SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the ALJD sits in an appellate capacity. Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 756 Consequently, the review in these inmate grievance cases is limited to the record presented. An Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment for that of an agency “as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” S.C. Code Ann. § 1‑23‑380(A)(6) (1986 & Supp.2000). Furthermore, an Administrative Law Judge may not reverse or modify an agency’s decision unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the decision is clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the whole record, arbitrary or affected by an error of law. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6); See also Marietta Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety, 337 S.C. 133, 522 S.E.2d 605 (1999); South Carolina Dept. of Labor, Licensing and Regulation v. Girgis, 332 S.C. 162, 503 S.E.2d 490 (1998).

DISCUSSION

In his appeal, the Appellant argues that he has improperly been placed in Minimum In (MI) custody. He contends that he meets and exceeds the policy criteria for placement in Minimum Out Restricted (MOR) custody. The Department, on the other hand, sets forth that it has properly determined within its discretion to place the Appellant in MI custody because he is incarcerated for the offense of kidnapping. To obtain relief before this Division, the Appellant must show that the Department abridged a liberty interest in his custody status without due process of law. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750. “The federal constitution vests no liberty interest in inmates retaining or receiving any particular security or custody status as long as the challenged conditions or degree of confinement are within the sentence imposed and are not otherwise violative of the Constitution.” Brown v. Evatt, 322 S.C. 189, 194, 470 S.E.2d 848, 851 (1996).

Furthermore, in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that as a result of the holding in Hewitt^[1] that the Courts were “shifting the focus of the liberty interest inquiry to one based on the language of a particular regulation, and not the nature of the deprivation. . . .” Sandin at 115 S. Ct. at 2298. The Sandin court explained that in determining whether a liberty is protected by the Due Process Clause, the analysis of a regulation or statute in light of the negative inferences to be made from that law is sensible when dealing with laws that are applicable to the general public. However, analyzing prison regulations in light of the negatives inferences that can be drawn from the mandatory language in prisoner regulations is simply not reasonable when determining whether a liberty is protected by the Due Process Clause. “Not only are such regulations not designed to confer rights on inmates, but the result of the negative implication jurisprudence is not to require the prison officials to follow the negative implication drawn from the regulation, but is instead to attach procedural protections that may be of quite a different nature.” Id. Therefore, in Sandin, the Court abrogated the approach adopted in Hewitt and adopted a two-prong approach in determining if a prisoner’s constitutionally protected liberty or property interest was implicated. Consequently, a state created interest is not protected by the Due Process Clause unless the Department’s actions concerning that state created interest:

1. Results in an “atypical” and significant hardship in either duration or degree of restriction from other inmates (Id. at 2301); or

2. Will “inevitably affect the duration” of the prisoner’s sentence ( Id. at 2302).

Thus, the relevant question in reviewing custody cases is whether the Department acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or from personal bias or prejudice in imposing a classification that is atypical and a significant restriction upon the Appellant’s prison life, or effects the duration of his sentence. See Crowe v. Leeke, 273 S.C. 763, 763, 259 S.E.2d 614, 615 (1979) (the South Carolina Supreme Court limited review of the Department’s transfer of an inmate within the prison system or the downgrading of an inmate’s custody status to whether the prison officials “acted arbitrarily, capriciously or from personal bias or prejudice.”).

Here, the Institutional Classification Committee determined the Appellant’s custody and housing classification should be MI. That classification is based upon the Committee’s evaluation of the inmate’s behavior and criminal history. The Appellant failed to establish that the Committee’s classification of him was improper. Moreover, he has failed to show that even if he was placed in the wrong custody status by the Department that he has suffered any atypical restriction upon his prison life or that the duration of his sentence was effected as a result of the MI custody. Therefore, I find that the Appellant failed to establish that his classification must be changed by this tribunal or that he even has a state created interest to protest.

ORDER

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Final Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED and the appeal of the Appellant is DENIED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

Ralph King Anderson, III

Administrative Law Judge

March 31, 2003

Columbia, South Carolina