South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
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SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
Arthur L. and Martha Y. Crosby, et al vs. SCDHEC, et al

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control

PARTIES:
Petitioners:
Arthur L. and Martha Y. Crosby, Albert George Lang, Jr., Sandra Eaton, Constance George, Kathleen R. Downey, and Robert M. Johnson, Jr.

Respondents:
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control and Lee Metz and George B. Smith
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
05-ALJ-07-0352-CC

APPEARANCES:
Mary Shahid, Esquire, for Petitioners

Evander Whitehead, Esquire, for DHEC

Lee Metz and George Smith, Pro Se
 

ORDERS:

FINAL ORDER AND DECISION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This contested case proceeding arises from a decision of the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control’s Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (Department) to amend a critical area private dock permit issued to Respondents Mr. Lee Metz and Mr. George Smith. Petitioners filed a request for a hearing objecting to the amendment of the permit. At the hearing, Petitioners asserted that the amendment was improperly issued because: 1) Respondents Smith/Metz should have provided a survey as ordered by Judge Kittrell before seeking authorization to place a boat lift downstream of the pierhead; 2) the request for a permit amendment failed to satisfy the requirements of 23A S. C. Code Ann. Reg. 30-12, regarding the restrictions on dock sizes relative to creek widths; 3) the construction of the boat storage dock and boat lift OCRM the impacts to navigation; and 4) 23A S. C. Code Ann. Reg. 30-12(2)(c)(ii) prohibits construction of the boat lift and boat storage dock. After timely notice to the parties, a hearing of this matter was held on March 14, 2006, at the South Carolina Administrative Law Court.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Having observed the witnesses and exhibits presented at the hearing and taking into consideration the burden of persuasion and the credibility of the witnesses, I make the following findings of fact by a preponderance of evidence:

1. Respondent Lee Metz is the owner of Lot 42 in the Wexford Sound Subdivision on James Island in Charleston County, which has the street address of 1482 Springwater Court. Respondent George B. Smith is the owner of Lot 41 in the Wexford Sound Subdivision on James Island in Charleston County, which has the street address of 1486 Springwater Court. The Metz and Smith lots are adjacent to each other and are adjacent to an unnamed tributary of Clark Sound hereinafter referred to as Clarks Creek.

All of the Petitioners have docks constructed on Clarks Creek. Petitioners George, Downey, and Lang’s docks are located upstream from the Smith/Metz dock. Petitioner Johnson’s dock is directly across Clarks Creek from the Smith/Metz dock. They currently have 120 square feet of dock, including the pierhead and floating dock and, in addition, have recently received authorization to install a boat-lift. Petitioners Arthur L. and Martha Y. Crosby have a joint-use dock that is immediately downstream from the Metz/Smith dock and located on the same side of Clarks Creek. Their dock consists of approximately 150 square feet of float and pierhead combined.

Permitting History[1]

2. The developer of Wexford Sound Subdivision obtained an approved Dock Master Plan (DMP) for portions of the development, but the DMP did not include Lots 41 (Smith) and 42 (Metz). Lot 42 had sufficient water frontage at the critical line on Clarks Creek to qualify for an individual dock but Lot 41 only qualified for a joint use dock because it possessed less than 75 feet of water frontage at Clarks Creek. Consequently, this Court determined that Metz was entitled to issuance of a single-use dock for Lot 42, but remanded the matter for consideration of whether an agreement could be reached between Smith and Metz regarding a joint use dock.

OCRM, Smith, and Metz then reached an agreement which authorized a 10’ by 10’ pierhead and two 7' by 10' floating docks, for a total of 240 square feet. This permit was appealed by Mark Tesniar. Tesniar claimed that the permitted dock would obstruct access to an unnamed tributary, which flows into Clarks Creek. Judge Kittrell found that “the dock, if constructed as permitted, will not pose a navigational hazard.” However, in order to ensure that the dock would be built in its proper location, Judge Kittrell ordered that:

Respondents Smith and Metz shall have a survey conducted of the dock and provide it to OCRM prior to receiving a construction placard in order that the structure, as built, will not pose a navigational hazard and conform to the provisions of this order.

Respondents Smith and Metz provided OCRM a survey, dated March 4, 2004, and no party objected that the survey did not comply with Judge Kittrell’s Order.

In June, 2003, Smith and Metz sought an amendment to the permit. This amendment, issued July 17, 2003, was not challenged and was the result of negotiations with concerned neighbors The amendment authorized combination of the two 7' by 10' floats to allow for one 10' by 14' float at the upstream end of the pierhead.

July 21, 2005 Amended Permit

3. Respondents Smith and Metz currently have a joint use dock adjacent to Clarks Creek consisting of a 10' by 10' pierhead and 10' by 14' float. Respondents’ pierhead is located near the mouth of a small tributary which is an offshoot of Clarks Creek. On October 14, 2004, Smith and Metz sought an amendment to the permit to construct a single-pile boat lift downstream of the existing pierhead and a 7’ by 12’ jet float[2] upstream of the existing floating dock.

Respondents’ Smith and Metz amendment request was initially denied by OCRM because the width of the creek was only 12' wide, and its regulations specifically prohibit boat lifts on creeks less than 20’ wide. Smith and Metz were notified of the denial of this permit on February 8, 2005. No appeal was taken by Smith and Metz with regard to this determination. However, OCRM later determined that its measurements were incorrect based on creek width measurements provided by Petitioner Robert Johnson. Therefore, though Smith and Metz made no new application, OCRM determined that Smith and Metz were entitled to the amendment. They were thus notified that their amendment request had been approved on July 21, 2005.

Single-Pile Boat Lift

4. The proposed single-pile boat lift is located at the intersection of Clarks Creek and an offshoot of Clarks Creek. The permit amendment indicates a single pile with two forks connected to the side of the pierhead facing the tributary extending from Clarks Creek. It appears that the proposed boat lift will be located immediately adjacent to the mouth of that tributary.

No measurements have been provided of the width or characteristics of this small tributary. Nevertheless, Clarks Creek is barely navigable at mid-tide by ordinary watercraft. The tributary extending off of Clarks Creek appears to be far less navigable.[3] Although Petitioner Crosby navigates in that tributary with a kayak, a 14 foot aluminum boat with an outboard, and a 14 foot sailboat, the evidence simply did not establish that this small tributary was navigable by ordinary watercraft at any tidal stage other high tide. Moreover, I do not find that placement of the boat lift as approved by OCRM will impede Petitioner Crosby’s current use of tributary.

Jet Float

5. Petitioners contend that the proposed jet float location is at an area of Clarks Creek which is less than 20 feet across and where it will interfere with navigation. Clarks Creek provides direct access to Clarks Sound. A typical, small pleasure craft with an out-board motor can navigate the creek from mid-tide to mid-tide in Clarks Creek at Petitioners’ docks and the Smith/Metz dock.

The width of Clarks Creek at the location of Respondent’s pierhead is 24 feet. Petitioners contend, however, that the width of the creek is 17 feet where the jet float would attach to the floating dock and would be only 15 feet at the upstream end of the jet float. However, the accuracy of Petitioner’s measurements was suspect.

Nevertheless, the Smith/Metz floating dock is affixed to two pilings. The furthest upstream piling is located in the creek, as opposed to being located at the marsh line, or in the marsh. The proposed jet float would extend further into the navigable creek than the existing floating dock. Moreover, the deepest section of the channel actually flows under the upstream corner of the existing 10' by 14' floating dock. Clarks Creek also begins to narrow immediately upstream of the Smith/ Metz pierhead. Therefore, at present the 10' by 14' float creates navigational difficulties. Though the current complexity to navigation is limited, the jet float will leave only seven to ten feet of creek open for navigation of small watercraft. Accordingly, I find that that the proposed jet float will negatively effect access through Clarks Creek and restrict navigation.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based upon the above Findings of Fact, I conclude the following as a matter of law:

General Conclusions

1. The Administrative Law Court has subject matter jurisdiction in this action pursuant to S. C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-500 et seq. (Supp. 2005) and S. C. Code Ann. § 48-39-150(D) (Supp. 2005). In the instant case, Petitioners, as the parties affirmatively asserting error in the Department’s issuance of the permit amendment, bear the burden of proof in this matter. See Leventis v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envt’l Control, 340 S.C. 118, 530 S.E.2d 643 (Ct. App. 2000). Therefore, Petitioners must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Department’s issuance of the permit amendment was in error under the relevant statutory and regulatory criteria governing activities in the critical areas. See Anonymous (M-156-90) v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 329 S.C. 371, 496 S.E.2d 17 (1998).

2. Respondent Smith and Metz seek to amend their permit authorizing their joint-use dock. Permits for the construction of private docks in the coastal zone are governed by the South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 48-39-10 et seq. (Supp. 2005), and the regulations promulgated pursuant to those provisions found at 23A S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 30-1 et seq. (Supp. 2005). Those regulations govern the management, development, and protection of the critical areas and coastal zone of this state. Furthermore, OCRM is charged with carrying out South Carolina’s coastal zone policies and issuing permits for docks and piers in the critical areas of the coastal waters and tidelands. 23A S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 30-1 et seq. (Supp. 2005); S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-130 (Supp. 2005).

“An amendment to a permit can be made without the requirements of a new permit if the proposed change on the amendment does not significantly increase the size or change the use of the permitted project.” 23A S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 30-4(H) (Supp. 2005). In reviewing any application for a critical area permit, the Department is also guided by a number of general considerations. See S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-150(A); 23A S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 30-11(B). Among other factors, the Department is required to consider the extent to which a proposed project would "harmfully obstruct the natural flow of navigable water," “affect existing public access to tidal and submerged lands, navigable waters and beaches,” cause “adverse environmental impact which cannot be avoided by reasonable safeguards,” utilize feasible safeguards to avoid environmental impacts, and "affect the value and enjoyment of adjacent owners [sic]." See 23A S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 30-11(B)(2), (5), (8), (9) & (10).

Additionally, in 2004, 23A S. C. Code Ann. Reg. 30-12 (A)(2) (Supp. 2004), set forth the standards for construction of docks and accordingly, the amendment of permits for docks the coastal zone. Regulation 30-12 (A)(2)(c) provided that “[t]he size and extension of a dock or pier must be limited to that which is reasonable for the intended use.” Furthermore, Regulation 30-12 (A)(2)(q) provided the standards for size and use of pierheads and floating docks. Docks were not permitted on creeks less than 20 feet wide as measured from marsh vegetation on either side unless the lot had “greater than 500 feet of water frontage or no potential access via dockage from the opposite side of the creek.” 23A S.C. Code Ann. Reg. 30-12 (A)(2)(q)(i) (Supp. 2004). If a creek was “between 20 and 50 feet, as measured from marsh vegetation on both sides, total allowable dock square footage shall be restricted to 120 square feet unless special geographic circumstances and land uses warrant a larger structure.” 23A S.C. Code Ann. Reg. 30-12 (A)(2)(q)(ii) (Supp. 2004).

Applicability of Regulatory Amendments Effective June 24, 2005

3. OCRM denied the Smith/Metz amendment request on February 8, 2005, and then later determined that it made an errant decision upon the application made by Smith and Metz. Therefore, on July 21, 2005, OCRM notified Smith and Metz that their amendment request was approved.  Petitioners contend that regulations promulgated by OCRM, effective June 24, 2005, prohibit OCRM’s approval of the amendment.  More specifically, they argue that the request for a permit amendment failed to satisfy the requirements of Regulation 30-12(2)(c) regarding the restrictions on dock sizes relative to creek widths. 

            At the time of Smith and Metz’s application, the binding Regulations were the regulations that were implemented effective May 24, 2002.  Since that application, new regulations were promulgated that were effective on June 24, 2005.  The differences between the amended Regulations and the Regulations that were placed in effect in May, 2002, as they relate to this appeal are: a) OCRM’s dock Regulation 30-12(A)(2) now includes the prefatory language that “[t]he following standards in addition to those in 23A S. C. Code Ann. Reg. 30-12(A)(1) are applicable for the construction of private and joint use docks.” (emphasis added);  b) Regulation (A)(2)(c) now requires a permit applicant to choose between a boat lift or boat storage dock; and, c) Regulation OCRM 30-12(A)(2)(c)(ii) now prohibits boat storage docks on creeks less than 20 feet wide.

            The Petitioners are correct that at the time of adoption of the June 2005 amendments there was no pending permit application from Smith and Metz seeking to add a boat lift and jet float.  In this case, OCRM determined that it made an errant decision upon the application made by Smith and Metz.  Timely corrections of incorrect decisions by state agencies are acts that should be lauded. Here, the reconsideration was made in a reasonable period of time.  Additionally, Petitioners have cited no authority that OCRM may not reconsider a permit decision or retract a decision made on errant facts.  In reconsidering its decision, the Department correctly considered the case in light of the regulation in effect at the time of the application.  See Leventis v. S.C. Dep’t of Health and Envtl. Control, 340 S.C. 118, 530 S.E.2d 643 (Ct. App. 2000).  Therefore, the requisites of amended Regulation 30-12 were properly disregarded.

Dock Size

4. OCRM implements a policy of approving, for purposes of joint use docks, twice the allowable square footage as is provided for in 23A S. C. Code Ann. Reg. 30-12(A)(2)(c). Based on the width of Clarks Creek at the location of their pierhead, Smith and Metz are entitled, under OCRM’s policy, to 240 square feet, as opposed to 120 square feet as provided in the regulations for creeks between 20 and 50 feet wide. The combined square footage of the Smith/Metz dock as constructed is consistent with OCRM’s policy at 240 square feet. Furthermore, under the 2004 Regulations the single-pile boat lift, the area bounded by the proposed lift, does not count against the limitation of square footage.

Navigation

5. Petitioners assert that the amended permit impedes navigation. The South Carolina Constitution provides that: “All navigable waters shall forever remain public highways free to the citizens of the State and the United States … .” Art. XIV, Sec. 4. See also S.C. Code Ann. § 49‑1‑10 (Supp. 2005). OCRM, however, is not charged by statute with protecting navigation in this state. Nevertheless, it is required to consider the extent to which a proposal may affect existing access to tidal and navigable waters. 23A S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 30‑12 (A)(1)(a) & (b) (Supp. 2004) provides that a dock “shall not restrict the reasonable navigation or public use of State lands and waters.” See also S. C. Code Ann. § 48-39-150(5) (Supp. 2005). Furthermore, Regulation 30‑12 (A)(2)(n) sets forth that:

Docks must generally extend to the first navigable creek, within extensions of upland property lines or corridor lines, that has a defined channel as evidenced by a significant change in grade with the surrounding marsh; or having an established history of navigational access or use.

OCRM’s regulations further recognize the relationship between the width of a creek, the size of docks, and navigation. 23A S. C. Code Ann. Reg. 30-12 (A)(2)(c)(i) through (c)(v).

“The true test to be applied [in determining whether a waterway is navigable] is whether a stream inherently and by its nature has the capacity for valuable floatage, irrespective of the fact of actual use or the extent of such use.” Hughes v. Nelson, 303 S.C. 102, 105, 399 S.E.2d 24, 25 (Ct. App. 1990), citing State ex rel. Medlock v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 289 S.C. 445, 449, 346 S.E.2d 716, 719 (1986). The term “valuable floatage” includes not only commercial vessels but also use of a waterway by the general public for boating, hunting, and fishing. State ex rel. Medlock v. S.C. Coastal Council, 289 S.C. 445, 346 S.E.2d 716 (1986). Furthermore, “[t]he test of navigability is not whether a waterway is accessible at all times. Rather, the test is whether it is accessible ‘at the ordinary stage of the water.’” Hughes, supra at 26 (1990), quoting State v. Columbia Water, 82 S.C. 181,189, 63 S.E. 884, 888 (1909).

Here, the evidence does not support Petitioners’ contention that the small tributary extending from Clarks Creek is navigable at the ordinary stage of the water. The only instances of navigation provided by Petitioners were in small watercraft. To the contrary, the evidence established that a reasonable boater would take an ordinary watercraft into the tributary only at high tide. Because of the ebb and flow of water on the South Carolina coast during high and low tides, most tidal areas are navigable at high tide. Furthermore, Petitioners did not establish that the tributary extending from Clarks Creek has a defined channel or an “established history” of navigation. Accordingly, placement of the proposed single-pile boat lift would not infringe the requirements of Regulation 30-12(A).

On the other hand, Clarks Creek is a navigable waterway with an “established history” of navigation. Furthermore, the location of the proposed jet float would restrict navigation in that waterway. Therefore, the proposed jet float contravenes the provisions of Regulation 30-12(A).

Survey Requested By Judge Kittrell

6. Petitioners contend that the survey required by Judge Kittrell’s Order does not reflect the unnamed tributary, nor does it reflect the dock construction.  However, Respondents Smith and Metz provided OCRM a survey, dated March 4, 2004.  No party objected that the survey did not comply with Judge Kittrell’s Order.  The Petitioners were not parties and did not seek to be parties in the case of  Mark Teseniar v. SCDHEC-OCRM, supra.  See 73A C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 142 (1983) (objections and exceptions to matters in administrative proceedings may be lost by waiver, as by acts or conduct indicating an intention not to raise such objections or exceptions).  Moreover, an objection to the failure to properly supply a survey is barred under the principle of laches.  Hallums v. Hallums, 296 S.C. 195, 198, 371 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1988) (“Laches is neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under circumstances affording opportunity for diligence, to do what in law should have been done.”).

ORDER

Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby:

ORDERED that the request for authorization to amend OCRM-01-059-M by adding a 7' by 12' jet float is DENIED. The request for authorization to amend OCRM-01-059-M by adding a single pile boat lift is APPROVED, subject to the following condition:

Prior to issuance of a construction placard, Respondents Smith and Metz must provide OCRM a survey of their dock in relation to the unnamed tributary, depicting the location and dimensions of the boat lift. This survey must provide information regarding the distance between the boat lift and the edge of the tributary. The boat lift must be located to insure sufficient off-set from the mouth of tributary to allow for placement of a boat without impacting the navigation of Petitioner Crosby’s kayak or 14 foot aluminum boat.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________________

Ralph King Anderson, III

Administrative Law Judge

May 17, 2006

Columbia, South Carolina



[1] This case is the third contested case before the ALC regarding Respondents’ Smith and Metz attempts to construct a dock for Lots 41 and 42 in Wexford Sound Subdivision. This Court takes judicial notice of two prior decisions - this Court’s Order in the consolidated appeal of Lee Metz v. SCDHEC-OCRM, 99-ALJ-07-0254-CC, and George B. Smith v. SCDHEC-OCRM, 99-ALJ-07-0253-CC, and the Order of the Honorable Marvin F. Kittrell in Mark Teseniar v. SCDHEC-OCRM, Lee Metz, and George Smith, 01-ALJ-07-0224-CC.

[2] The “jet float” is also referred to in OCRM’s regulations as a “boat storage dock.”

[3] Petitioners contend that Judge Kittrell previously determined that the tributary extending off of Clarks Creek was a navigable waterway. However, I find no such determination in his order. Even if that finding had been previously made, it blatantly appears from the evidence presented at the hearing that the tributary is no longer navigable at the average stage of the tide by ordinary watercraft.


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