ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the Administrative Law Court pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-460 (2000). Petitioner (“Sonoco”) contests the Final Agency Determination of Respondent, South Carolina Department of Revenue (“DOR,” or “Respondent”), which held Sonoco’s headquarters office buildings and order fulfillment center building are on the site of the Sonoco manufacturing facility, or contiguous to it, and are properly assessed at a 10½% assessment ratio rather than a 6% assessment ratio.
Sonoco exhausted its pre-hearing remedies pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 12-60-470 (2000) and filed a request for a contested case hearing with the ALC. Prior to the hearing, the parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts. After notice to the parties, a hearing was held at the offices of the Administrative Law Court in Columbia, South Carolina, on October 21, 2004. Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing and the Stipulation of Facts, I find that Sonoco’s headquarters office buildings and order fulfillment center building are contiguous to the plant site and are, therefore, properly assessed at a 10½% assessment ratio rather than a 6% assessment ratio.
Any motions or issues raised in the proceedings, but not addressed in this Order are deemed denied pursuant to Rule 29(C), ALC.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I make the following Findings of Fact, taking into consideration the stipulations of the parties, the burden on the parties to establish their respective cases by a preponderance of the evidence, and the credibility of the witnesses:
1. Sonoco operates a manufacturing facility in Hartsville, South Carolina. In addition to the manufacturing building, it owns four buildings at the same location. Three of these buildings serve as Sonoco’s worldwide corporate headquarters. The fourth is its order fulfillment center; i.e., customer services.
2. Functions conducted at the world headquarters buildings are human resources, public relations, accounting, executive, finance, and similar administrative functions. The functions conducted in the order fulfillment center are customer service functions such as order management, collections, accounts receivable, and data management.
3. The three corporate headquarters buildings are located across a street (Novelty Road) and a railroad track from the majority of the manufacturing plant. Thus, these buildings are sandwiched between the manufacturing plant and the order fulfillment center.
4. Of the three buildings comprising the corporate headquarters, two of the buildings were built in 1969 and 1978, respectively. A third building was constructed in 1989. The buildings built in 1969 and 1978 were in support of the manufacturing facility at that time and were assessed at 10½% as manufacturing related property. The 1989 building (the corporate headquarters) was attached to the two existing administrative buildings and was, likewise, assessed at 10½% as manufacturing related property.
5. The order fulfillment center was built in 1997 and was also assessed at 10½%.
6. Three streets provide access to the plant, Novelty Road (which becomes Woodmill), Patrick Highway (formerly Miller Road), and 3rd Avenue. The headquarters is across Novelty Road and a railroad track from the main portion of the manufacturing plant.
7. The plant site is not confined to an area bounded by Novelty/Woodmill, Patrick Highway, and 3rd Avenue. Rather, it extends across those streets. Examples are Sonoco Spiral Division, the Machine Shop, and the Bleachery. Plant parking and tractor trailer parking are also located across the street from the plant.
8. The parties stipulated that Sonoco owns Novelty Road, which separates the corporate headquarters from the plant, subject to an easement granted to the South Carolina Department of Transportation. Novelty Road is now part of the state secondary road system and is numbered S-269 by the South Carolina Department of Transportation.
9. The parties stipulated that Sonoco owns the land traversed by the railroad tracks.
10. The parties stipulated that there are no intervening land owners between the plant site and the buildings in question.
The sole issue for this Court’s determination is whether Sonoco’s office buildings and order fulfillment center are on the plant site or contiguous thereto. The determination of this issue affects the assessment ratio applied to this Sonoco for property tax purposes. If the buildings are on the plant site or contiguous thereto, Sonoco’s assessment ratio will remain at 10½%. If the buildings are not on the plant site or are not contiguous to the plant site, then Sonoco’s assessment ratio will drop to 6% on the buildings in question.
The statutory law governing assessment ratios for property tax purposes is S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220 (Supp 2003). Specifically, § 12-43-220(a) establishes the ratio for manufacturing property and states, in part:
(a) All real and personal property owned by or leased to manufacturers and utilities and used by the manufacturer or utility in the conduct of the business must be taxed on an assessment equal to ten and one-half percent of the fair market value of the property.
. . . .
Real property owned by or leased to a manufacturer and used primarily as an office building is not considered used by a manufacturer in the conduct of the business of the manufacturer for purposes of classification of property under item (a) of this section if the office building is not located on the premises of or contiguous to the plant site of the manufacturer. (Emphasis added)
27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-124.4 (1976) defines a plant site as follows:
A plant site shall consist of all land contiguous to a plant which is related to the overall manufacturing operation. It shall include all land on which personal property is located including but not limited to the following: parking lots, manufacturing areas, buildings, landscaping, piping, railroad siding, docking, water sheds, ditching, pollution control facilities, pumping stations, wells, roads, water tanks, areas for ingress and egress, water storage facilities, and all other lands directly related to manufacturing. When possible, a plant site will be one contiguous parcel using legal and or natural boundaries. (Emphasis added)
The buildings composing Sonoco’s corporate headquarters are located across Novelty Road and the railroad tracks from the plant. The order fulfillment center is located across Novelty Road, the railroad tracks, and Calhoun Street from the plant. Sonoco argues the presence of the roads and the railroad tracks form an area separate and apart from the plant site. Therefore, it maintains that the corporate headquarters buildings and order fulfillment center are not contiguous to the plant site and should be assessed at the 6% assessment ratio. Sonoco further argues that these buildings are not related to the manufacturing function in that they are administrative in nature and serve all Sonoco plants throughout the United States. Thus, it argues that the buildings are not a part of the plant site.
Alternatively, the Department maintains that there are no intervening landowners, thus making the parcels contiguous to the plant site. The Department further argues that the existence of a public road or right of way does not destroy contiguity. The Court agrees with the Department.
Since § 12-43-220(a) does not provide a definition of the word “contiguous,” a basic definition of that term can be found in the American Heritage College Dictionary, Third Edition. That definition reads as follows: “1. sharing an edge or boundary; touching. 2. Neighboring, adjacent. 3. Connected in time or space without a break.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, defines “contiguous” as “In close proximity; neighboring; adjoining; . . . in actual close contact; touching at a point or along a boundary; bounded or traversed by.”
South Carolina law is replete with cases stating that a right of way or an easement is merely the right which one person has to use the land of another. It does not convey title to the land. (See Douglas v. Medical Investors, Inc., 256 S.C. 440, 182 S.E. 2d 720 (1971); South Carolina Pipeline Corp. v. Lone Star Steel Co., 345 S.C. 151, 546 S.E.2d 654 (2001); Lighthouse Tennis Club Village Horizontal Property Regime LXVI v. South Island Public Service District, 355 S.C. 529, 586 S.E.2d 146 (2003); Faulkenberry v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 349 S.C. 318, 563 S.E.2d 644 (2002).) Further, there is extensive South Carolina case law indicating that a dedication of a street for public use does not divest the dedicator of title, but only allows the public the right to use it. (See Hoogenboom v. City of Beaufort, 315 S.C. 306, 433 S.E.2d 875 (1992); Boyd v. Hyatt, 294 S.C. 360, 364 S.E.2d 478 (1988); Leppard v. Central Carolina Telephone Co., 205 S.C. 1, 30 S.E.2d 755 (1944); Charleston Rice Milling Co. v. Bennett & Co., 18 S.C. 254, 1882 WL 5661 (1882).) Sonoco is the true owner of Novelty Road and the land over which the railroad tracks traverse. There are no intervening land owners. These facts satisfy the above definition of contiguous.
Numerous South Carolina statutes and regulations define the word “contiguous.” Without exception, these statutes and regulations indicate that intervening roads, rights of way, and railroad tracks do not destroy contiguity. The three statutes encompass three different areas of the law which suggests that the Legislature exhibited its intent with regard to the concept of “contiguity” consistently throughout the South Carolina Code of Laws.
First, S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-232(2) (2000) defines “contiguous tracts” for purposes of determining whether tracts of land devoted to agricultural use can be combined to obtain the favorable agricultural use tax assessment ratio. The pertinent portion of that statute reads as follows: “contiguous tracts include tracts with identical owners of record separated by a dedicated highway, street, or road or separated by any other public way.” It should be noted that this provision specifically restricts itself to subsection 2 of § 12-43-232; however, the fact that roads do not destroy contiguity is clear.
Second, S.C. Code Ann. § 5-3-305 (Supp. 2000) defines “contiguous” in the context of annexation by municipalities. This provision became law May 1, 2000 and it reads as follows:
For purposes of this chapter, “contiguous” means property which is adjacent to a municipality and shares a continuous border. Contiguity is not established by a road, waterway, right-of-way, easement, railroad track, marshland, or utility line which connects one property to another; however, if the connecting road, waterway, easement, railroad track, marshland, or utility line intervenes between two properties, which but for the intervening connector would be adjacent and share a continuous border, the intervening connector does not destroy contiguity. (Emphasis added)
Third, S.C. Code Ann. § 34-28-160(3) (1987) uses the word “contiguous” in defining the location of facilities providing services to savings association customers. The pertinent portion of this statute reads as follows:
It is not necessary that any facility be a part of, or physically connected to, the main structure of the home office or branch if the facility is located on the property on which the main structure of the home office or branch is situated or on property contiguous thereto. Property which is separated from the property on which the main structure of the home office or branch is situated only by a street and one or more walkways and alleyways is, for the purpose of this subsection, considered contiguous. The operation of any facility which is not located on the property on which the main structure of the home office or branch is situated or on property contiguous thereto shall not constitute a facility within the meaning of this subsection. (Emphasis added)
Based upon the above statutes, the South Carolina General Assembly has repeatedly expressed its reluctance to destroy contiguity when two tracts are separated by a street, railroad track, or other public way.
Sonoco argues that §§ 5-3-305 and 12-43-232(2) support its position because those sections restrict the definition of “contiguous” to a specific section or chapter. This distinction would be persuasive if there were definitions of the word “contiguous” in the South Carolina Code which stated that roads or railroad rights of way destroy contiguity. Sonoco provided no such definition and the Court, in its research, has been unable to locate such a section.
Further, Sonoco’s interpretation of these statutes renders absurd results. For example, Sonoco interprets the language of § 12-43-232(2) to mean that contiguous tracts separated by a highway, street, road, or public way are not contiguous in all other property tax matters. Stated in the alternative, Sonoco contends that the only instance where property separated by a road or railway can be considered contiguous for property tax purposes is when applying the provisions of § 12-43-232(2).
Sonoco’s construction of § 12-43-232(2) would place the provision in conflict with other property tax statutes, as well as other taxing statutes. In other tax statutes where the word “contiguous” is not specifically defined, the context in which the word is used mandates that intervening roads and railroad rights of way be included within its definition.
Two examples readily come to mind. First, the language of § 12-43-220(a), which is the statute being contested here, states that an office building is not considered to be used in the conduct of the business of the manufacturer “if the office building is not located on the premises of or contiguous to the plant site of the manufacturer.” (Emphasis added) It is obvious from this language that “on the premises of” is intended to mean something different from “contiguous to.” If the Legislature had intended for roads and railroad rights of way to destroy contiguity, there would have been no need for the phrase “contiguous to the plant site,” because only those buildings on the premises of the plant would remain at the higher assessment ratio. Such a construction would lead to the absurd result in that plant offices separated by a road serving the plant could be granted the 6% assessment ratio.
A second example is found in S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-6520(6) (2000) defining “designated development area” to be “a contiguous area set aside by municipal or county ordinance in which one or more tourism or recreation facilities will be located. The term includes a downtown or waterfront redevelopment area, a local historic district, redevelopment of a closed military facility, or a newly designated economic development site.” To say that a road destroys contiguity would render this section virtually meaningless. Clearly, that was not the meaning of “contiguous” envisioned by the Legislature since each of the areas referred to in the statute would have roads traversing through them.
South Carolina common law is consistent with this statutory construction. A leading case in this area is Tovey v. City of Charleston, 237 S.C. 475, 117 S.E.2d 872 (1961). In this case dealing with annexation, the channel of the Ashley River divided two parcels. The appellants argued that there was a lack of contiguity because of the separation created by the Ashley River. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, however, held that separation by a navigable stream does not break contiguity.
In Bryant v. City of Charleston, 295 S.C. 408, 368 S.E.2d 899 (1988), also involving annexation, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the ordinary meaning of “contiguous” is “touching.” Citing Tovey v. City of Charleston, it further held that contiguity was not destroyed by water or marshland, within either the annexing municipality’s existing boundaries or those of the property to be annexed, merely because it separates the parcels of highland involved.
In Pinckney v. City of Beaufort, 296 S.C. 142, 370 S.E.2d 909 (Ct. App. 1988), the court held that contiguity was not precluded by the fact that access from the city to the annexed area required crossing a river and traversing for a short distance over unannexed property.
The fourth case, Glaze v. Grooms, 324 S.C. 249, 478 S.E.2d 841 (1996), affirmed the previous decision in Tovey and Bryant, that contiguity is not destroyed by water or marshlands which separate parcels of highland. It should be noted that contiguity was being used in the context of incorporation of a town.
In St. Andrews Public Service District v. City of Charleston, 339 S.C. 320, 529 S.E.2d 64 (Ct. App. 2000) (reversed by the South Carolina Supreme Court on grounds of standing but affirming issue of contiguity, 349 S.C. 602, 564 S.E.2d 647 (2002)), the court provides the most direct answer to the question at hand. The pertinent portion of the court’s opinion is as follows:
Courts have generally held that contiguous is synonymous with the terms “adjacent to” or “adjoining.” Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, What Land is Contiguous or Adjacent to Municipality so as to be Subject to Annexation, 49 A.L.R. 3d 589, 599 (1973). Our Supreme Court explained, “The statutory word ‘contiguous’ must be afforded its ordinary meaning of ‘touching’” Bryant v. City of Charleston, 295 S.C. 408, 410, 368 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1988). To achieve contiguity, actual physical touching of the properties is not required. The Supreme Court has rejected an argument that the annexed parcels must have the additional qualifications of unity, substantial physical touching, or a common boundary. Id. at 410, 368 S.E.2d at 900. However, the Supreme Court has never held that non-adjacent properties not incidentally separated by a road, railway, or waterway are in fact contiguous. Id. at 339 S.C. at 324, 529 S.E.2d at 66. (Emphasis added)
In Beaufort County v. Trask, 349 S.C. 522, 563 S.E.2d 660 (Ct. App. 2002), the South Carolina Court of Appeals once again affirmed that the separation of property by waters and the marshes of a river did not destroy contiguity.
In Mosteller v. County of Lexington, 336 S.C. 360, 520 S.E.2d 620 (1999), the court examined the term “contiguous” in the context of a constitutional taking of property case. The plaintiff claimed that SCDOT’s closure of a railroad grade crossing impeded his right to access a certain highway and devalued his property. The plaintiff cited a prior South Carolina case for the proposition than an abutting property owner has a right of access over a street adjacent to his property and that an obstruction that materially deprives the abutting property of ingress or egress to and from his property constitutes a taking. The court then defined the term “abut” to mean “contiguous, or border on; to bound upon; to end at, or terminate, to join at a border or boundary; to meet; to touch at the end or side.” Id., 520 S.E.2d at 623. The court concluded that “abut” does not always mean actual contact. The court further held that property may abut a road despite the existence of an intervening, natural barrier like a stream or river.
In Kizer v. Clark, 360 S.C. 86, 600 S.E.2d 529 (2004), a case related to the previously cited case of Glaze v. Grooms, the South Carolina Supreme Court reiterated its prior decision that marshlands and creeks do not destroy contiguity.
The final case is one decided by this Court, defining the term “contiguous” in yet another context. In Greenwood Mills, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Docket No. 96-ALJ-07-0542-CC, this Court was asked to decide if two plants owned by Greenwood Mills were contiguous for purposes of the permitting requirements under the South Carolina Pollution Control Act. Greenwood Mills contended that the plants were not contiguous and required two permits while DHEC contended that they were contiguous and required one permit. The plants were two separate plants in close proximity to one another with a shared steam pipe and boiler. In a paragraph pertinent to the matter herein being determined, this Court stated:
The common dictionary definition of “contiguous” consists, in part, of “nearby, neighboring, adjacent.” On this basis, the EPA has historically interpreted “contiguous property” to mean the same as “contiguous or adjacent property” in the development of numerous regulations to implement the Act. . . . [T]he fact that all property at a plant site may not be physically touching does not mean that separate plant sites exist. For example, it is common for a railroad right-of-way or highway to cut across a plant site. However, this does not create two separate plant sites. To claim that it does would be an artificial distinction, and it is contrary to the intent of the statutory definition of major source. 1997 WL 1526600, p. 3 (Citing 59 Fed. Reg. 12412 (1994)). (Emphasis added)
Pursuant to the cases cited above, South Carolina common law uniformly provides that contiguity is not destroyed by intervening roads and railroad rights-of-way. The rules of common law are not to be changed by doubtful implication, nor overturned except by clear and unambiguous language. Smith v. Todd, 155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506 (1930). The general rule as usually expressed is that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. In re Condemnation of Lands of Twin City Power Co., et al., 169 S.C. 198, 168 S.E. 554 (1933).
Sonoco argues that many of the cases cited above are annexation cases. It further argues that the definition of “contiguous” in annexation cases should not be used to determine a property tax matter in that the considerations of an annexation case are the unity and compactness of the area. Thus, a public road would not create a barrier to a unified area but would enhance the ability to function as a collective body. This argument is without merit. The same considerations are important in the property tax case at hand. The question to be answered is whether Sonoco plant is one unified area or an area composed of a plant site distinct from the location of its offices. This Court finds that the analysis employed in annexation cases is relevant for the determination of “contiguity.”
Even if Sonoco did not own Novelty Road, Calhoun Street, and the railroad tracks in the area in question, the overwhelming weight of authority on this issue dictates that the existence of streets and railroad rights-of-way between the majority of the plant site and the buildings in question does not destroy contiguity. In fact, there are manufacturing buildings which are also located across the road and the railroad tracks from the majority of the plant site. Examples are Sonoco Spiral Division, Machine Shop, the Bleachery, parking lots for tractor trailer rigs used by the manufacturing plant, and the water treatment facility. Also, a parking lot located across 2nd Street, parallel to the buildings in question is used by plant employees.
The Department next argues that the buildings could be considered a part of the “plant site” as defined in Regulation 117-124.4. Sonoco argues that the headquarters is not a part of the manufacturing plant because the functions therein serve all Sonoco plants, not just the Hartsville plant. This argument is without merit. In Regulation 117-124.4, a “plant site” consists of contiguous land which is related to the overall manufacturing operation. The above paragraphs establish that the headquarters and the order fulfillment center are contiguous. Thus, the remaining requirement is that the buildings must be “related to the overall manufacturing operation.”
The corporate headquarters buildings house accounting, human resources, corporate communications, sales and marketing, administration, corporate planning, executive offices, and similar functions. The corporate headquarters serves all Sonoco plants. The order fulfillment center conducts customer service, order management, accounts receivable, and data management services for all of Sonoco’s operations. These functions are not only related, but are essential and necessary to the operation of the Hartsville manufacturing plant. The functions would be essential and necessary to any manufacturing operation. The American Heritage Dictionary defines the word “related” to mean “being connected; associated.” Clearly, the headquarters and the order fulfillment center are connected to and associated with the Hartsville plant site. Moreover, there is no requirement that these buildings be exclusively related to the Hartsville plant. The language of Regulation 117-124.4 is expansive rather than restrictive. It speaks of land related to the “overall” manufacturing operation. Thus, the language of the statute lends itself to the interpretation that the “overall manufacturing operation” encompasses the worldwide manufacturing operation of the entity.
Having reached the determination that the buildings in question are contiguous to the Hartsville manufacturing plant, this Court need not determine whether these buildings are a part of the “plant site.”
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, I conclude, as a matter of law:
1. The Administrative Law Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to § 12-60-460.
2. The standard of proof in administrative proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence. Anonymous v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 329 S.C. 371, 496 S.E.2d 17 (1998).
3. The trier of fact must weigh and pass upon the credibility of evidence presented. See S.C. Cable Television Ass’n v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 308 S.C. 216, 417 S.E.2d 586 (1992). The trial judge who observes a witness is in the best position to judge the witness’s demeanor and veracity and evaluate his testimony. See e.g., McAlister v. Patterson, 278 S.C. 481, 299 S.E.2d 322 (1982).
4. The rules of statutory construction are provided to remove doubt but never to create doubt. See 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 146, citing Englewood Water Dist. v. Tate, 332 So. 2d 626 (Fla. App. 1976). Thus “the primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intention or purpose as expressed in the statute.” Scholtec v. Estate of Reeves, 327 S.C. 551, 490 S.E.2d 603, 606 (Ct. App. 1997). The language used should be given its plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to expand or limit the scope of a statute. See Berkebile v. Outen, 311 S.C. 50, 426 S.E.2d 760 (1993). It is accepted practice in South Carolina to resort to the dictionary to determine the literal meaning of words used in statutes and the meanings which these words embrace. Hay v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 273 S.C. 269, 253 S.E.2d 837 (1979).
5. § 12-43-220(a) provides a lower assessment ratio for certain office buildings owned by manufacturers. The pertinent portion of that statute reads as follows:
Real property owned by or leased to a manufacturer and used primarily as an office building is not considered used by a manufacturer in the conduct of the business of the manufacturer for purposes of classification of property under item (a) of this section if the office building is not located on the premises of or contiguous to the plant site of the manufacturer. (Emphasis added)
6. 27 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 117-124.4 (1976) defines a plant site as follows:
A plant site shall consist of all land contiguous to a plant which is related to the overall manufacturing operation. It shall include all land on which personal property is located including but not limited to the following: parking lots, manufacturing areas, buildings, landscaping, piping, railroad siding, docking, water sheds, ditching, pollution control facilities, pumping stations, wells, roads, water tanks, areas for ingress and egress, water storage facilities, and all other lands directly related to manufacturing. When possible, a plant site will be one contiguous parcel using legal and or natural boundaries. (Emphasis added)
7. The American Heritage College Dictionary, Third Edition, defines the word “contiguous” as “1. sharing an edge or boundary; touching. 2. Neighboring, adjacent. 3. Connected in time or space without a break.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, defines “contiguous” as “In close proximity; neighboring; adjoining; . . . in actual close contact; touching at a point or along a boundary; bounded or traversed by.”
8. Contiguity is not destroyed by an intervening road or right of way. St. Andrews Public Service District v. City of Charleston, 339 S.C. 320, 529 S.E.2d 64 (Ct. App. 2000) (reversed by the South Carolina Supreme Court on grounds of standing but affirmed issue of contiguity, 349 S.C. 602, 564 S.E.2d 647 (2002)); Greenwood Mills, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Docket No. 96-ALJ-07-0542-CC .
9. The rules of common law are not to be changed by doubtful implication, nor overturned except by clear and unambiguous language. Smith v. Todd, 155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506 (1930). The general rule as usually expressed is that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. In re Condemnation of Lands of Twin City Power Co., et al., 169 S.C. 198, 168 S.E. 554 (1933).
10. A right of way or an easement is merely the right which one person has to use the land of another. It does not convey title to the land. (See Douglas v. Medical Investors, Inc., 256 S.C. 440, 182 S.E. 2d 720 (1971); South Carolina Pipeline Corp. v. Lone Star Steel Co., 345 S.C. 151, 546 S.E.2d 654 (2001); Lighthouse Tennis Club Village Horizontal Property Regime LXVI v. South Island Public Service District, 355 S.C. 529, 586 S.E.2d 146 (2003); Faulkenberry v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 349 S.C. 318, 563 S.E.2d 644 (2002).)
11. A dedication of a street for public use does not divest the dedicator of title, but only allows the public the right to use it. (See Hoogenboom v. City of Beaufort, 315 S.C. 306, 433 S.E.2d 875 (1992); Boyd v. Hyatt, 294 S.C. 360, 364 S.E.2d 478 (1988); Leppard v. Central Carolina Telephone Co., 205 S.C. 1, 30 S.E.2d 755 (1944); Charleston Rice Milling Co. v. Bennett & Co., 18 S.C. 254, 1882 WL 5661 (1882).) Sonoco is the true owner of Novelty Road and the land over which the railroad tracks traverse. There are no intervening land owners.
ORDER
Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby:
ORDERED that Sonoco’s headquarters office buildings and order fulfillment center are contiguous to the plant site and all property taxes computed thereon should be calculated using a 10½% assessment ratio.
Carolyn C. Matthews
Administrative Law Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
August 30, 2005
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