ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
This
matter is an appeal by the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles
(Department) from a Final Order and Decision of the South Carolina Division of
Motor Vehicle Hearings (DMVH). The DMVH’s Final Order and Decision was issued following
an administrative hearing held pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1090(c) (Supp.
2007). The Department contends that the DMVH hearing officer abused his
discretion by reducing the habitual offender suspension of Respondent Charles
D. White. The Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) has jurisdiction to hear
this matter pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2007). Upon review of
this matter, the DMVH’s Final Order and Decision is reversed as set forth below.
background
In February of 2003, Respondent’s
driver’s license was suspended as a result of neglecting to pay a traffic
ticket. Respondent initially failed to take the appropriate actions to
reinstate his license and, in the months following his suspension, was
convicted of Driving Under Suspension (DUS) on three separate occasions. In late
2003, as a result of those convictions, Respondent was found to be a “habitual
offender” pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020. In accordance with S.C. Code
Ann. § 56-1-1090(a), Respondent’s driver’s license was suspended for a five-year
period beginning December 3, 2003 and ending December 3, 2008. On November 13,
2005, almost two years after his habitual offender suspension had begun, Respondent
was charged with Driving While Impaired (DWI) in North Carolina. He pled
guilty to that offense and was convicted on December 14, 2005.
On January 8, 2008, pursuant
to Section 56-1-1090(c), Respondent filed a petition with the DMVH for a
reduction of his habitual offender suspension. On January 15, 2008, the
Department filed an Objection to Request for Reduction of Habitual Offender
Suspension (Objection) with the DMVH. In its Objection, the Department argued
that, because of Respondent’s DWI offense, Respondent had not earned the right
to have his suspension reduced.
Respondent’s
hearing was held on February 13, 2008. On February 14, 2008, the DMVH hearing
officer issued a Final Order and Decision in which he ordered that Respondent’s
habitual offender suspension be reduced. The Department now appeals.
ISSUE
ON APPEAL
Did the DMVH
hearing officer abuse his discretion by reducing Respondent’s habitual offender
suspension?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The DMVH is authorized
by law to determine contested cases arising from the South Carolina Department
of Motor Vehicles (Department). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp.
2007). Therefore, the DMVH is an “agency” under the Administrative Procedures
Act (APA). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-505(2) (as amended by 2008 S.C. Act
No. 334). As such, the APA’s standard of review governs appeals from decisions
of the DMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (as amended by 2008 S.C. Act
No. 334); see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health &
Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1995).
The standard used by appellate bodies – including the ALC – to review agency decisions
is provided by S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380(5) (as amended by 2008 S.C. Act No.
334). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(E) (as amended by 2008 S.C. Act No.
334) (directing administrative law judges to conduct appellate review in the
same manner prescribed in § 1-23-380). This section provides:
The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of
the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court
may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further
proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the agency] if
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the
agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of
the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or
characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380(5) (as amended by 2008 S.C. Act No. 334).
Decisions regarding the
existence of good cause are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Melton v. Olenik, 379 S.C. 45, 54-55, 664 S.E.2d 487, 492
(Ct. App. 2008); Mauro v. Clabaugh, 299 S.C. 184, 191, 383 S.E.2d 244,
249 (Ct. App. 1989); Berry v. Ianuario, 286 S.C. 522, 526, 335 S.E.2d
250, 252 (Ct. App. 1985); Bradey v. Children’s Bureau of South Carolina,
275 S.C. 622, 624, 274 S.E.2d 418, 420 (1981); Planters Fertilizer &
Phosphate Co. v. McCreight, 187 S.C. 483, 491, 198 S.E. 405, 408 (1938). The
meaning of the phrase “abuse of discretion” has been explained as follows:
The term ‘abuse of discretion’ has no opprobrious implication
and may be found if the conclusions reached by the lower court are without
reasonable factual support. We note, however, “[i]t is not always easy to
determine when and if a trial judge has abused his discretion. Overly
simplified, abuse of discretion involves the extent of disagreement. When an
appellate court is in agreement with a discretionary ruling or is only mildly
in disagreement, it says that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion. On
the other hand, when the appellate court is in substantial or violent
disagreement, it says that there has been an abuse of discretion.”
State v.
Corey D., 339 S.C. 107, 118, 529 S.E.2d 20, 26 (2000) (quoting Rish v.
Rish, 296 S.C. 14, 15-16, 370 S.E.2d 102, 103 (Ct. App. 1988)) (internal
citations omitted). The burden is on the appellant to show that there is an
abuse of discretion. Halverson v. Yawn, 328 S.C. 618, 621, 493 S.E.2d
883, 884 (Ct. App. 1997).
DISCUSSION
The Department argues
that the DMVH hearing officer abused his discretion by reducing Respondent’s
habitual offender suspension. The Court agrees.
Pursuant to Section
56-1-1090(a), the length of a habitual offender suspension is five years,
unless the suspension period is reduced to two years as permitted by Section
56-1-1090(c). Section 56-1-1090(c) provides in pertinent part:
[U]pon petition to the Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings and
for good cause shown, the hearing officer may restore to [a person declared to
be a habitual offender] the privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State
upon terms and conditions as the department may prescribe, subject to other
provisions of law relating to the issuance of drivers’ licenses. The petition
permitted by this item may be filed after two years have expired from the date
of the decision of the department finding the person to be an habitual
offender. At this time and after hearing, the hearing officer may reduce the
five-year period of [subsection] (a) to a two-year period for good cause shown.
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1090(c) (Supp.
2007).
The term “good cause”
is not defined in the motor vehicle code, nor has it been defined by South Carolina’s appellate courts. Unfortunately, the term does not lend itself to a
precise definition. Weiler v. Lutz, 501 N.W.2d 667, 671 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993); Bd. of Educ. of the Smyrna School Dist. v. DiNunzio, 602 A.2d 85,
94 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990); In re Marriage of Bennett, 938 S.W.2d 952,
957 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). Generally speaking, “good cause” is “a cause or
reason sufficient in law; one that is based on equity or justice or that would
motivate a reasonable man under all the circumstances.” DeVries v. Rix,
279 N.W.2d 89, 95 (Neb. 1979) (quoting Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 213 (7th ed. 1999)
(defining “good cause” as “a legally sufficient reason.”). The definition of
good cause, however, “varies with the context in which it is used.” Zorrero
v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 120 Cal. Rptr. 855, 858 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1975). Its meaning “must be determined not only by the verbal context
of the statute in which [the] term is employed but also by [the] context of the
action and the procedures involved in the type of case presented.” In re
Conservatorship of Estate of Marsh, 566 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Neb. Ct. App.
1997) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 692 (6th ed.1990)).
In determining the
meaning of “good cause” with respect to reducing a habitual offender
suspension, it is thus necessary to examine the purpose of the suspension. Cf. Marsh, 566 N.W.2d at 786 (“[T]he meaning of “good cause” to remove a
conservator necessarily requires an examination of a conservator’s purpose and
duties.”). According to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1010(b) (2006), the objective of
a habitual offender suspension is “[t]o deny the privilege of operating motor
vehicles on [the public highways of this State] to persons who by their conduct
and record have demonstrated their indifference to the safety and welfare of
others and their disrespect for the laws of this State.” Therefore, in
determining whether a reduction of a habitual offender suspension should be
granted, tribunals should evaluate the likelihood that the motorist will, if
granted a reduction, demonstrate an “indifference to the safety and welfare of
others” or a “disrespect for the laws of this State.”
Here, the hearing officer
found that Respondent is “now a more responsible, mature individual.” DMV
argues that, other than a passage of time, there is nothing in the record to
support a finding that Respondent is a more mature and responsible individual.
Indeed, Respondent never testified that he had become more responsible or
mature, and some of the hearing officer’s findings in this regard are not
supported by the record. For instance, the hearing officer found that:
· Respondent “is sorry for his past mistakes;”
· Respondent “has not driven since his last violation;” and
· At the time of Respondent’s DWI violation, Respondent “was not driving
nor had he been driving,” and Respondent “just went ahead and ‘took the easy
road’ and plead guilty to the violation.”
A review of the record, however,
shows that Respondent never expressed any remorse for his past mistakes.
In fact, instead of accepting responsibility for those mistakes, Respondent
largely put the blame on others. Additionally, other than the fact that
Respondent has not been convicted of a motor vehicle offense since his DWI
conviction, there is no evidence that Respondent has abstained from driving
since that conviction. Moreover, while Respondent did testify that his vehicle
was parked at the time of his DWI arrest, he did not testify that he had
refrained from driving earlier that night. Furthermore, where the validity of
a criminal conviction has been established, it is improper to question the
efficacy of that conviction in an administrative proceeding like the one held
below. See S.C. Wildlife and Marine Resources v. Kunkle, 287 S.C.
177, 336 S.E. 2d 468 (1985).
Therefore, the issue
here is whether a reasonable person could find that even though Respondent has
been convicted of DWI since being declared a Habitual Offender, the remaining
findings of facts support reducing the suspension. Those findings of fact are
that:
· Respondent has served over four (4) years of his five (5) year
suspension;
· Respondent’s motor vehicle problems originated from his failure
to pay traffic tickets. That failure occurred because his ex-wife failed to
pay the tickets while he was on the road. He is now divorced;
· Respondent, who was a trucker driver, is now forced to work as a
diesel mechanic since he is unable to drive;
· Respondent completed the ADSAP program;
· Respondent’s ten-year Driver’s Record shows that he has not been
convicted of any controlled substance violations;
· Respondent paid all reinstatement fees, about twelve hundred
dollars ($1200.00); and
· Respondent has not had any motor vehicle violations since his
North Carolina DWI conviction.
Most of these findings
provide, at most, minimal support for the proposition that Respondent has
matured and become more responsible. For instance, Respondent’s completion of
the ADSAP program was a legal requirement that resulted from his being
convicted of DWI during the service of his habitual offender suspension. Additionally,
the fact that Respondent has not been convicted of any controlled substance
violations is a fact that is unrelated to the infractions that led to Respondent’s
habitual offender suspension and should be expected of all citizens. Moreover,
the payment of reinstatement fees is simply a prerequisite for reinstatement of
Respondent’s license. Furthermore, the fact that Respondent can no longer
conduct his previous occupation of driving trucks is merely evidence of his
need for a license.
Therefore, those findings carried little, if any, probative value as to
Respondent’s development of maturity or responsibility.
Consequently, the only
findings of fact that may reflect that Respondent has matured or become more
responsible are that: (1) since Respondent is now divorced, he no longer relies
on his ex-wife to pay his traffic tickets; (2) over four years have passed
since Respondent was declared a Habitual Offender; and (3) Respondent has not
had any motor vehicle violations since his North Carolina DWI conviction. As
to (1), the fact that one has personally assumed the responsibility of paying
his traffic tickets may reflect increased responsibility. However, the
responsibility that has been assumed is one which is expected of all citizens.
Moreover, the notion that Respondent’s divorce demonstrates that he has become
more responsible is questionable at best. Regarding (2), the probative value
of that evidence must be made in the context of what occurred during that time
frame. In this case, Respondent was convicted of DWI – one of the most serious
traffic offenses – during that period. That conviction is a reflection of a
lack of development of maturity or responsibility.
Thus, the primary fact supporting Respondent’s development of maturity or
responsibility is that he did not violate any motor vehicle laws after his
North Carolina DWI conviction. However, Respondent was under
suspension during that time period, and he did not testify that he refrained
from driving during that period. Therefore, the gravity of that
evidence is quite small in light of the countervailing fact
that Respondent was convicted of DWI while serving his habitual offender
suspension. I therefore find that the decision below was without reasonable
factual support.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the DMVH’s Final Order
and Decision is REVERSED.
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
Ralph K. Anderson, III
Administrative
Law Judge
January 6, 2009
Columbia, South Carolina
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