ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) pursuant to the
appeal of Phillip S. Copeland, an inmate incarcerated with the Department of Corrections
(Department). Copeland was convicted of violating SCDC Disciplinary Code §§ 1.03 (Striking
an Employee With/Without a Weapon) 1.08 (Riot), 1.11 (Hostage Taking), and 2.12
(Inciting/Creating a Disturbance). As a result of his conviction, Copeland lost forty (40) days of
“good-time” credit. Inmate Copeland filed a grievance with the Department and received the
Department’s final decision on or about June 18, 2004. On June 25, 2004, Copeland filed this
appeal with the Court.
BACKGROUND
On January 15, 2004, the Appellant left his cell and participated in an incident in which
inmates took control over B-wing of the Saluda unit at Broad River Correctional Institution.
During that disturbance, the inmates assaulted and subdued correctional officers overseeing the
unit. The inmates also set fire to mattress on the unit. The Appellant, in particular, kicked
Officer Miller in the head and body and then tried to take his keys. Following the incident,
Warden White charged the Appellant with violating SCDC Disciplinary Code §§ 1.03 (Striking
an Employee With/Without a Weapon) 1.08 (Riot), 1.11 (Hostage Taking), and 2.12
(Inciting/Creating a Disturbance). Inmate Copeland received written notice of the charges on
February 3, 2004.
On February 10, 2004, a Major Disciplinary Hearing was held before a DOC
Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) concerning the above-listed charges. At the Appellant’s
request, he was provided a counsel substitute during the hearing. Also, the Appellant requested
that his accuser be present at the hearing. During the hearing, the DHO read a narrative of the
Incident Report into the Record and received testimony from the Appellant and Warden White.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the DHO found the Appellant guilty of charges and sanctioned
him with the loss of all of his good time credit - forty (40) days. After the hearing, the DHO
completed a Major Disciplinary Report and Hearing Record which documented the DHO’s
findings.
The Appellant filed a grievance with the Department appealing his convictions of all
charges. After reviewing his contentions, Warden McKie denied the Appellant’s grievance. The
Appellant then appealed the Warden’s decision and the Department subsequently denied that
grievance, stating that the evidence supported the convictions and that the sanction imposed was
appropriate for the violations that the Appellant committed. This appeal followed.
The Appellant’s Notice of Appeal alleges that his due process rights were violated
because supplemental statements and investigative synopses were used against him at his
hearing rather than “19-29 Incident Reports.” The use of these accounts violated his rights
because he was unable to cross-examine the declarant and could not respond to the reports
because “he would most likely incriminate himself contrary to the 5th Amendment.” In his
Appeal Brief, the Appellant asks that:
1.His convictions be reversed and his good time restored; and
2.His current “standing in punitive segregation of the maximum security unit” be
re-evaluated.
Though I find that he has failed to provide any argument to support his allegation, I nonetheless
address the issues.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction to hear this matter is derived entirely from the decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000).
The Court’s appellate jurisdiction in inmate appeals is limited to state created liberty interests
typically involving: (1) cases in which an inmate contends that prison officials have erroneously
calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status; and (2) cases in which an
inmate has received punishment in a major disciplinary hearing as a result of a serious rule
violation. Id.
When reviewing the Department’s decisions in inmate grievance matters, the Court sits
in an appellate capacity. Id. at 756. Consequently, the review in these inmate grievance cases is
limited to the Record presented. An Administrative Law Judge may not substitute his judgment
for that of an agency “as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2003). Furthermore, an Administrative Law Judge may not reverse or
modify an agency’s decision unless substantial rights of the Appellant have been prejudiced
because the decision is clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the whole
Record, arbitrary or affected by an error of law. See Section 1-23-380(A)(6); See also Marietta
Garage, Inc. v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety, 337 S.C. 133, 522 S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App.
1999); South Carolina Dept. of Labor, Licensing and Regulation v. Girgis, 332 S.C. 162, 503
S.E.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1998). “‘Substantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the
evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the
Record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative
agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action.” Lark v. Bi-Lo, 276 S.C. 130,
135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). Accordingly, the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being
supported by substantial evidence. Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461
S.E.2d 388 (1995).
Additionally, in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 456, 105 S.Ct. 2768 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the relevant
question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached
by the disciplinary board.” Moreover, in Al-Shabazz, the Court underscored that since prison
officials are in the best position to decide inmate disciplinary matters, the Courts and therefore
this tribunal adhere to a “hands off” approach to internal prison disciplinary policies and
procedures when reviewing inmate appeals under the APA. Al-Shabazz at 757; See also Pruitt
v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 266 S.E.2d 779 (1980) (stating the traditional “hands off” approach of
South Carolina courts regarding internal prison discipline and policy).
In this case, the Appellant alleges that the Department should not have revoked his forty
(40) days of accrued good time. Inmates have a protected liberty interest in their earned
statutory good-time credits under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, when, as here, the
Department revokes an inmate’s good-time credits as punishment in a “major disciplinary
hearing” involving “more serious rule violations,” prison officials must provide that inmate with
“minimal due process.” Al-Shabazz at 750. Consequently, specific administrative procedures
must be followed before depriving an inmate of statutorily granted earned credit, including
adequate advance notice of the charges, adequate opportunity for a hearing in which the inmate
can present witnesses and documentary evidence, and an impartial hearing officer who prepares
a written statement of all the evidence presented and the reasons for his decision. Id. at 751,
(citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-82 (1974)).
DISCUSSION
The Appellant set forth that the use of the supplemental statements and investigative
synopses at his hearing violated his right to due process. The Record indicates that the Appellant
received written notice of the charges against him in excess of twenty-four (24) hours prior to a
hearing that was held before an impartial Disciplinary Hearing Officer. In addition, although not
constitutionally required, the Appellant was afforded a counsel substitute who assisted him in his
defense. At the hearing, the Appellant was given the opportunity to offer evidence and call
witnesses. If the Appellant believed that there were witnesses to support his case, he could have
requested that they appear. If that request was denied, this Court could then review whether that
denial was an abuse of discretion. See Smith v. Massachusetts Dept. of Corrections, 936 F.2d
1390 (1st Cir. 1991).
In his Notice of Appeal, the Appellant also stated that he could not respond to the above
reports because “he would most likely incriminate himself contrary to the 5th Amendment.”
Though the Appellant could certainly invoke his Fifth Amendment rights against self
incrimination in an inmate disciplinary proceeding, he cannot claim prejudice from his decision
to exercise that right. In fact, to the contrary, it is permissible to draw an adverse inference from
an inmate's silence at his disciplinary proceedings. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct.
1551 (1976). See also Griffith v. Griffith, 332 S.C. 630, 641, 506 S.E.2d 526, 532 (Ct. App.
1998) (“[I]t is permissible for the fact finder to draw an adverse inference in a civil case against
a party invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”)
I also find that there is substantial evidence to support the Appellant's convictions of the
alleged violations of the SCDC Disciplinary Code §§ 1.03 (Striking an Employee With/Without
a Weapon) 1.08 (Riot), 1.11 (Hostage Taking), and 2.12 (Inciting/Creating a Disturbance). A
Code § 1.03 (Striking an Employee ) violation is: “The wilful causing of bodily injury to a
SCDC employee with or without a weapon.” A Code § 1.08 (Riot) violation is: “When an
inmate, with two or more persons, intentionally participates in conduct that creates danger of
damage or injury to property or persons and substantially obstructs the performance of unit
operations or institutional operations.” Additionally, a Code § 1.11 (Hostage Taking) violation
is: “The act of any inmate alone or with others who by threats, coercion, intimidation, or
physical force, takes, holds, or carries away any person as a hostage for any reason whatsoever.”
“Hostage” is defined as “one that is involuntarily controlled by an outside influence.”
Merriam-Webster Online (2002), available at http://www.m-w.com. Finally, a Code § 2.12
(Inciting/Creating a Disturbance) violation is: “Any act or activity which results in a disruption
of institutional operations or a breach of institution security.”
The Record clearly supports the facts recited in the “Background” portion of this Order.
Those facts establish substantial evidence that the Appellant caused bodily injury to Officer
Miller, participated in conduct that created damage and injury to both property and the officers,
and substantially obstructed the performance of unit operations. The Appellant also assisted in
taking Officers Singletary and Miller involuntarily under control.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the appeal of the Appellant is DISMISSED and
the Final Decision of the Department is AFFIRMED;
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Ralph King Anderson, III
Administrative Law Judge
March 17, 2005
Columbia, South Carolina |