I. Introduction
Keystone Legends I (taxpayer) filed a Motion for Reconsideration of an order valuing the
taxpayer’s apartment complex in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina at $11,100,000 for the 2002
tax year. The Motion asserts that the taxpayer “cannot agree with the Overall Capitalization
Rate or [with] the Valuation Result” reached in the decision. The motion must be denied.
II. Analysis
A Motion for Reconsideration will not be granted unless the requirements for a reconsideration
are satisfied. See Bennett v. City of Clemson, 293 S.C. 64, 358 S.E.2d 707 (1987). The
requirements are established by ALC Rule 29(D) and SCRCP Rule 60(B) and explain that a
decision should be reconsidered in the presence of the following:
1. mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
2. newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
3. fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
4. the judgment is void; or
5. the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application.
To meet the requirements, “[t]he movant in a Rule 60(b) motion has the burden of presenting
evidence proving the facts essential to entitle him to relief.” Bowers v. Bowers, 304 S.C. 65, 403
S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ct. App. 1991). Here, the motion does not establish the facts essential to relief.
As to Rule 60(b)(1), the taxpayer does not show that the decision was reached as the result of
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. On the contrary, the instant motion reargues
positions made at the hearing. United States v Williams 674 F2d 310 (4th Cir. W.Va. 1982) (a
motion that amounts to “a request that the district court change its mind, however, . . . is not
authorized by Rule 60(b).”); Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law § 393 (“A rehearing petition may not be
used . . . to reargue issues determined by the challenged opinion.”). For example, here, the issues of
what capitalization rate is proper and of what reductions are appropriate in reaching a final value
were contested at the hearing and were extensively covered by the parties. Further, in reaching a
conclusion on value, the decision considered all of the evidence presented, found some evidence to
be more persuasive than other evidence in making factual conclusions, and then applied the law to
the facts established. Accordingly, the decision in this case was not reached as the result of mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
Concerning 60(b)(2), nothing in this record suggests that newly discovered evidence has now come
to light and that consideration of that evidence will require a different decision. Similarly, 60(b)(3) is
not implicated since no allegation with supporting proof exists that the decision results from fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party. Quite the contrary, this case was well
presented, and all parties dealt with the controversy in a fair manner.
Additionally, as to 60(b)(4), no basis exists to find the judgment is void since generally a judgment is
void only when the decision is rendered by an adjudicator having no jurisdiction to render such a
decision. Thomas & Howard Co. Inc. v T.W. Graham and Co., 318 S.C. 286, 457 S.E.2d 340
(1995). Here, jurisdiction is well established. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-60-2540(A) (Supp.2003), 1-23-310 et seq. (Supp.2003).
Finally, the motion does not implicate 60(b)(5). Nothing in this record exists to show that the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or that a prior judgment upon which the current
judgment is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or that it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application.
III. Order
Accordingly, since the criteria of ALC Rule 29(D) and SCRCP 60 are not met, the Motion for
Reconsideration is denied.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________
RAY N. STEVENS
Administrative Law Judge
Dated: December 14, 2004
Greenville, South Carolina