South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
Edgar A. Brown building 1205 Pendleton St., Suite 224 Columbia, SC 29201 Voice: (803) 734-0550

SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
James E. Chambers vs. SCDMV

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles

PARTIES:
Appelllant:
James E. Chambers

Respondents:
South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
07-ALJ-21-0333-AP

APPEARANCES:
n/a
 

ORDERS:

ORDER

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter is an appeal by James E. Chambers (“Chambers”) from a Final Order and Decision of the South Carolina Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings (“DMVH”) following an administrative hearing held pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2951(B)(2) (2006). Chambers claims that the DMVH Hearing Officer erroneously sustained the suspension of his driver’s license. The Administrative Law Court (“ALC”) has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2007). Upon review of this matter, the DMVH’s Final Order and Decision is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

On April 14, 2007, Corporal Justin Carabetta, a police officer for the Cayce Department of Public Safety, responded to a police dispatch that there had been a possible automobile accident at 910 Knox Abbott Drive in Cayce involving a gold GMC sport utility vehicle. Upon arriving at the scene, Corporal Carabetta observed a gold GMC sport utility vehicle pulling out onto Knox Abbott Drive and heading south. Witnesses at the scene were pointing at the vehicle. Corporal Carabetta followed the vehicle and conducted a traffic stop. Corporal Carabetta noticed a strong smell of alcohol emitting from the passenger compartment of the vehicle and asked the driver, Chambers, to exit the car. Corporal Carabetta asked Chambers to perform field sobriety tests, which Chambers refused. Corporal Carabetta placed Chambers under arrest and read Chambers his Miranda rights. Chambers was transported to the Cayce Department of Public Safety, where he was again read his Miranda rights, and also read the implied consent advisement. Chambers refused to give a breath sample. Based on this refusal, Chambers was issued a notice of suspension pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2951(A) (2006).

Pursuant to § 56-5-2951(B)(2), Chambers filed a request for an administrative hearing to challenge the suspension. The DMVH held an administrative hearing on May 22, 2007. At the hearing, Corporal Carabetta testified that he was dispatched to Knox Abbott Drive because a possible automobile accident had occurred. Corporal Carabetta further testified that, although he did not provide Chambers with his implied consent advisement in writing until after Chambers’s refusal, Corporal Carabetta read the advisement to Chambers.

On June 21, 2007, the DMVH Hearing Officer issued a Final Order and Decision sustaining Chambers’s suspension. Specifically, he stated:

The officer was allowed to repeat what the dispatcher told him. The statement was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The officer then, through his personal knowledge, concluded [Chambers] was under the influence of alcohol. . . .

The officer testified that he read the Advisement to [Chambers] and [Chambers] replied that he would not submit to a breath test. Moreover, [Chambers] testified that he was not going to take a test or sign anything without the presence of his attorney. [Chambers] failed to show prejudice when the officer failed to provide him with a copy of the Advisement.

Chambers now appeals.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.      Did the DMVH Hearing Officer err in sustaining the suspension of Chambers’s driving privileges where the initial stop and detention was based on an allegedly false and uncorroborated anonymous tip?

2.      Did the DMVH Hearing Officer err in finding that Chambers was properly advised of his implied consent rights prior to the request for a breath sample?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The DMVH is authorized by law to determine contested cases arising from the Department. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660. Therefore, the DMVH is an “agency” under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005). As such, the APA’s standard of review governs appeals from decisions of the DMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (as amended 2008)[1]; see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1995). The standard used by appellate bodies to review agency decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(E) (as amended 2008) (directing administrative law judges to conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in § 1-23-380). This section provides:

The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

a)                  in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

b)                  in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

c)                  made upon unlawful procedure;

d)                 affected by other error of law;

e)                  clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

f)                   arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5).

Thus, pursuant to the APA, this court’s review is limited to deciding whether the DMVH’s Final Order and Decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is affected by an error of law. Bass v. Kenco Group, 366 S.C. 450, 457, 622 S.E.2d 577, 581 (Ct. App. 2005). Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the agency reached in order to justify its action. Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co., 360 S.C. 276, 289, 599 S.E.2d 604, 611 (Ct. App. 2004). The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 290, 599 S.E.2d at 611. The party challenging an agency’s decision has the burden of proving convincingly that the agency’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. Waters v. S.C. Land Resources Conservation Comm’n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996).

DISCUSSION

1. Lawfulness of Stop

Chambers argues that the suspension of his license is erroneous because Corporal Carabetta lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2951(F)(1) (Supp. 2007) (including the lawfulness of the arrest or detention as an issue properly within the scope of the hearing before the DMVH Hearing Officer). Relying on State v. Green, 341 S.C. 214, 532 S.E.2d 896 (Ct. App. 2000), and other case law interpreting the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Chambers argues that because Corporal Carabetta was dispatched to the scene based only on an anonymous tip, Corporal Carabetta did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Chambers. The court disagrees.

First, there is no evidence in the record whatsoever that the stop was based upon an anonymous tip. Corporal Carabetta simply testified that he was dispatched to 910 Knox Abbott Drive and informed by the dispatcher that a gold GMC sport utility vehicle had possibly been involved in an accident. (DMVH Hr’g Tr. 4, May 22, 2007.) While Corporal Carabetta did not have personal knowledge as to the source of the dispatcher’s information, it does not necessarily follow that it was an anonymous tip. Accordingly, it is questionable whether case law addressing the reliability of anonymous tips is even applicable to the instant facts.

Even if the dispatch of Corporal Carabetta were based upon an anonymous tip, however, the record shows that Corporal Carabetta had reasonable suspicion to detain Chambers. See State v. Khingratsaiphon, 352 S.C. 62, 69, 572 S.E.2d 456, 459 (2000) (holding that a police officer may stop and detain an individual for investigative purposes when the officer has reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal activity); State v. Nelson, 336 S.C. 186, 192, 519 S.E.2d 786, 789 (1999) (“[A] policeman who lacks probable cause but whose observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, may detain that person briefly in order to investigate the circumstances that provoke that suspicion.”) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)).

By statute, “deputy sheriffs may for any suspected freshly committed crime, whether upon view or upon prompt information or complaint, arrest without warrant . . . .” S.C. Code Ann. § 23-13-60 (2007) (emphasis added). Section 23-6-140 (2007) gives highway patrolmen the same authority as deputy sheriffs “to arrest without warrants and to detain persons found violating or attempting to violate any laws of the State relative to highway traffic, motor vehicles or commercial motor carriers.” In this particular case, Corporal Carabetta received a police dispatch that a possible accident had occurred at 910 Knox Abbot Drive; upon arriving at the scene, witnesses pointed to Chambers’s vehicle, indicating that it was the vehicle in question. Thus, this case does not involve a routine traffic stop; rather, having been advised of a possible automobile accident, coupled with an at-the-scene identification by more than one witness, Corporal Carabetta stopped Chambers based on a reasonable suspicion that Chambers had been involved in an accident and was leaving the scene. See State v. Easler, 327 S.C. 121, 489 S.E.2d 617 (1997) (“The present case, however, does not involve a routine traffic stop. On the contrary, the officers, having been advised there had been an accident and that someone had left the scene, went looking for that individual based upon a description given by two eyewitnesses.”). Thus, the record shows that Corporal Carabetta had reasonable suspicion to detain Chambers. See State v. Khingratsaiphon, 352 S.C. 62, 69, 572 S.E.2d 456, 459 (2000) (“‘Reasonable suspicion’ requires a ‘particularized and objective basis that would lead one to suspect another of criminal activity.’”) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)); State v. Moultrie, 316 S.C. 547, 552, 451 S.E.2d 34, 37 (Ct. App. 1994) (“[P]robable cause for a warrantless arrest generally exists ‘where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient for a reasonable person to believe that a crime has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested’”) (quoting United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695 (4th Cir. 1991)).

Therefore, the DMVH Hearing Officer did not err in holding that the Department met its burden of proving that it complied with the implied consent law by suspending Chambers’s license because he was arrested for driving under the influence and refused to submit to a breath test. See S.C. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles v. Nelson, 364 S.C. 514, 523, 613 S.E.2d 544, 549 (Ct. App. 2005); Ex Parte Horne, 303 S.C. 30, 31, 397 S.E.2d 788, 789 (Ct. App. 1990). Further, the record supports the Hearing Officer’s rejection of Chambers’s defense that the stop was unlawful.

2. Implied Consent Advisement

Chambers argues that the DMVH Hearing Officer erred in sustaining his suspension even though Corporal Carabetta admitted to not giving Chambers the implied consent form in writing prior to his refusal. The court disagrees.

It is undisputed that Corporal Carabetta read the Implied Consent Advisement to Chambers. The DMVH Hearing Officer further concluded that Chambers failed to show he was prejudiced by not receiving his implied consent advisement in writing. The decision by the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Taylor v. S.C. Department of Motor Vehicles, 368 S.C. 33,
627 S.E.2d 751 (Ct. App. 2006), cert. granted (Aug. 9, 2007),[2] requires that the motorist allege and prove that he was prejudiced by the officer’s failure to provide those rights in writing. Taylor, 368 S.C. at 38, 627 S.E.2d at 754. Chambers alleges prejudice in that he did not understand his rights or the ramifications of refusal; however, Chambers does not offer proof of the alleged prejudice. First, Corporal Carabetta testified that Chambers refused multiple times to take a breathalyzer test. Further, Chambers said that he would not do anything without his attorney present. Second, although Chambers stated during the hearing that he did not understand the ramifications of refusal because he was not provided with his advisement in writing, Corporal Carabetta read this information to Chambers. Third, Chambers’s attorney stated during the hearing that even if Corporal Carabetta had provided Chambers a copy of the advisement in writing, Chambers would not have been able to read it because he did not have his glasses. (DMVH Hr’g Tr. 17, May 22, 2007.) Accordingly, under Taylor, the DMVH Hearing Officer did not err in sustaining Chambers’s suspension on this basis.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is

ORDERED that the DMVH’s Final Order and Decision is AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________________

Paige J. Gossett

Administrative Law Judge

September 24, 2008

Columbia, South Carolina



[1] The APA was amended and renumbered via 2008 S.C. Act No. 334. Accordingly, all citations to the APA in this Order are to the recently amended and renumbered sections.

[2] Although certiorari has been granted in Taylor, the court notes that the decision is still binding on the ALC. See Stephen P. Bates, The Contested Case Before the ALJD, in South Carolina Administrative Practice & Procedure 161, 211 (Randolph R. Lowell & Stephen P. Bates eds., 2004) (“Decisions by the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court on administrative law issues are controlling . . . .”); 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 142 (2005) (“Decisions of the court of appeals . . . should be followed by all lower courts . . . .”); Rule 220(a), SCACR.


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