ORDERS:
Order
STATEMENT
OF CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or
Court) pursuant to the appeal of Rodney Jones, an inmate incarcerated with the
Department of Corrections (Department). Jones was convicted of convicted of
violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 1.10, Use or Possession of Narcotics,
Marijuana or Unauthorized Drugs, Including Prescription Drugs. As a result of
his conviction, Jones lost ninety (90) days of “good-time” credit. On March
28, 2005, the Appellant filed this appeal with the Court. Afterwards, this
case was transferred to the undersigned on January 6, 2006.
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
The
Court’s jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived from the decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527
S.E.2d 742 (2000). The Court’s appellate jurisdiction in inmate appeals is
limited to state created liberty interests typically involving: (1) cases in
which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously calculated his
sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in which
an inmate has received punishment in a major disciplinary hearing as a result
of a serious rule violation. Id.
When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance
matters, the Court sits in an appellate capacity. Id. at 756.
Consequently, the review in these inmate grievance cases is limited to the
Record presented. An Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment
for that of an agency “as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.”
S.C. Code Ann. § 1‑23‑380(A)(6) (Supp. 2004). Furthermore, an
Administrative Law Judge may not reverse or modify an agency’s decision unless
substantial rights of the Appellant have been prejudiced because the decision
is clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the whole Record,
arbitrary or affected by an error of law. See Section 1-23-380(A)(6); See also Marietta Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety,
337 S.C. 133, 522 S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1999); South Carolina Dept. of Labor,
Licensing and Regulation v. Girgis, 332 S.C. 162, 503 S.E.2d 490 (Ct. App.
1998).
DISCUSSION
Following a hearing on
April 27, 2004, Appellant was sanctioned with the loss of ninety (90) days of
“good-time” credit for Use or Possession of Narcotics, Marijuana or
Unauthorized Drugs, Including Prescription Drugs. However, the Department
later overturned that conviction. Following Appellant’s appeal of the
Department’s decision, the Department made a Motion to Dismiss this case
contending that this case is moot because the Appellant’s conviction was
overturned and his “good-time” credits were restored.
Appellant does not
dispute that his conviction for Possession of Contraband was overturned and his
“good-time” credits were restored. He, nonetheless, contends that this case
should not be dismissed as moot because as a result of the Department’s charge,
he was confined in administrative segregation and, thus, unable to accrue
good-time credits. In other words, he contends that the mere opportunity to
earn good-time credits constitutes a constitutionally cognizable liberty
interest sufficient to trigger the protection of the Due Process Clause.
Nevertheless, “the Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the
conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995), citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538 (1976). More specifically, “the
transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictive quarters for
nonpunitive reasons is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily
contemplated by a prison sentence.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. at 468. Therefore,
the placement of the Appellant in administrative segregation, without more,
does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty
interest. Sandin, supra.
Furthermore, in Luken
v. Scott, the Court addressed virtually the same issue as is before this
court. 71 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1196, 116 S.Ct.
1690, (1996). Luken alleged that he was confined in administrative segregation
because of false information. He further argued that because of his
confinement in administrative segregation, he was “unable to accrue additional
good-time credits to accelerate his eligibility for parole.” Id. at
193. The Court held that:
The loss of the opportunity to earn good-time credits, which
might lead to earlier parole, is a collateral consequence of Luken's custodial
status. Yet, such speculative, collateral consequences of prison administrative
decisions do not create constitutionally protected liberty interests. Any of a
host of administrative or disciplinary decisions made by prison authorities might
somehow affect the timing of a prisoner's release, but such effects have never
been held to confer a constitutionally protected liberty interest upon a
prisoner such that the prison authorities must comply with the Constitutional
requirements of due process.
71 F.3d at 193 (citations omitted). See also Abed v. Armstrong, 209 F.3d 63 (2nd Cir. 2000) (Although inmates have a liberty interest in good time credit they
have already earned, they have no interest in the opportunity to earn good time
credit where prison officials have discretion to determine whether an inmate is
eligible to earn the credit.); Conway v. Gorczyk, 171 Vt. 374, 765 A.2d
463 (2000) (denying an inmate the opportunity to earn additional good-time
credits did not impose an atypical-and-significant hardship upon him); Baumann
v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 846 (9th Cir.1985)
(loss of work and educational opportunities not constitutionally protected); James
v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627 (3rd Cir.1989) (In order to state a cognizable
claim that inmates were deprived of wages without due process of law, they must
have either a liberty or a property interest.).
I,
therefore, find that Appellant has no liberty interest to contest. See Slezak v. South
Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 361 S.C. 327, 605 S.E.2d 506 (2004); Sullivan, supra.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE
ORDERED that the appeal of the Appellant is DISMISSED and the Final
Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED;
AND IT IS SO
ORDERED.
_________________________________
Ralph
King Anderson, III
Administrative
Law Judge
April 20, 2006
Columbia, South Carolina
In Sullivan, the Supreme Court also found that
other conditions of confinement could potentially implicate a state created
liberty interest. However, those interests are “generally limited to freedom
from restraint which. . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sullivan v.
S.C. Department of Corrections (355 S.C. 437, 586 S.E.2d 124 (2003) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).
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