ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) pursuant to the
appeal of Adrian L. Tribble, an inmate incarcerated with the Department of Corrections
(Department or DOC). Tribble was convicted of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 809,
Threatening to Inflict Harm on/Assaulting an Employee and/or Member of the Public. As a
result of his conviction, Tribble lost ninety (90) days of “good-time” credit. Inmate Tribble filed
a grievance with the Department and received the Department’s final decision on or about
January 18, 2005. On February 9, 2005, Inmate Tribble (Appellant) filed this appeal with the
Court.
BACKGROUND
On October 28, 2004, Corporal Harouff and Officer Rogers were assigned to move
Appellant to another cell. While they were preparing to pack his property, Appellant became
agitated and stated that he would not go to “lock up for PC.” Corporal Harouff informed
Appellant that he knew nothing about the reason for his transfer and that he was simply there to
pack his property. Appellant then took off his shirt and responded that “your punk ass is going
to have to come get me.” Corporal Harouff and Officer Rogers then exited the cell. As soon as
the door shut, Appellant threw his breakfast tray at the cell door and then a chair. When
Corporal Harouff opened the door to retrieve the chair, Appellant stated that “I got this cup of
piss I’m going to throw on you when you come in here.” The Department later recovered the
cup which in fact contained urine.
Following the incident, Corporal Harouff completed an Incident Report and submitted it
to his supervisor, Sergeant Fleming. Appellant was charged with violating SCDC Disciplinary
Code § 809, Threatening to Inflict Harm on/Assaulting an Employee and/or Member of the
Public. He was given written notice of the charges on November 3, 2004.
On November 3, 2004, a Major Disciplinary Hearing was held before a DOC
Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) concerning the above charges. At Appellant’s request he
was provided a counsel substitute. Additionally, Appellant originally requested that Corporal
Harouff be present at the hearing. However, once at the hearing, he waived that request. During
the hearing, the DHO read a narrative of Corporal Harouff’s Incident Report into the Record and
received testimony from Inmate Tribble and Corporal Wessinger. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the DHO found Appellant guilty of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code § 809,
Threatening to Inflict Harm on/Assault an Employee and/or Member of the Public, and
sanctioned him with the loss of ninety (90) days of good time credit. After the hearing, the DHO
completed a Major Disciplinary Report and Hearing Record which documented the DHO’s
findings.
Appellant filed a grievance with the Department appealing his conviction of violating
SCDC Disciplinary Code § 809. After reviewing his contentions, the Warden denied
Appellant’s grievance. Appellant then appealed the Warden’s decision and the Department
subsequently denied that grievance, stating that the evidence supported the conviction and that
the sanction imposed was appropriate for the violation that Appellant committed. This appeal
followed.
In his Appeal Brief, Appellant alleges that:
1.His due process rights were violated because the Department failed to attach an
“accessory memorandum” from the mental health care professionals; and
2.He was denied the right to call Sergeant Fowler.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000).
The Court’s appellate jurisdiction in inmate appeals is limited to state created liberty interests
typically involving: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in which an
inmate has received punishment in a major disciplinary hearing as a result of a serious rule
violation. Id.
When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the Court sits
in an appellate capacity. Id. at 756. Consequently, the review in these inmate grievance cases is
limited to the Record presented. An Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment
for that of an agency “as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2004). Furthermore, an Administrative Law Judge may not reverse or
modify an agency’s decision unless substantial rights of the Appellant have been prejudiced
because the decision is clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the whole
Record, arbitrary or affected by an error of law. See Section 1-23-380(A)(6); See also Marietta
Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety, 337 S.C. 133, 522 S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App.
1999); South Carolina Dept. of Labor, Licensing and Regulation v. Girgis, 332 S.C. 162, 503
S.E.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1998). “‘Substantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the
evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the
Record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative
agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action.” Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130,
135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). Accordingly, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being
supported by substantial evidence. Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461
S.E.2d 388 (1995).
Additionally, in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 456, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the relevant
question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached
by the disciplinary board.” Moreover, in Al-Shabazz, the Court underscored that since prison
officials are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, the Courts and therefore
this tribunal adhere to a “hands off” approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and
procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz at 757; See also Pruitt
v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off” approach of
South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy).
In this case, Appellant alleges that the Department should not have revoked his ninety
(90) days of accrued good time. Inmates have a protected liberty interest in their earned
statutory good-time credits under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, when, as here, the
Department revokes an inmate’s good-time credits as punishment in a “major disciplinary
hearing” involving “more serious rule violations,” prison officials must provide that inmate with
“minimal due process.” Al-Shabazz at 750. Consequently, specific administrative procedures
must be followed before depriving an inmate of statutorily granted earned credit, including
adequate advance notice of the charges, adequate opportunity for a hearing in which the inmate
can present witnesses and documentary evidence, and an impartial hearing officer who prepares
a written statement of all the evidence presented and the reasons for his decision. Id. at 751
(citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-82 (1974)).
DISCUSSION
The Appellant contends his due process rights were violated because the Department
failed to attach an “accessory memorandum” from the mental health care professionals. SCDC
Policy/Procedure 22.14 § 3.5 provides that:
The supervisor will review the SCDC Form 19-29A, “Incident Report” within 24
hours unless there are exceptional circumstances for delaying this review. The
review may include interviewing the reporting employee, other employee
witnesses, the accused inmate, or the accused inmate’s witnesses. Upon review,
the supervisor will make a determination whether to refer the inmate to the
Major/Responsible Authority (Responsible Authority includes the Warden or
Duty Warden, or for institutions with no Major assigned, the Captain) for
disciplinary action. The supervisor will document his/her review in the space
provided on SCDC Form 19-29A. (NOTE: When appropriate, this review may
include meeting with appropriate mental health care professionals to determine
the inmate’s mental status at the time of the offense. In these instances, a
memorandum from the mental health care professional must be included as an
attachment to SCDC Form 19-29A, “Incident Report,” attesting to the inmate’s
mental status and accountability for his/her actions.
(Emphasis added).
Clearly, Section 3.5 grants the reviewing supervisor discretion in determining whether to
meet with the appropriate mental health professional. Only when the supervisor elects to
conduct such a review is a memorandum required to be attached to the SCDC Incident Report.
Here, there is no evidence that the reviewing supervisor chose to meet with a mental health
professional concerning Appellant. Therefore, Appellant failed to show the Department violated
its policy. Moreover, Appellant failed to explain why a memorandum from his mental health
professional was essential to his receiving due process at the disciplinary hearing. See Palmetto
Alliance, Inc. v. S. C. Public Service Comm’n., 282 S.C. 430, 319 S.E.2d 695 (1984) (To prove
the denial of due process, a party must show that it has been substantially prejudiced by the
administrative process.).
Furthermore, Appellant’s due process rights in this proceeding are summarized in Al-Shabazz, supra. The Record indicates that Appellant received written notice of the charges
against him in excess of twenty-four (24) hours prior to a hearing that was held before an
impartial Disciplinary Hearing Officer. At the hearing, Appellant was given the opportunity to
offer evidence, call witnesses, and confront his accuser.
In addition, although not
constitutionally required, Appellant was afforded a counsel substitute who assisted him in his
defense. After the DHO determined that Appellant was guilty of the charged offense, he
prepared a written report detailing the evidence he relied upon and the penalty assessed in
finding Appellant guilty of the disciplinary infraction. Appellant was also permitted to appeal
the DHO’s decision through the inmate grievance process. Finally, Appellant did not establish
that he was adversely affected by the Department’s incorrect spelling of his name on the
Disciplinary Report and Hearing Record. I find that Appellant was afforded all process due him
pursuant to Al-Shabazz.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the appeal of Appellant Tribble is DISMISSED
and the Final Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED;
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Ralph K. Anderson, III
Administrative Law Judge
June 1, 2005
Columbia, South Carolina |
