ORDERS:
Order
STATEMENT
OF CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC)
pursuant to the appeal of Johnny Padgett, an inmate incarcerated with the
Department of Corrections (Department or DOC). Padgett was convicted of
violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.04 (Threatening to Inflict Harm on an
Employee or Member of the Public). As a result of his conviction, Padgett lost
ninety (90) days of “good-time” credit. He filed a grievance with the
Department and the Department issued a final decision on October 3, 2005. Following
the Department’s denial of that grievance, Padgett filed this appeal with the
ALC.
BACKGROUND
On
June 19, 2005, Lieutenant Conwell was making rounds in SMU when he was called
over to Appellant’s cell. Appellant Padgett then told him to tell his uncle
Jimmy Sewell that when Appellant gets out of jail he is going to “put nails in
his balls.” Lieutenant Conwell immediately filed an incident report. A
hearing was held on June 29, 2005 in the absence of Appellant due to the fact
that he was disruptive in the holding cell while waiting for the hearing to
begin. Appellant was represented by Counsel Substitute who stated that
Appellant indicated that he wished to have witnesses called; however Appellant
never informed him who those witnesses were. Appellant also never sent prior
notice of a witness request to his Counsel Substitute or the Disciplinary
Hearing Officer (DHO). During the hearing, the DHO read a narrative of the
Incident Report into the Record and received testimony from the Counsel
Substitute. At the conclusion of the hearing, the DHO found the Appellant
guilty of the charge and sanctioned him to loss of ninety (90) days good time.
Appellant
Padgett filed a grievance with the Department appealing his conviction of the
charge. After reviewing his contentions, the Warden denied Appellant’s
grievance. The Appellant then appealed the Warden’s decision and the
Department subsequently denied that grievance stating that the evidence
supported the conviction and that the sanction imposed was appropriate for the
violation that the Appellant committed. This appeal followed.
In
his Appeal Brief, Appellant
alleges that:
1. He was denied Due Process when he was not allowed to call any witnesses.
2. There is not enough evidence to support the charge.
3. Jimmy Sewell and James Sewell are not the same person.
4. The incident report failed to list evidence or witnesses.
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
The Court’s
jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527
S.E.2d 742 (2000). The Court’s appellate jurisdiction in inmate appeals is
limited to state created liberty interests typically involving: (1) cases in
which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously calculated his
sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in which
an inmate has received punishment in a major disciplinary hearing as a result
of a serious rule violation. Id.
As
set forth above, when reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance
matters, the Court sits in an appellate capacity. Id. at 756.
Consequently, the review in these inmate grievance cases is limited to the
Record presented. An Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment
for that of an agency “as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.”
S.C. Code Ann. § 1‑23‑380(A)(6) (Supp. 2005). Furthermore, an
Administrative Law Judge may not reverse or modify an agency’s decision unless
substantial rights of the Appellant have been prejudiced because the decision
is clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the whole Record,
arbitrary or affected by an error of law. See Section 1-23-380(A)(6); see also Marietta Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety,
337 S.C. 133, 522 S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1999); South Carolina Dept. of Labor,
Licensing and Regulation v. Girgis, 332 S.C. 162, 503 S.E.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1998).
“ ‘Substantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence
viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering
the Record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion
that the administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify
its action.” Lark v. Bi‑Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306
(1981). Accordingly, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from
being supported by substantial evidence. Grant v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461 S.E.2d 388 (1995).
Additionally,
in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 455-456, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that
“the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that
could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Moreover, in Al-Shabazz, the Court underscored that since prison officials are in the best position to decide
inmate disciplinary matters, the Courts and therefore this tribunal adhere to a
“hands off” approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and procedures
when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz at 757; see also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980)
(stating the traditional “hands off” approach of South Carolina courts
regarding internal prison discipline and policy).
In this case, Appellant Padgett alleges that the Department
should not have revoked his ninety (90) days of accrued good time. Inmates
have a protected liberty interest in their earned statutory good-time credits
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, when, as here, the Department
revokes an inmate’s good-time credits as punishment in a “major disciplinary
hearing” involving “more serious rule violations,” prison officials must
provide that inmate with “minimal due process.” Al-Shabazz at 750.
Consequently, specific administrative procedures must be followed before
depriving an inmate of statutorily granted earned credit, including adequate
advance notice of the charges, adequate opportunity for a hearing in which the
inmate can present witnesses and documentary evidence, and an impartial hearing
officer who prepares a written statement of all the evidence presented and the
reasons for his decision. Id. at 751 (citing Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-82 (1974)).
DISCUSSION
Due
Process
The Appellant’s due
process rights in this proceeding are summarized in Al-Shabazz, supra.
I find that the Appellant was afforded all process due him pursuant to Al-Shabazz.
The Record indicates that the Appellant received written notice of the charges
against him in excess of twenty-four (24) hours prior to a hearing that was
held before an impartial Disciplinary Hearing Officer. In addition, although
not constitutionally required, the Appellant was afforded a counsel substitute
who assisted him in his defense. After the DHO determined that the Appellant
was guilty of the charged offense, he prepared a written report detailing the
evidence he relied upon and the penalty assessed in finding the Appellant
guilty of the disciplinary infraction. The Appellant was also permitted to
appeal the DHO’s decision through the inmate grievance process. Finally, the
Appellant did not establish that he was denied the right to present witnesses.
More specifically,
Appellant argues that his due process rights were violated because he was not
allowed to call any witnesses at his hearing. SCDC policy OP-22.14
(3)(a)(2)(b) provides that:
At the time an inmate is served with notice of disciplinary
charges, the inmate will be informed of the right to present documentary
evidence and to request witnesses. Should the inmate request witnesses, s/he
will be required to submit a list of names of the witnesses s/he desires to be
present at the hearing to his/her counsel substitute (or, if no counsel
substitute has been requested, to the DHO) anytime prior to the hearing. This
information will then be given to the DHO. The inmate or counsel substitute may
inform the DHO at any time prior to the hearing of any changes in the list of
witnesses requested.
The Appellant was appointed a
counsel substitute at his request. However, the Appellant failed to follow the Department's
procedure in requesting the attendance of any witnesses.
“The discretion of prison officials in such matters is undeniably broad, but it
is still subject to judicial review for abuse.” Smith v. Massachusetts Dept.
of Corrections, 936 F.2d 1390, 1399 (1st Cir.1991). Therefore, in Smith
the Court held that:
an inmate claiming a violation of procedural due process in a
disciplinary hearing must allege that his requests to call witnesses or submit
written statements "were denied for reasons not having to do with
institutional security or correctional goals, and that the prison
officials" who denied such requests "clearly abused their
considerable discretion in such matters." Such "allegations must be
backed up with enough supportive facts to outline the elements of the
[inmate’s] claim."
Smith, at 1399 (quoting in
part, Hurney v. Carver, 602 F.2d 993 (1st Cir.1979)). The
Department can refute an inmates allegation explaining, in a limited manner,
“the reason why witnesses were not allowed to testify . . . by making the
explanation a part of the ‘administrative record’ . . . or they may choose to
explain it ‘later.’” Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 105 S.Ct. 2192, 85
L.Ed.2d 553 (1985). Here, the Appellant was given the opportunity to offer
evidence, call witnesses, and confront his accuser. He, nevertheless, choose
not to follow the proper procedure. Furthermore, the evidence establishes that
the Department actions were not arbitrary and therefore the Appellant failed to
establish the Department abused its discretion. McGuinness v. Dubois, 75
F.3d 794 (1st Cir. 1996). Accordingly, I do not find that the DHO's
failure to call Appellant’s witness(es) was an abuse of discretion. See Smith
v. Massachusetts Dept. of Corrections, 936 F.2d 1390 (1st Cir.1991).
Substantial
Evidence
I also find that
there is substantial evidence to support the Appellant's conviction of
violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.04, Threatening to Inflict Harm on an
Employee and/or Member of the Public. A Code 1.04 violation is:
Communication, verbal or written, by an inmate to an
individual that s/he intends to injure that person or commit a violent or
unlawful act dangerous to human life, presently or in the future; or one who
commits a physical act of a threatening nature, and the probable result of such
threats or action is to place the individual in fear of bodily injury; or one
who causes evacuation of a building; or one who creates serious disruption or
alarm. Any unauthorized body contact of an employee or member of the public
which creates serious alarm, but does not result in bodily injury.
Appellant’s defense is primarily
that he was reciting a threat made against him and that his words were mixed up.
Nevertheless, the Record clearly supports the facts recited in the “Background”
portion of this Order. In evaluating the evidence presented at the hearing,
“[t]he fact finder is imbued with broad discretion in determining credibility
or believability of witnesses.” Small v. Pioneer Machinery, Inc., 329
S.C. 448, 465, 494 S.E.2d 835, 843 (Ct. App. 1997). Moreover, in Superintendent
v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56, 457 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the revocation of good time must be supported by “some evidence in the
record.” However, “[a]scertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not
require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant
question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the
conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 455. Thus, if
reasonable minds could arrive at the DHO’s conclusion based upon the evidence
presented, the Department’s decision must be upheld regardless of the
derivation of the evidence. See also Smith v. Samu, 54
F.3d 788 (10th Cir. 1995).
When viewed in light of
the DHO’s discretion, the Record sufficiently establishes substantial evidence
that the Appellant acted in a threatening manner. Accordingly, I find that
there is substantial evidence to support the Appellant's conviction of
violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.04 (Threatening to Inflict Harm on an
Employee and/or Member of the Public).
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE
ORDERED that the appeal of the Appellant is DISMISSED and the Final Decision
of the Department is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO
ORDERED.
_________________________________
Ralph
King Anderson, III
Administrative
Law Judge
April 7, 2006
Columbia, South Carolina
Arguments 3 and 4 were not raised at Appellant’s hearing.
Therefore, they cannot be addressed on appeal. See Kiawah
Resort Associates v. South Carolina Tax Com'n, 318 S.C. 502, 504, 458
S.E.2d 542, 544 (1995) (In reviewing a final decision of an administrative
agency, the Administrative Law Judge “has a limited scope of review, and cannot
ordinarily consider issues that were not raised to and ruled on by the
administrative agency.”).
In Sullivan, the Supreme Court also found that
other conditions of confinement could potentially implicate a state created
liberty interest. However, those interests are “generally limited to freedom
from restraint which. . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sullivan v.
S.C. Department of Corrections 355 S.C. 437, 586 S.E.2d 124 (2003) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). See also Slezak v. S.C. Department of Corrections , 361 S.C. 327, 605 S.E.2d 506 (2004).
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