South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
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SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
M. Rodney Jones, # 244189 vs. SCDOC

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Corrections

PARTIES:
Appellant:
M. Rodney Jones, # 244189

Respondent:
South Carolina Department of Corrections
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
05-ALJ-04-00300-AP

APPEARANCES:
n/a
 

ORDERS:

Order

STATEMENT OF CASE

This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) pursuant to the appeal of Rodney Jones, an inmate incarcerated with the Department of Corrections (Department). Jones was convicted of convicted of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.10, Use or Possession of Narcotics, Marijuana or Unauthorized Drugs, Including Prescription Drugs. As a result of his conviction, Jones lost ninety (90) days of “good-time” credit. On March 28, 2005, the Appellant filed this appeal with the Court. Afterwards, this case was transferred to the undersigned on January 6, 2006.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court’s jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived from the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). The Court’s appellate jurisdiction in inmate appeals is limited to state created liberty interests typically involving: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in which an inmate has received punishment in a major disciplinary hearing as a result of a serious rule violation. Id.[1]

When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the Court sits in an appellate capacity. Id. at 756. Consequently, the review in these inmate grievance cases is limited to the Record presented. An Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment for that of an agency “as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” S.C. Code Ann. § 1‑23‑380(A)(6) (Supp. 2004). Furthermore, an Administrative Law Judge may not reverse or modify an agency’s decision unless substantial rights of the Appellant have been prejudiced because the decision is clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the whole Record, arbitrary or affected by an error of law. See Section 1-23-380(A)(6); See also Marietta Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety, 337 S.C. 133, 522 S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1999); South Carolina Dept. of Labor, Licensing and Regulation v. Girgis, 332 S.C. 162, 503 S.E.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1998).

DISCUSSION

Following a hearing on April 27, 2004, Appellant was sanctioned with the loss of ninety (90) days of “good-time” credit for Use or Possession of Narcotics, Marijuana or Unauthorized Drugs, Including Prescription Drugs. However, the Department later overturned that conviction. Following Appellant’s appeal of the Department’s decision, the Department made a Motion to Dismiss this case contending that this case is moot because the Appellant’s conviction was overturned and his “good-time” credits were restored.

Appellant does not dispute that his conviction for Possession of Contraband was overturned and his “good-time” credits were restored. He, nonetheless, contends that this case should not be dismissed as moot because as a result of the Department’s charge, he was confined in administrative segregation and, thus, unable to accrue good-time credits. In other words, he contends that the mere opportunity to earn good-time credits constitutes a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest sufficient to trigger the protection of the Due Process Clause. Nevertheless, “the Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995), citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538 (1976). More specifically, “the transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 468. Therefore, the placement of the Appellant in administrative segregation, without more, does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest. Sandin, supra.

Furthermore, in Luken v. Scott, the Court addressed virtually the same issue as is before this court. 71 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1196, 116 S.Ct. 1690, (1996). Luken alleged that he was confined in administrative segregation because of false information. He further argued that because of his confinement in administrative segregation, he was “unable to accrue additional good-time credits to accelerate his eligibility for parole.” Id. at 193. The Court held that:

The loss of the opportunity to earn good-time credits, which might lead to earlier parole, is a collateral consequence of Luken's custodial status. Yet, such speculative, collateral consequences of prison administrative decisions do not create constitutionally protected liberty interests. Any of a host of administrative or disciplinary decisions made by prison authorities might somehow affect the timing of a prisoner's release, but such effects have never been held to confer a constitutionally protected liberty interest upon a prisoner such that the prison authorities must comply with the Constitutional requirements of due process.

71 F.3d at 193 (citations omitted). See also Abed v. Armstrong, 209 F.3d 63 (2nd Cir. 2000) (Although inmates have a liberty interest in good time credit they have already earned, they have no interest in the opportunity to earn good time credit where prison officials have discretion to determine whether an inmate is eligible to earn the credit.); Conway v. Gorczyk, 171 Vt. 374, 765 A.2d 463 (2000) (denying an inmate the opportunity to earn additional good-time credits did not impose an atypical-and-significant hardship upon him); Baumann v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 846 (9th Cir.1985) (loss of work and educational opportunities not constitutionally protected); James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627 (3rd Cir.1989) (In order to state a cognizable claim that inmates were deprived of wages without due process of law, they must have either a liberty or a property interest.).

I, therefore, find that Appellant has no liberty interest to contest. See Slezak v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 361 S.C. 327, 605 S.E.2d 506 (2004); Sullivan, supra.

ORDER


IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the appeal of the Appellant is DISMISSED and the Final Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED;

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

_________________________________

Ralph King Anderson, III

Administrative Law Judge

April 20, 2006

Columbia, South Carolina



[1] In Sullivan, the Supreme Court also found that other conditions of confinement could potentially implicate a state created liberty interest. However, those interests are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which. . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sullivan v. S.C. Department of Corrections (355 S.C. 437, 586 S.E.2d 124 (2003) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).


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