ORDERS:
ORDER
The
above-captioned matter is before the South Carolina Administrative Law Court
(“ALC” or “Court”) pursuant to a notice of appeal filed by Phillip C. Beard (“Beard”)
on October 9, 2008. Beard seeks reversal of a decision by the Director of the
Office of Human Resources, State Budget and Control Board (“Director”), which upheld the
termination of his employment with Respondent South Carolina Department of
Natural Resources (“Resources”).
After
timely notice to the parties, oral arguments were held on March 2, 2009 at the
ALC in Columbia, South Carolina. Based upon the record, the parties’ briefs
and oral arguments, and upon applicable law, I find that the Director’s
decision in this matter must be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Beard
began his employment with the Department as a law enforcement officer on
approximately January 17, 2000. On June 23, 2008, the Department’s Director,
John E. Frampton (“Director Frampton”), notified Beard that he was being
terminated from his position with the Department for improper conduct or
conduct unbecoming an officer. Beard received this letter by hand-delivery on
June 23, 2008, which listed the effective date of his termination as June 20,
2008. In the letter, Director Frampton informed Beard that, pursuant to S.C.
Code Ann. § 50-3-310, he had the authority to remove law enforcement officers
at his discretion, and that Beard was not entitled to grieve the June 23, 2008
termination decision.
Beard
wrote a letter to the Department, which was received on July 11, 2008,
requesting that the Department issue a final agency decision regarding his
termination so he could appeal to the
Office of Human
Resources, State Budget and Control Board (“OHR”). In his letter, Beard
disagreed with Director Frampton’s contention that he was not entitled to
grieve the termination matter pursuant to the provisions of the State Employee
Grievance Act (“Act”). See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 8-17-310 et seq.
In response, Director Frampton issued a letter on July 15, 2008, again
informing Beard that the final agency decision was made on June 20, 2008. By
letter dated August 4, 2008, Beard appealed Director Frampton’s decision to the
Director pursuant to the Act. On September 12, 2008, the Director determined
that Beard failed to timely file a grievance with the Department’s Director
pursuant to the Act, and therefore, Beard’s appeal was denied.
On
October 9, 2008, Beard filed a notice of appeal with this Court.
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
This
Court’s appellate review of final decisions in state employee grievance
proceedings is governed by the standards provided in S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380
(Supp. 2008). Section 1-23-380 (5) provides that the ALC “may not substitute
its judgment for the judgment of the [Respondent] as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact.” However, pursuant to the statutory provision, this
Court,
“may
reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or
decisions are:
(a)
in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b)
in excess of the statutory authority of the [Board];
(c)
made upon unlawful procedure;
(d)
affected by other error of law;
(e)
clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record; or
(f)
arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.”
Id.; see
also Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981)
(stating “‘[s]ubstantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the
evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which,
considering the Record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the
conclusion that the administrative agency reached or must have reached in order
to justify its action.” Id. at 135, 276 S.E.2d at 306. Accordingly,
“[t]he ‘possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence
does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by
substantial evidence.’” Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 461
S.E.2d 388 (1995) (citing Palmetto Alliance, Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm.,
282 S.C. 430, 432, 319 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1984)).
An
abuse of discretion occurs when an administrative agency’s ruling is based upon
an error of law, such as application of the wrong legal principle; or, when
based upon factual conclusions, the ruling is without evidentiary support; or,
when the trial court is vested with discretion, but the ruling reveals no
discretion was exercised; or, when the ruling does not fall within the range of
permissible decisions applicable in a particular case, such that it may be
deemed arbitrary and capricious. State v. Allen, 370
S.C. 88, 94, 634 S.E.2d 653, 656 (2006) (application of standard to circuit
court) (citing Fontaine v. Peitz, 291 S.C. 536, 539, 354 S.E.2d 565, 566
(1987); see also Converse
Power Corp, 350 S.C. 39, 47 564 S.E.2d 341, 345 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Deese
v. State Bd. of Dentistry, 286 S.C. 182, 184-85, 332 S.E.2d 539, 541 (Ct.
App. 1985) (“A decision is arbitrary if it is without a rational basis, is
based alone on one’s will and not upon any course of reasoning and exercise of
judgment, is made at pleasure, without adequate determining principles, or is
governed by no fixed rules or standards.”).
DISCUSSION
S.C.
Code Ann. § 8-17-310 (Supp. 2007) requires a covered employee to file a
grievance concerning an agency action within the time frames established under
the Act:
[A]ll grievances of
agency actions affecting a covered employee must be initiated internally by
such employee within fourteen calendar days of the effective date of the
action.
§ 8-17-330. Beard
contends that he timely filed his grievance with the Department Director. He
further contends that even if the Court were to conclude that he did not timely
file, the Department improperly advised him that he could not appeal the
termination matter. Therefore, Beard asserts that an untimely filing should be
excused based upon the Department’s statements contained in its June 23, 2008
letter. The Court must determine whether Beard timely filed his grievance with
the Department’s Director, and if not, is the Department estopped from claiming
that Beard did not timely file his grievance action based upon its statements
contained within its June 23, 2008 letter.
Timeliness
Section
8-17-310 specifically provides that a covered employee must initiate the
grievance process with the agency “within fourteen calendar days of the
effective date of the action.” § 8-17-330. There is no limiting language or
exceptions contained within the statute. Beard was terminated from his
employment with the Department on June 20, 2008, and he received the
Department’s decision on June 23, 2008. However, Beard’s grievance was not
filed with the Department’s Office of Human Resources until July 11, 2008 –
twenty-one (21) calendar days from the effective date of the action and
eighteen (18) calendar days from the date Beard was informed of his termination.
Both of these dates are outside the filing time allowed pursuant to §
8-17-330. Based upon a fundamental rule of law, it is well established that a
court does not have the authority to extend the time for taking an appeal from
a decision of an administrative agency. See, e.g., Sadico of
Greenville, Inc. v. Greenville County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 340 S.C. 57,
59, 530 S.E.2d 383, 384 (2000); Mears v. Mears, 287 S.C. 168, 337 S.E.2d
206 (1985); Burnett v. S.C. State Highway Dep’t, 252 S.C. 568, 167
S.E.2d 571 (1969). Accordingly, Beard failed to timely file his grievance with
the Department.
Equity
Beard
also contends, even if he failed to timely file his grievance in this matter,
the Department should be estopped from relying upon his failure to timely file
based upon Director Frampton’s statement in the June 23, 2008 termination
letter. Specifically, Beard asserts that because Director Frampton improperly
advised him that he did not have grievance rights in this matter, his untimely
grievance filing should be excused. I disagree.
Equitable
estoppel against a government agency may be appropriate to apply in certain
situations. However, a person asserting estoppel against a government agency “must
prove ‘(1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to
the facts in question, (2) justifiable reliance upon the government’s conduct,
and (3) a prejudicial change in position.’ Absent even one element, estoppel
will not lie against a government entity. Further, citizens are presumed to
know the law and are charged with exercising ‘reasonable care to protect
[their] interest[s].’” Morgan v. S.C. Budget and Control Bd., 377 S.C.
313, 659 S.E.2d 263 (Ct. App. 2008) citing Smothers v. U.S. Fidelity
and Guar. Co., 322 S.C. 207, 210-11, 470 S.E.2d 858, 860 (Ct. App. 1996).
Here, § 8-17-330 specifically delineates the time within which an employee can
file an appeal of an agency’s final decision.
Every individual is presumed to know the law, and Beard’s situation is no
different. Beard cannot relieve himself of the duty to abide by the time
frames mandated by the Act based upon statements contained in the letter. Accordingly,
Beard failed to satisfy the first element of equitable estoppel against a
government agency.
Based
upon the Court’s rulings, it is unnecessary to address the remaining issues in
this matter. See S.C. Coastal Conservation
League v. S.C. Dep’t. of Health and Envtl. Control, 380 S.C. 349, 383, 669, S.E.2d 899, 917 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Whiteside v.
Cherokee County Sch. Dist. No. One, 311 S.C. 335, 340, 428 S.E.2d 886, 889
(1993) (holding courts need not address remaining exceptions when the
resolution of a prior issue is dispositive of the case)).
ORDER
For the reasons
set forth above, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Director’s decision in this matter is AFFIRMED.
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_____________________________________
Marvin
F. Kittrell Chief
Judge
March 12, 2009
Columbia, South Carolina
|