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Administrative Law Court
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SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
Phillip S. Copeland #194023 vs. SCDOC

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Corrections

PARTIES:
Appellant:
Phillip S. Copeland #194023

Respondent:
South Carolina Department of Corrections
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
04-ALJ-04-00271-AP

APPEARANCES:
n/a
 

ORDERS:

ORDER

STATEMENT OF CASE

This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) pursuant to the appeal of Phillip S. Copeland, an inmate incarcerated with the Department of Corrections (Department). Copeland was convicted of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code §§ 1.03 (Striking an Employee With/Without a Weapon) 1.08 (Riot), 1.11 (Hostage Taking), and 2.12 (Inciting/Creating a Disturbance). As a result of his conviction, Copeland lost forty (40) days of “good-time” credit. Inmate Copeland filed a grievance with the Department and received the Department’s final decision on or about June 18, 2004. On June 25, 2004, Copeland filed this appeal with the Court.

BACKGROUND

On January 15, 2004, the Appellant left his cell and participated in an incident in which inmates took control over B-wing of the Saluda unit at Broad River Correctional Institution. During that disturbance, the inmates assaulted and subdued correctional officers overseeing the unit. The inmates also set fire to mattress on the unit. The Appellant, in particular, kicked Officer Miller in the head and body and then tried to take his keys. Following the incident, Warden White charged the Appellant with violating SCDC Disciplinary Code §§ 1.03 (Striking an Employee With/Without a Weapon) 1.08 (Riot), 1.11 (Hostage Taking), and 2.12 (Inciting/Creating a Disturbance). Inmate Copeland received written notice of the charges on February 3, 2004.

On February 10, 2004, a Major Disciplinary Hearing was held before a DOC Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) concerning the above-listed charges. At the Appellant’s request, he was provided a counsel substitute during the hearing. Also, the Appellant requested that his accuser be present at the hearing. During the hearing, the DHO read a narrative of the Incident Report into the Record and received testimony from the Appellant and Warden White. At the conclusion of the hearing, the DHO found the Appellant guilty of charges and sanctioned him with the loss of all of his good time credit - forty (40) days. After the hearing, the DHO completed a Major Disciplinary Report and Hearing Record which documented the DHO’s findings.

The Appellant filed a grievance with the Department appealing his convictions of all charges. After reviewing his contentions, Warden McKie denied the Appellant’s grievance. The Appellant then appealed the Warden’s decision and the Department subsequently denied that grievance, stating that the evidence supported the convictions and that the sanction imposed was appropriate for the violations that the Appellant committed. This appeal followed.

The Appellant’s Notice of Appeal alleges that his due process rights were violated because supplemental statements and investigative synopses were used against him at his hearing rather than “19-29 Incident Reports.” The use of these accounts violated his rights because he was unable to cross-examine the declarant and could not respond to the reports because “he would most likely incriminate himself contrary to the 5th Amendment.” In his Appeal Brief, the Appellant asks that:

1.His convictions be reversed and his good time restored; and

2.His current “standing in punitive segregation of the maximum security unit” be re-evaluated.

Though I find that he has failed to provide any argument to support his allegation, I nonetheless address the issues.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court’s jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000). The Court’s appellate jurisdiction in inmate appeals is limited to state created liberty interests typically involving: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in which an inmate has received punishment in a major disciplinary hearing as a result of a serious rule violation. Id. Footnote

When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the Court sits in an appellate capacity. Id. at 756. Consequently, the review in these inmate grievance cases is limited to the Record presented. An Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment for that of an agency “as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2003). Furthermore, an Administrative Law Judge may not reverse or modify an agency’s decision unless substantial rights of the Appellant have been prejudiced because the decision is clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the whole Record, arbitrary or affected by an error of law. See Section 1-23-380(A)(6); See also Marietta Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety, 337 S.C. 133, 522 S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1999); South Carolina Dept. of Labor, Licensing and Regulation v. Girgis, 332 S.C. 162, 503 S.E.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1998). “‘Substantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the Record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action.” Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). Accordingly, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461 S.E.2d 388 (1995).

Additionally, in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 456, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Moreover, in Al-Shabazz, the Court underscored that since prison officials are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, the Courts and therefore this tribunal adhere to a “hands off” approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz at 757; See also Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off” approach of South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy).

In this case, the Appellant alleges that the Department should not have revoked his forty (40) days of accrued good time. Inmates have a protected liberty interest in their earned statutory good-time credits under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, when, as here, the Department revokes an inmate’s good-time credits as punishment in a “major disciplinary hearing” involving “more serious rule violations,” prison officials must provide that inmate with “minimal due process.” Al-Shabazz at 750. Consequently, specific administrative procedures must be followed before depriving an inmate of statutorily granted earned credit, including adequate advance notice of the charges, adequate opportunity for a hearing in which the inmate can present witnesses and documentary evidence, and an impartial hearing officer who prepares a written statement of all the evidence presented and the reasons for his decision. Id. at 751, (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-82 (1974)).

DISCUSSION

The Appellant set forth that the use of the supplemental statements and investigative synopses at his hearing violated his right to due process. The Record indicates that the Appellant received written notice of the charges against him in excess of twenty-four (24) hours prior to a hearing that was held before an impartial Disciplinary Hearing Officer. In addition, although not constitutionally required, the Appellant was afforded a counsel substitute who assisted him in his defense. At the hearing, the Appellant was given the opportunity to offer evidence and call witnesses. If the Appellant believed that there were witnesses to support his case, he could have requested that they appear. If that request was denied, this Court could then review whether that denial was an abuse of discretion. See Smith v. Massachusetts Dept. of Corrections, 936 F.2d 1390 (1st Cir. 1991).

In his Notice of Appeal, the Appellant also stated that he could not respond to the above reports because “he would most likely incriminate himself contrary to the 5th Amendment.” Though the Appellant could certainly invoke his Fifth Amendment rights against self incrimination in an inmate disciplinary proceeding, he cannot claim prejudice from his decision to exercise that right. In fact, to the contrary, it is permissible to draw an adverse inference from an inmate's silence at his disciplinary proceedings. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551 (1976). See also Griffith v. Griffith, 332 S.C. 630, 641, 506 S.E.2d 526, 532 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[I]t is permissible for the fact finder to draw an adverse inference in a civil case against a party invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”)

I also find that there is substantial evidence to support the Appellant's convictions of the alleged violations of the SCDC Disciplinary Code §§ 1.03 (Striking an Employee With/Without a Weapon) 1.08 (Riot), 1.11 (Hostage Taking), and 2.12 (Inciting/Creating a Disturbance). A Code § 1.03 (Striking an Employee ) violation is: “The wilful causing of bodily injury to a SCDC employee with or without a weapon.” A Code § 1.08 (Riot) violation is: “When an inmate, with two or more persons, intentionally participates in conduct that creates danger of damage or injury to property or persons and substantially obstructs the performance of unit operations or institutional operations.” Additionally, a Code § 1.11 (Hostage Taking) violation is: “The act of any inmate alone or with others who by threats, coercion, intimidation, or physical force, takes, holds, or carries away any person as a hostage for any reason whatsoever.” “Hostage” is defined as “one that is involuntarily controlled by an outside influence.” Merriam-Webster Online (2002), available at http://www.m-w.com. Finally, a Code § 2.12 (Inciting/Creating a Disturbance) violation is: “Any act or activity which results in a disruption of institutional operations or a breach of institution security.”

The Record clearly supports the facts recited in the “Background” portion of this Order. Those facts establish substantial evidence that the Appellant caused bodily injury to Officer Miller, participated in conduct that created damage and injury to both property and the officers, and substantially obstructed the performance of unit operations. The Appellant also assisted in taking Officers Singletary and Miller involuntarily under control.

ORDER

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the appeal of the Appellant is DISMISSED and the Final Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED;

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

_________________________________

Ralph King Anderson, III

Administrative Law Judge

March 17, 2005

Columbia, South Carolina


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