of the subpoenaing of his witnesses to the Board at the hearing, but instead raises it for the first time on appeal. Moreover, not only did Appellant fail to seek a ruling on the issue at the hearing, but he also failed to respond to a letter from the Board’s counsel sent prior to the hearing, requesting that Appellant explain the relevance of each of the thirty witnesses and provide contact information for the witnesses before the issuance of any subpoenas. Accordingly, this issue is not properly preserved for review and will not be considered by this tribunal.

Secondly, Appellant contends that the Board violated his right to due process by failing to provide him with adequate notice of the charges against him prior to the disciplinary hearing. While “[t]he requirement of notice in an administrative proceeding is not as strict or exacting as that in a judicial proceeding,” 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 285 (1994), procedural due process does require that Appellant have received “fair notice” of the allegations against him prior to the disciplinary hearing. See Burdge v. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 304 S.C. 42, 46, 403 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1991) (reversing and remanding physician misconduct case to the Board of Medical Examiners because its “failure to give fair notice [to the physician] of the allegations against him constitute[d] a denial of procedural due process”); see also S.C. Dep’t of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v. Girgis, 332 S.C. 162, 166, 503 S.E.2d 490, 492 (Ct. App. 1998) (listing “adequate notice” as a basic requirement of procedural due process in administrative proceedings). Further, S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-320(b) (Supp. 2002) sets forth the notice requirements for contested case hearings under the Administrative Procedures Act:

The notice shall include:

(1) a statement of the time, place and nature of the hearing;

(2) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held;

(3) a reference to the particular sections of the statutes and rules involved;

(4) a short and plain statement of the matters asserted.

Id. (emphasis added). This Section also provides that, if the initial notice of the hearing is limited to a statement of the issues involved, “a more definite and detailed statement shall be furnished” to a party upon request. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-320(b)(4) (Supp. 2002).

In the case at hand, the Board provided Appellant with adequate notice of the charges against him. The “Notice of Charges and Hearing” sent to Appellant on February 11, 2002, plainly sets forth the statutory and regulatory provisions Appellant was alleged to have violated, as well as the time and date of the hearing on those charges and the Board’s jurisdiction to hold that hearing. Beyond these technical provisions, the Notice of Charges also describes the conduct of Appellant that is alleged to be in violation of the cited statutes and regulations. The Notice informs Appellant of the particular project in question, and further details the conduct at issue:

7. That [Appellant] was not licensed to provide professional engineering services in South Carolina, and that by providing the structural, mechanical, electrical, and plumbing design drawings for a 5000 square foot building of assembly, [Appellant] engaged in conduct which falls outside the accepted scope of the “practice of architecture” as defined in S.C. Code Ann. § 40-3- 20(6) (1986 & Supp. 2000), and which constitutes the practice of engineering.

8. That the design documents described above and sealed by [Appellant] regarding the New Hope Christian Fellowship in Greenville, South Carolina are incomplete in that they have not been properly coordinated, and do not provide the minimum amount of information required to protect the life, safety, and welfare of the public.

(R. at 9-10.) Without question, the Board’s Notice fully apprised Appellant of the nature of the charges against him, and was not deficient in any manner. Further, Appellant never made a request for a more definite statement of the charges against him as permitted under Section 1-23-320(b)(4). In sum, Appellant had fair and adequate notice of the charges against him prior to the disciplinary hearing before the Board, and has not had his procedural due process rights violated for lack of notice.

As a third procedural ground for appeal, Appellant claims that, because the sanctions imposed by the Board after the hearing were greater than those offered by the Board’s counsel in a proposed consent order prior to the hearing, the Board violated his due process rights by punishing him for exercising his right to a hearing of the disciplinary charges against him. This argument must also fail. While “[i]t is a due process violation to punish a person for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right,” State v. Higgenbottom, 344 S.C. 11, 14, 542 S.E.2d 718, 720 (2001), Appellant has not demonstrated that the Board acted in such a punitive manner in this case. The mere fact, standing alone, that the proposed sanctions offered by counsel for the Board were less severe than the sanctions imposed by the Board’s hearing panel does not establish or otherwise raise an inference that the Board sought to punish Appellant for exercising his right to a hearing. In fact, there was no connection between the settlement efforts made by the Board’s counsel and the actions taken by the hearing panel. The proposed consent order prepared by counsel specifically noted that the order would “not become effective unless and until approved by the Board,” (R. at 21) (emphasis added), and, at the start of the hearing, the members of the hearing panel certified that they had no knowledge of the case beyond the information contained in the complaint. (R. at 49.) Further, in his closing at the hearing, counsel for the Board did not suggest any particular sanctions beyond the imposition of costs, but rather only asked the Board to “make whatever decision you think is appropriate with regard to discipline in this matter.” (R. at 265.) In short, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Board sought to punish Appellant for requesting a disciplinary hearing in this matter.

2. Substantive Grounds for Appeal

In addition to the procedural grounds for appeal addressed above, Appellant challenges the substance of the Board’s Order on two counts. Specifically, Appellant contends that the Board’s determinations that he engaged in the practice of engineering beyond the scope of his licensure as an architect and that he practiced architecture without reasonable care and competence are both erroneous as a matter of law and clearly erroneous, as a matter of fact, in light of the substantial evidence in the record. Each determination will be addressed in turn.

In its Final Order, the Board concluded that Appellant had violated Regulations 11-12(C)(3)^[7] and 11-12(E)(3)^[8] because the foundation, electrical, and mechanical drawings he submitted for the New Hope Christian Fellowship Church “were not incidental to the practice of architecture” and, as such, “expanded his practice beyond the scope of the practice of architecture” and into the practice of engineering. (R. at 5-6.) However, Appellant contends that, with regard to the design of buildings, the practice of architecture and the practice of engineering overlap to such an extent that the design work performed by Appellant in this matter could be categorized under either profession, and, therefore, that Appellant was entitled by his licensure as an architect to prepare the design documents in question. I agree.

While the practice of architecture and the practice of engineering in South Carolina are governed by separate and distinct practice acts, see S.C. Code Ann. §§ 40-3-5 et seq. (2001 & Supp. 2002) and S.C. Code Ann. §§ 40-22-5 et seq. (Supp. 2002), and are regulated by separate and distinct boards within the Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, see S.C. Code Ann. § 40-3-10 (2001) and S.C. Code Ann. § 40-22-10 (Supp. 2002), the two professions share much in common and their practices significantly overlap. This overlap is evident in the basic statutory definitions of the two professions. The architectural practice act defines the “practice of architecture” as:

a service or creative work requiring architectural education, training, and experience and the application of the principles of architecture and related technical disciplines to the professional services or creative work as consulting, evaluating, planning, designing, specifying, coordinating of consultants, administration of contracts, and reviewing of construction for the purpose of assuring compliance with the specifications and design, in connection with a building or site development.

S.C. Code Ann. § 40-3-20(6) (2001) (emphasis added). Similarly, the “practice of engineering” is statutorily defined, in relevant part, as:

any service or creative work, the adequate performance of which requires engineering education, training, and experience in the application of special knowledge of the mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences to such services or creative work as consultation, investigation, expert technical testimony, evaluation, design and design coordination of engineering works and systems, design for development and use of land and water, performing engineering surveys and studies, and the review of construction for the purpose of monitoring compliance with drawings and specifications, any of which embraces such services or work, either public or private, in connection with any utilities, structures, buildings, machines, equipment, processes, work systems projects, [etc.]

S.C. Code Ann. § 40-22-20(22) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). Under the plain terms of these statutes, both architects and engineers are qualified, in their respective practices, to be involved in the design and to supervise the construction of buildings. Cf., e.g., Ga. Ass’n of the Am. Inst. of Architects v. Gwinnett County, 233 S.E.2d 142, 143 (Ga. 1977) (comparing Georgia’s architecture and engineering licensing statutes and finding that “[i]t thus appears that the design and supervision of the building of a fire station is permitted to both professions by the legislature”); Smith v. Am. Packing & Provision Co., 130 P.2d 951, 957 (Utah 1942) (“The statutory definitions of ‘architecture,’ ‘professional engineer’ and ‘professional engineering’ indicate that the making of plans and designs, as well as supervision of construction, are activities more or less common to both fields.”).

However, evidence of the overlap between these professions is not confined to the statutory definitions cited above. For example, to be licensed as an architect, an individual must pass a registration examination that covers such engineering-related subjects as “predesign, site design, building design, structural technology, materials and methods of construction, mechanical, plumbing, electrical, acoustical, life safety systems, and construction documents and services.” S.C. Code Ann. § 40-3-230(C)(3) (2001). And, the practice acts themselves recognize the overlap between the practice of architecture and the practice of engineering. See S.C. Code Ann. § 40-3-290(D) (2001) (“Nothing in this chapter prevents or affects the practice of engineering, as defined in Chapter 22 of Title 40, or architectural work incidental to the practice of engineering.”), S.C. Code Ann. § 40-22-280(A)(1) (Supp. 2002) (“This chapter may not be construed to prevent or to affect . . . the practice of any other regulated profession or trade where the practice of the profession or trade may legitimately overlap the professions regulated by this chapter.”). Moreover, while the Board’s expert witnesses and the Board itself concluded that Appellant had crossed the boundary between architecture and engineering, neither the witnesses nor the Board were able to delineate that boundary or otherwise articulate a distinction between the two professions. Therefore, although the practice of architecture and the practice of engineering are not entirely indistinguishable and are not wholly contained within one another, it is generally understood that “there is an overlapping between the professions of architecture and engineering, and it is recognized that each of the professions have some things in common.” 6 C.J.S. Architects § 6, at 470 (1975); see also Am. Packing & Provision Co., 130 P.2d at 957 (“It is only natural that these two professions which are related in some particulars, have at least some activities in common and to that degree overlap.”).

When confronted by similar statutory schemes and faced with similar problems in drawing a distinction between these professions, American courts have generally concluded

that where either a licensed architect or a licensed engineer performed services which could properly be regarded as within the reach of the statute licensing his profession and also within the statute licensing the other profession, he performed such services under the statute under which he was licensed and was not affected by the fact that they came incidentally within the purview of the other licensing statute.

L.S. Tellier, Annotation, What Amounts to Architectural or Engineering Services within License Requirements, 82 A.L.R.2d 1013, 1016 (1961); see also, e.g., Ga. Ass’n of the Am. Inst. of Architects, 233 S.E.2d at 142 (“Since the building of a fire station falls within the legislative definitions of both professions and because the Code explicitly recognizes some overlap between them, we cannot say that the county’s professional engineer has engaged in the unlawful practice of architecture.”), Verich v. Fla. State Bd. of Architecture, 239 So. 2d 29, 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that the conflict in overlapping architecture and engineering statutes “can only be resolved by concluding that the statutes mean a registered architect can plan and design and supervise construction of a building as the practice of architecture and a registered professional engineer can plan and design and supervise the construction of a building as a professional engineer.”). Of particular note is the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama in State ex rel. State Bd. for Registration of Architects v. Jones, 267 So. 2d 427 (1972), in which the court was called upon to address whether a licensed engineer had engaged in the practice of architecture. In Jones, the court was confronted with statutory provisions similar to South Carolina’s, including provisions that recognized the overlap between the practice of architecture and the practice of engineering, see id. at 430-31, and was faced with expert testimony that, as in the instant case, “was conclusionary to the effect that the plans [in question] were architectural in nature . . . or that the plans were in the field of professional engineering.” Id. at 429. The court therefore concluded that, “[b]ecause it is virtually impossible under our statutory definitions to distinguish between the practice of engineering and architecture, groping in this twilight zone to determine what is incidental to each profession presents questions impossible of any harmonious solution,” id. at 431, and found that the engineer should not be enjoined from continuing his practice.

Similar principles apply in the present matter. The design work performed by Appellant for the New Hope Christian Fellowship Church could be defined as both the practice of architecture and the practice of engineering under South Carolina’s licensing statutes. Further, neither those statutes nor the expert testimony presented at the disciplinary hearing provide a workable standard upon which to determine whether Appellant’s work crossed from the practice of architecture into the practice of engineering. Therefore, as the evidence before the Board in this case indicates that Appellant’s design work fell into the natural overlap between the practice of architecture and that of engineering, the Board’s decision to discipline Appellant for practicing engineering beyond the scope of his licensure as an architect is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. In short, while the Board was apparently willing to “grope into the twilight zone” between these two professions to sanction Appellant for his design work for the church, this tribunal, like the Supreme Court of Alabama, cannot find a legal or factual justification for reaching such an essentially arbitrary conclusion. Accordingly, I find that the Board’s decision to hold Appellant in violation of Regulations 11-12(C)(3) and 11-12(E)(3) for practicing engineering beyond that which is incidental to the practice of architecture must be reversed.

In addition to concluding that Appellant had impermissibly engaged in the practice of engineering in this matter, the Board also determined that the drawings submitted by Appellant for the New Hope Christian Fellowship Church were deficient such that he was in violation of Regulations 11-12(E)(1)^[9] and 11-12(E)(2).^[10] However, Appellant contends that the deficiencies in his plans identified by the expert witnesses were generally minor and that, therefore, the Board’s decision to sanction him for incompetence is erroneous in light of the substantial evidence in the record. This contention must fail.

At the hearing of this matter, the plan examiner for Greenville County, three licensed engineers, and one licensed architect testified that they found Appellant’s drawings to contain numerous errors, omissions, and deficiencies. These deficiencies ranged from relatively minor omissions, such as the failure to specify certain materials in the electrical plans, to significant errors, such as the failure to set the footings for the building at the proper depth. Given the number of errors and omissions in Appellant’s plans, these experts concluded that the drawings were incomplete and insufficient for use in construction, at least to the extent that a contractor would be required to properly fill the gaps in the plans to meet code requirements. See, e.g., R. at 333 (“My opinion is that the electrical design for this project . . . is not complete and contains inaccuracies which could result in code violations by an unscrupulous or incompetent contractor.”), R. at 334 (finding the plumbing and HVAC drawings to be “incomplete and lack[ing] enough information for a competent contractor to use for construction”). In particular, after reviewing the plans, the licensed architect concluded that Appellant’s drawings for the church “are incomplete, have not been coordinated, do not meet the requirements of the 1997 Standard Building Code and do not provide the minimum amount of information required to be permitted, constructed or to protect the life safety and welfare of the public.” (R. at 341.) He further concluded that “these documents are not indicative of competent practice nor are they consistent with the standard of care the public has a right to expect from registered Architects.” (R. at 341.) Moreover, Appellant testified that, because of certain constraints placed upon him by the church, he had to complete his plans in a short amount of time and had to limit his plans because of the church’s cost concerns and prior arrangements between the church and its contractor. Based upon the testimony of these experts, and Appellant himself, the Board’s conclusions that Appellant’s drawings for the New Hope Christian Fellowship Church were not created with the reasonable competence and technical skill ordinarily applied by architects in South Carolina and that the plans did not take into account all applicable state and municipal building laws and regulations are clearly supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the Board’s determination that Appellant violated Regulations 11-12(E)(1) and 11-12(E)(2) must be upheld.

ORDER

For the reasons set forth above,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Board’s decision to find Appellant in violation of 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 11-12(E)(1) and 11-12(E)(2) for the deficiencies in his design drawings for the New Hope Christian Fellowship Church is AFFIRMED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Board’s decision to find Appellant in violation of 23 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 11-12(C)(3) and 11-12(E)(3) for practicing engineering beyond the scope of his licensure as an architect in preparing design documents for the New Hope Christian Fellowship Church is REVERSED.

THEREFORE, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is REMANDED to the Board of Architectural Examiners to reconsider the sanctions imposed upon Appellant in light of this Order reversing two of the four regulatory violations found against Appellant.^[11]

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________________

JOHN D. GEATHERS

Administrative Law Judge

May 5, 2003

Columbia, South Carolina