South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
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SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
D. Lanette Atkins, M.D. vs. SCDLLR

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation

PARTIES:
Appellant:
D. Lanette Atkins, M.D.

Respondents:
South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, State Board of Medical Examiners
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
07-ALJ-11-0487-AP

APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant:
William W. Watkins, Sr., Esquire

For the Respondent:
Marvin G. Frierson, Esquire
 

ORDERS:

ORDER

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In this appeal, D. Lanette Atkins, M.D. (“Atkins”) challenges the final Amended Order of the South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, State Board of Medical Examiners (“Board”) following an administrative hearing held pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 40-47-117 (Supp. 2007). Atkins contends that the Board erroneously overturned the decision of the Medical Disciplinary Commission’s panel,[1] which determined that the State had failed to prove that Atkins had violated any statutes, rules, or regulations. The Administrative Law Court (“ALC”) has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 40-1-160 (2001) and § 40-47-160 (Supp. 2007). Upon consideration of the briefs and the oral arguments, the Board’s final Amended Order is remanded to the Board for further consideration.

BACKGROUND

Atkins is a psychiatrist licensed by the Board. Atkins and the Complainant in this matter had been close friends for several years prior to the filing of the Complaint. On at least one occasion, Atkins prescribed medication to the Complainant for back pain. In 2001, the Complainant tested positive for HIV using a home test he purchased online. The Complainant shared the results of his home test with Atkins, and Atkins recommended a physician and accompanied the Complainant to the physician’s office, where the Complainant was treated by a nurse practitioner. With the Complainant’s permission, Atkins disclosed the Complainant’s HIV status to his partner. Atkins also discussed the Complainant’s condition with other individuals.

A hearing was held before a panel of the Medical Disciplinary Commission (“Panel”) of the Board on March 28, 2007, based on a Complaint alleging, among other things, that Atkins had violated the Complainant’s confidentiality by revealing his HIV status to third parties. The Panel determined that the State had failed to prove that Atkins had violated any statutes, rules, or regulations. The Board reviewed the decision, which included holding a new hearing on August 7, 2007. The Board affirmed the Panel’s decision except with regard to the patient confidentiality issue. The Board issued an Amended Order on November 13, 2007 sanctioning Atkins for breaching a patient’s confidentiality, finding that Atkins had established a physician-patient relationship with the Complainant and that the relationship continued to exist at the time that Atkins learned of the Complainant’s HIV status. Specifically, the Board found that “[w]ith no formal conclusion of the physician-patient relationship, it remained in effect at the time [Atkins] disclosed [Complainant’s] medical status.” (R. at 2.) Because a physician-patient relationship had been established, and because the Board found that the relationship had not been terminated by a formal conclusion, the Board found that Atkins breached the confidentiality of the Complainant by sharing his HIV status with individuals whom the Complainant had not authorized Atkins to inform. Atkins appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Board is authorized by law to investigate complaints against physicians and impose sanctions when appropriate. See S.C. Code Ann. § 40-47-115 to -120 (Supp. 2007). The Board is an “agency” under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (as amended 2008).[2] As such, the APA’s standard of review governs appeals from decisions of the Board. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380; see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1995). The standard used by appellate bodies to review agency decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(E) (directing administrative law judges to conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in § 1-23-380). This section provides:

The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

a)                  in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

b)                  in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

c)                  made upon unlawful procedure;

d)                 affected by other error of law;

e)                  clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

f)                   arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5). Thus, pursuant to the APA, this court’s review is limited to deciding whether the Board’s final Amended Order is unsupported by substantial evidence or is affected by an error of law. Bass v. Kenco Group, 366 S.C. 450, 457, 622 S.E.2d 577, 581 (Ct. App. 2005).

ISSUE ON APPEAL

Did the Board err in requiring that the physician-patient relationship be terminated with a “formal conclusion”?

DISCUSSION

In regulating the practice of physicians, the South Carolina Board of Medical Examiners may conduct investigations and sanction physicians for misconduct. See S.C. Code Ann. § 40-47-115 to -120 (Supp. 2007). Section 40-47-70 of the South Carolina Code provides, “A practitioner shall conduct himself or herself in accordance with the applicable codes of ethics adopted by the board in regulation.” The Board has adopted a code of medical ethics in 26 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. § 81-60 (Supp. 2007). This code of ethics provides in pertinent part, “A physician shall respect the rights of patients, of colleagues, and of other health professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidence within the constraints of the law.” Further, S.C. Code Ann. § 40-47-110 provides a list of actions that constitute physician misconduct. Among these are “violat[ion of] the code of medical ethics adopted by the board” and “violat[ion of] a provision of this chapter or a regulation or order of the board.” S.C. Code Ann. § 40-47-110(13), (14) (Supp. 2007).

On appeal, Atkins argues that the Board made an error of law in imposing the requirement of a “formal conclusion” of a physician-patient relationship. She contends that the Board’s decision effectively required that Atkins comply with advice by the American Medical Association (“AMA”), a national, private medical professional organization, regarding the termination of a physician-patient relationship. Because the AMA recommendation is not binding as a regulation or statute, she argues, noncompliance cannot constitute a legally sufficient ground for sanctions where there is not otherwise a violation of the applicable law.

Atkins does not dispute that she established a physician-patient relationship with the Complainant for the purpose of prescribing the back medication. However, the parties diverge in their positions as to whether this relationship was terminated by Atkins prior to her learning of the Complainant’s HIV status. In its Amended Order the Board determined, contrary to the Panel, that the physician-patient relationship had not been terminated because there was no “formal conclusion.” Although the Board did not specify what it considered to constitute a “formal conclusion,” counsel for the Board asserted in its appellate brief and at oral argument that because Atkins had not terminated her relationship with the Complainant in writing, based on the AMA recommendations for terminating a physician-patient relationship, there was no “formal conclusion” of the relationship.[3]

As the Board acknowledges, the AMA recommendation relied on by the Board on appeal has not been adopted by or incorporated by reference into the applicable statues and regulations. [4] As stated above, the applicable regulatory provision states, “A physician shall respect the rights of patients, of colleagues, and of other health professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidence within the constraints of the law.” 26 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. § 81-60. Nothing in the plain language of this regulation requires a “formal conclusion” for a physician-patient relationship to be properly terminated. Moreover, case law discussing the termination of the physician-patient relationship in other contexts has recognized that the relationship may be terminated with notice that is reasonable and sufficient. See Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 212 (Utah 1937) (“A physician has the right to withdraw from a case, but if the case is such as to still require further medical or surgical attention, he must, before withdrawing from the case, give the patient sufficient notice so the patient can procure other medical attention if he desires.”); see also Johnston v. Ward, 288 S.C. 603, 610, 344 S.E.2d 166, 170 (Ct. App. 1986), overruled in part on other grounds by Spahn v. Town of Port Royal, 330 S.C. 168, 499 S.E.2d 205 (1998)) (“Once employed, a physician must attend the case as long as it requires attention, unless the relation of physician and patient is ended by mutual consent or is revoked by the dismissal of the physician. A physician cannot abandon a case without reasonable notice to the patient.”) (citations omitted). Thus, the court finds that the Board erred to the extent that it imposed as a matter of law a requirement that the relationship be “formally” concluded to constitute a valid termination.

It is unclear, however, whether this error affected the Board’s conclusion that Atkins violated 25 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. § 81-60’s requirement of confidentiality. See § 1-23-380. The court cannot discern whether the Board’s determination that Atkins violated her ethical duty of confidentiality necessarily turned on its misapprehension that the physician-patient relationship had to be “formally” concluded. Accordingly, it concludes that it must remand this matter for reconsideration, based upon the evidence already presented, of the issue of whether Atkins was the Complainant’s physician when she learned of the confidential information or whether the physician-patient relationship had at that time, as a matter of fact, been terminated with reasonable and sufficient notice. See Fuller v. Blanchard, 358 S.C. 536, 546, 595 S.E.2d 831, 836 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the existence of a physician-patient relationship is a question of fact).


ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is

ORDERED that this matter is REMANDED to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________________

Paige J. Gossett

Administrative Law Judge

September 11, 2008

Columbia, South Carolina



[1] See S.C. Code Ann. § 40-47-11 (creating the Medical Disciplinary Commission of the Board of Medical Examiners); see also §§ 40-47-11(C), -117 (discussing panel hearings of the Medical Disciplinary Commission).

[2] The APA was amended and renumbered via 2008 S.C. Act No. 334. Accordingly, all citations to the APA in this Order are to the recently amended and renumbered sections.

[3] During oral argument, counsel for the Board reiterated his assertion from his brief that a formal conclusion requires a writing pursuant to the Board’s policy. Based on the court’s questioning, counsel for the Board conceded that if the law does not require termination in writing, the court should reverse Atkins’s sanctions. However, immediately following oral arguments, counsel for the Board submitted a letter to this court, and served a copy on Atkins’s counsel, arguing that no manner of termination, written or otherwise, permits a physician to disclose patient confidences.

The court emphasizes that nothing in its decision should be construed to suggest that a doctor can free herself, simply by terminating the physician-patient relationship, from her ethical obligation not to disclose confidences learned while serving as a patient’s physician. See Salerian v. Md. State Bd. of Physicians, 932 A.2d 1225, 1237 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (holding that physician’s duty to maintain patient confidences remains intact even after the relationship ends); see also S.C. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs v. Hedgepath, 325 S.C. 166, 169, 480 S.E.2d 724, 726 (1997) (holding that a physician has a duty of confidentiality to a patient, except where disclosure is compelled by law or consented to by the patient). That is simply not the issue before the court. The question in the instant appeal turns on whether the Complainant’s HIV status was a “patient confidence” within the meaning of § 81-60.

[4] Although counsel for the Board asserted at oral argument that the requirement of a “formal conclusion” is a longstanding policy interpretation of the Board, this statement was not supported in any way. Cf. Etiwan Fertilizer Co. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 217 S.C. 354, 60 S.E.2d 682, 684 (1950) (“[W]here the construction of a statute has been uniform for many years in administrative practice, and has been acquiesced in by the General Assembly for a long period of time, such construction is entitled to weight, and should not be overruled without cogent reasons.”).


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