STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The above-captioned case is before the Administrative Law Court pursuant to the request of Petitioner Claude Thomas (“Petitioner”) for a contested case hearing. In this matter, Petitioner seeks review of Final Agency Determination No. 08-021 issued by Respondent South Carolina Budget and Control Board, South Carolina Retirement Systems (“Retirement Systems”), on October 22, 2008, in which the Retirement Systems affirmed the determination that Petitioner’s earliest possible date of retirement for the commencement of his disability retirement benefits under the South Carolina Retirement System was August 18, 2007. On March 24, 2009, Respondent Retirement Systems filed a Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter, and, on March 26, 2009, Petitioner filed a reciprocal Motion for Summary Judgment. These motions were heard by the Court on April 8, 2009, at the Administrative Law Court in Columbia, South Carolina. Having fully considered the arguments presented at that hearing and in the parties’ motions, and having carefully examined the applicable law, I find that summary judgment should be granted in favor of the Retirement Systems for the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Claude Thomas is a sixty-year-old retired member of the South Carolina Retirement System (“SCRS” or “System”), who retired from the System on a disability retirement allowance on August 18, 2007. Prior to his retirement, Petitioner was employed in two positions covered by SCRS as the Deputy Director of Planning for Greenwood County and as a County Councilman on the Abbeville County Council. Petitioner took his position as deputy planning director with Greenwood County on February 14, 2000, and last physically performed his job duties in that position on December 16, 2005, when he left work on sick leave. Although he last earned compensation for his planning position on March 24, 2006, when he exhausted his accrued annual and sick leave, Petitioner remained on the County’s payroll and was not terminated from his employment with Greenwood County until nearly a year later, on February 28, 2007. Petitioner assumed his position as a Councilman on the Abbeville County Council on January 1, 2001, and continues to hold that post, with his current term expiring in 2012. On August 17, 2007, Petitioner terminated his active service in SCRS in connection with his service as a county councilman, and he now serves in that position as a working retiree. As a result of his dual employment, Petitioner participated in SCRS as an active member with regard to both positions, making contributions to the System from his wages for each position and receiving service credit in the System for both positions.[1] Additionally, Petitioner’s compensation from both positions was included in the calculation of the average final compensation used to determine the amount of his disability retirement allowance.
While on sick leave from his position as deputy planning director for Greenwood County, Petitioner submitted an application for disability retirement benefits to the Retirement Systems on December 19, 2005. Although Petitioner’s application was initially denied by the Retirement Systems, his claim for disability retirement benefits was subsequently approved by the Retirement Systems on August 8, 2007, after Petitioner submitted additional medical evidence regarding the nature and extent of his disability to the Retirement Systems while his challenge to the denial of his application was pending before the Administrative Law Court.
In order to finalize the approval of Petitioner’s disability retirement, the Retirement Systems obtained an “Employer Certification of Last Day Paid” and a “Certification of Final Retirement Deductions” from both of Petitioner’s recent employers, Greenwood County and Abbeville County. The forms returned from Greenwood County in August 2007 and February 2008 indicated that Petitioner’s last day of earned compensation with Greenwood County was March 24, 2006, and that his date of termination from employment with Greenwood County was February 28, 2007. The forms completed by Abbeville County in September 2007 and July 2008 listed Petitioner as terminating his active service in SCRS with regard to his employment as a county councilman on August 17, 2007. Based upon this August 17, 2007 date on which Petitioner terminated the last of his active service in SCRS, the Retirement Systems determined Petitioner’s date of retirement to be August 18, 2007, the earliest retirement date possible after his participation as an active member in the System had ceased. Accordingly, Petitioner’s disability retirement benefits commenced with a partial monthly disability retirement allowance for the remainder of August 2007 and continued with regular monthly disability retirement allowances beginning in September 2007.
By a letter dated July 9, 2008, Petitioner sought review of the determination of his effective date of retirement, requesting that his retirement date be changed from August 18, 2007, to May 1, 2006. On October 22, 2008, the Retirement Systems issued Final Agency Determination No. 08-021, in which the Retirement Systems found that Petitioner’s date of retirement had been properly determined to be August 18, 2007. By a Request for Contested Case Hearing filed on November 26, 2008, Petitioner now challenges that Final Agency Determination before this Court.
DISCUSSION
In the instant case, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, SCRCP, and ALC Rules 19(A) and 68. In the motions, the parties agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute in this matter, and that this case can be decided as a matter of law based upon the statutory requirements of the South Carolina Retirement Code. As set forth below, I find that summary judgment should be granted in favor of the Retirement Systems in this matter.
Summary judgment is proper in a case when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), SCRCP; see also, e.g., Henderson v. Allied Signal Inc., 373 S.C. 179, 183, 644 S.E.2d 724, 726 (2007). The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite disposition of cases that do not require the services of a fact finder. Austin v. Beaufort County Sheriff’s Office, 377 S.C. 31, 34, 659 S.E.2d 122, 123 (2008). Accordingly, where no further development of the facts is necessary to clarify the application of a statute, summary judgment is a proper means of disposing of a purely legal question of statutory interpretation, even where the case presents a novel issue of statutory construction. See, e.g., Med. Univ. of S.C. v. Arnaud, 360 S.C. 615, 620 n.6, 602 S.E.2d 747, 749 n.6 (2004). In the case at hand, there is no dispute between the parties as to the material facts underlying the case. Rather, the sole dispute in this case concerns the proper interpretation of S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-1540 (Supp. 2008) as it relates to Petitioner’s effective date of retirement for the commencement of his disability retirement benefits.
On that issue, Petitioner requests that the Court reverse the Retirement Systems’ Final Agency Determination that Petitioner’s date of retirement was properly determined to be August 18, 2007, and instead find Petitioner’s effective date of retirement to be no later than September 19, 2006. Specifically, Petitioner argues that, pursuant to Section 9-1-1540, if Petitioner is found to be eligible for disability retirement benefits under SCRS, he must be given a retirement date not later than nine months after he submitted his application, regardless of whether he had separated from active service under the System at that time. The Retirement Systems, however, contends that based upon the fundamental requirements for retirement under the statutes governing the South Carolina Retirement System, a member of the System may not retire pursuant to Section 9-1-1540 or any other SCRS retirement provision unless and until he withdraws from all active service under the System.
In interpreting the provisions of the Retirement Code, the South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized that, while retirement statutes “should be liberally construed in favor of those to be benefitted and the objective sought to be accomplished,” those statutes must also be read in context with the “elaborate statutory and constitutional scheme designed to protect the independence, integrity and actuarial soundness of the [Retirement Systems’] funds.” Duvall v. S.C. Budget & Control Bd., 377 S.C. 36, 41, 659 S.E.2d 125, 127 (2008) (quoting King v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 319 S.C. 373, 461 S.E.2d 822 (1995), and Wehle v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 363 S.C. 394, 611 S.E.2d 240 (2005), respectively). Accordingly, the Court has cautioned that, in construing a particular statute under the Retirement Code, the “statute should not be construed by concentrating on an isolated phrase,” but rather, “the statute must be read as a whole, and sections which are part of the same general statutory law must be construed together and each one given effect.” Id. at 42, 659 S.E.2d at 127. Further, the Court has often noted that, where a statutory scheme has provided a definition for a specific word or term, that definition should be followed in interpreting the statutes under that scheme that employ the defined word. See, e.g., Weston v. Carolina Research & Dev. Found., 303 S.C. 398, 403-04, 401 S.E.2d 161, 164 (1991) (holding that “[i]t is ‘well settled that a legislative body has the power within reasonable limits to prescribe legal definitions of its own language, and when an Act passed by it embodies the definition, it is generally binding upon the Courts’”) (quoting Windham v. Pace, 192 S.C. 271, 283, 6 S.E.2d 270, 275 (1939)); Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., 223 S.C. 320, ___, 75 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1953) (“The lawmaking body’s construction of its language by means of definitions of the terms employed should be followed in the interpretation of the act or section to which it relates and is intended to apply.”); see also, e.g., Bell Fin. Co. v. S.C. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 297 S.C. 111, 114, 374 S.E.2d 918, 920 (Ct. App. 1988) (“Where the statute . . . contains words that are statutorily defined, the statutory definitions should generally be followed in interpreting the statute.”). And, finally, our courts have also routinely acknowledged that “[t]he construction of a statute by the agency charged with its administration will be accorded the most respectful consideration and will not be overruled absent compelling reasons.” Dunton v. S.C. Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, 291 S.C. 221, 223, 353 S.E.2d 132, 133 (1987); see also, e.g., Comm’rs of Pub. Works v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 372 S.C. 351, 359, 641 S.E.2d 763, 767 (Ct. App. 2007) (same).
With regard to specific statutory provisions at issue in this case, the eligibility of a member of the South Carolina Retirement System for disability retirement benefits is governed by S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-1540 (Supp. 2008), which provides, in relevant part:
Upon the application of a member in service or of his employer, a member in service . . . may be retired by the [State Budget and Control] [B]oard not less than thirty days and not more than nine months next following the date of filing the application on a disability retirement allowance if the [S]ystem, after a medical examination of the member, certifies that the member is mentally or physically incapacitated for the further performance of duty, that the incapacity is likely to be permanent, and that the member should be retired.
Id. (emphasis added). “Retirement” under this disability retirement statute or any other retirement statute in the Retirement Code is, in turn, defined by S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-10(26) (Supp. 2008) as “the withdrawal from active service with a retirement allowance granted under the [S]ystem.” Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, while Section 9-1-1540 does not explicitly require a member to withdraw from active service prior to commencing a disability retirement under the System, this requirement is nevertheless incorporated into the requirements for disability retirement under Section 9-1-1540 through the basic definition of retirement provided in Section 9-1-10(26). Consequently, based upon the most fundamental definition of retirement provided for in the statutes governing SCRS, a member who is approved for disability retirement under Section 9-1-1540 must, like any other SCRS retiree, at a minimum withdraw from all active service in the System in order to commence his retirement. Cf., e.g., S.C. Code Ann. §§ 9-1-1510(3), 9-1-1515(A)(4), 9-1-1790(A) (Supp. 2008). Further, it should be emphasized that, where a member is employed by multiple employers covered under the South Carolina Retirement System, the member must sever employment and withdraw from active service with all covered employers in order to begin receiving a retirement allowance under the System. Put simply, “retirement” under SCRS is system-wide—a member retires under SCRS not by merely quitting a particular covered position, but by terminating from all active employment in the System. See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-10(26) (Supp. 2008) (defining “retirement” under SCRS as “the withdrawal from active service with a retirement allowance granted under the [S]ystem”).
In the instant matter, the record clearly demonstrates that Petitioner did not separate from all active service with a covered employer under SCRS and terminate his active membership in the System until August 17, 2007, and thus Petitioner could not retire under the System until the following day, August 18, 2007. While Petitioner was terminated from his employment as a deputy planning director with Greenwood County on February 28, 2007, he continued to participate as an active member in SCRS with regard to his position on the Abbeville County Council until August 17, 2007, when he ceased his active membership in the System in order to receive his disability retirement benefits. And, although Petitioner has at times characterized his service on the county council as merely a part-time supplement to his primary employment with Greenwood County, Petitioner was enrolled in SCRS for his service on the Abbeville County Council; the county council paid active member contributions to the System on Petitioner’s behalf based upon his compensation from that position; and the Retirement Systems awarded Petitioner service credit for the time he served on the council as an active member of the System and used his compensation from that position in the calculation of his average final compensation. Accordingly, Petitioner’s service on the Abbeville County Council prior to August 17, 2007, was active service with a covered employer in SCRS such that Petitioner was not eligible to receive a retirement benefit from the System until he terminated his active membership in the System with regard to that service. Therefore, it must be found that, as a matter of law, the Retirement Systems properly determined that Petitioner did not separate from all active service under SCRS until he terminated his active service with the Abbeville County Council on August 17, 2007, and thus could not retire under the System any earlier than August 18, 2007.
Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary on this point are unavailing. In order to support his contention that his date of retirement should be moved back to September 19, 2006, Petitioner reads one clause of Section 9-1-1540 in isolation to reach the conclusion that a member approved for disability retirement benefits must be allowed to commence his retirement within nine months of the date of his application, even if he is still participating as an active member in the System at that time. This argument not only fails to recognize the fundamental separation from service requirement for retirement set out in the definition of retirement in Section 9-1-10(26) and found throughout the SCRS retirement statutes, but also leads to patently absurd results. For example, in Petitioner’s own case, his argument that his date of retirement should be moved back to September 19, 2006, if accepted, would cause Petitioner to be considered retired and to receive retroactive retirement benefits for an eleven-month period between September 2006 and August 2007 during which he participated as an active member of SCRS while making contributions to, and earning service credit in, the System as a result of his employment on the Abbeville County Council. Similarly, Petitioner’s argument for a piecemeal disability retirement benefit that would pay him a retirement benefit based solely upon his Greenwood County employment until he withdrew from active service with Abbeville County has no basis in the Retirement Code and would cause the same anomalous result of Petitioner simultaneously having both active and retired status in the South Carolina Retirement System.
In sum, because the undisputed facts in this case clearly establish that Petitioner did not withdraw from all active service with a covered employer under SCRS until August 17, 2007, it is further clear that, as a matter of law, Petitioner was not eligible to retire and commence receiving a disability retirement allowance pursuant to Section 9-1-1540 until the following day, August 18, 2007. Therefore, I find that summary judgment should be granted in favor of the Retirement Systems in this matter.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, I find that the Retirement Systems is entitled to judgment in its favor in this matter as a matter of law. Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent South Carolina Retirement Systems’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner Claude Thomas’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
___________________________________
The Honorable John D. McLeod
Administrative Law Judge
June ___, 2009
Columbia, South Carolina
