SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

2. The property which is the subject of this hearing is identified as TMS #286-00-00-

010. It was purchased by the Petitioner’s father, Frank T. Thornley, on July 30, 1971, and was shown on the deed as “a Portion of Lot 2 of Marshfield Plantation,” .63 acres, according to a survey dated July 28, 1971. Upon the death of Frank Thornley in 1977, the Petitioner, Harry E. Thornley, inherited the subject property. In May 2001, the Petitioner received a contract for sale of this property. As part of this transaction, the prospective purchaser had the property surveyed and discovered that the property consisted of .448 acres, not .63 acres, due to an acquisition by the South Carolina Department of Highways in 1964, which had gone unnoticed until then.

3.                  The Petitioner requested that Charleston County (the County) refund his property

taxes which were overpaid from 1993 through 2000. The Petitioner chose to go back to 1993 because that was the year that the County reassessed property values and the assessed value went from $7500.00 to $150,000.00, which in turn raised the taxes from $128.00 to $2007.00 per year.

4.                  The County refunded a portion of the Petitioner’s payments for tax years 1999 and

2000, based on the discrepancy in acreage, but has not addressed the substantial increase in the assessed value.^[1]

5.                  The Petitioner appealed the reassessment by letter dated July 20,1993. On August

31, 1993, Petitioner and Respondent participated in a telephone conference regarding the appeal. Respondent mailed a form to the Petitioner on August 31, 1993, and informed them that they must return it by October 1, 1993. The Petitioner does not recall receiving a letter which required a response by a certain date. Even assuming that the Petitioner did not receive the August 31 letter, and did not fully pursue his objection in 1993, Petitioner did not timely object to the assessment for tax years 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 or 1998.

6. In 1996, the statute of limitations on refunds was reduced from ten years to two

years.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The ALJD has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to S.C. Code

Ann. §1-23-600 (Supp. 2002) and §12-60-2560 (Supp. 2002).

2. This issue was addressed in Horry County Assessor v. Milligan, 00-ALJ-17-0057-

CC (2000). Boards such as the Tax Refund Committee of Charleston County can act only within the parameters of state statutory law. South Carolina Tax Commission v. South Carolina Board of Review, 278 S.C. 556, 299 S.E.2d 489 (1983) holding that "an order cannot be made by an administrative body which would materially alter or add to the law.'' Banks v Batesburg Hauling Co., 202 S.C. 273, 24 S.E.2d 496 (1943); Lee v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 250 S.C. 462, 158 S.E.2d 774 (1968). See also 2 Am Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 188, at 21 (1994 & Supp. 1999) and 84 C.J.S. Taxation §§ 518 & 520 (1954 & Supp. 1999).

3. S.C. Code Ann. §12‑54‑85(F) (Supp. 2002) provides that "claims for credit or

refund must be filed within three years of the time the return was filed or two years from the date of payment, whichever is later. If no return was filed, a claim must be filed within two years from the date of payment." Although this section applies to state taxes collected by the Department of Revenue, S.C. Code Ann. §12‑60‑2560 (2002) incorporates these same limits into requests for property tax refunds from the county.

4. Specifically, S.C. Code Ann. §12‑60‑2560 (2002) provides that "[S]ubject to the

limitation in §12‑60‑1750 and within the limitations of §12‑54‑85(F), a property taxpayer may seek a refund of real property taxes assessed by the county assessor and paid . . .by filing a claim for refund with the county assessor. . . .” This section makes the statutory limitations of §12-54-85(F), which apply to taxes collected by the Department of Revenue, also applicable to the property taxes owed to the county and sets the procedure and time limits for such actions.

5. In this case, as in Milligan, the Taxpayer does not meet the time limitations set

forth in S.C. Code Ann. §12‑54‑85(F)(1) (2002). This result may be harsh, but the right to apply for a refund is purely statutory, and it is incumbent upon those seeking relief to proceed according to the statute affording such relief. Commonwealth of Virginia v. Cross, 196 Va. 375, 83 S.E.2d 722 (1954). There is no exception provided. As noted, the Petitioner did not pursue his appeal in 1993. Furthermore, this tribunal has no legislative powers. Its responsibility is to determine and give effect to the intention of the legislature. To do otherwise is to legislate, not interpret. The responsibility for the justice or wisdom of laws rests exclusively with the legislature. Smith v. Wallace, 295 S.C. 448, 369 S.E.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1988).

6. In enacting S.C. Code Ann. §12‑54‑85, the General Assembly provided a remedy

for taxpayers whose property has been erroneously assessed. At the same time, in not providing exceptions for untimely refund claims, the legislature virtually ensured that the Department, and by extension the political subdivisions of the State, would not be inundated with requests for refunds after the expiration of the statutory period. See Anonymous Taxpayers v. South Carolina Department of Revenue, 00-ALJ-17-0681 (2000).

7.                  The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the problem government would

encounter if there were equitable exceptions to statutorily mandated time limits for requesting refunds of erroneously paid or assessed taxes:

An "equitable tolling" . . . could create serious administrative problems by forcing the IRS to respond to, and perhaps litigate, large numbers of late claims, accompanied by requests for "equitable tolling" which, upon close inspection, might turn out to lack sufficient equitable justification. . . . The nature and potential magnitude of the administrative problem suggest that Congress decided to pay the price of occasional unfairness in individual cases (penalizing a taxpayer whose claim is unavoidably delayed) in order to maintain a more workable tax enforcement system. At the least it tells us that Congress would likely have wanted to decide explicitly whether, or just where and when, to expand the statute's limitations periods, rather than delegate to the courts a generalized power to do so wherever a court concludes that equity so requires. United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997).

The same problems could be encountered by the county in its power to levy and collect property taxes. While this situation is unfortunate for the Petitioner and other taxpayers, the State and its counties must be able to carry out their duties and bring closure to these matters.

8. The language of the statute is not ambiguous and is susceptible to only one

meaning: The refund is limited to the two‑year period, which the Petitioner has already received.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

___________________________________

CAROLYN C. MATTHEWS

Administrative Law Judge

March 19, 2003

Columbia, South Carolina