ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
This matter is an appeal by the South Carolina Department of
Motor Vehicles (Department) from a Final Order and Decision of the South
Carolina Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings (DMVH). The DMVH’s Final Order and
Decision was issued following an administrative hearing held pursuant to S.C.
Code Ann. § 56-1-1090(c) (Supp. 2006). The Department contends that the DMVH
hearing officer erroneously reduced the driver’s license suspension of Respondent
Chad Johnson (Johnson). The Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) has
jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp.
2006). Upon consideration of the briefs, the DMVH’s Final Order and Decision is
affirmed as set forth below.
background
On
April 18,2003, after being convicted of Driving Under Suspension (DUS) on three
separate occasions in a three-year period, Respondent was found to be a
“habitual offender” pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020 (2006). In
accordance with S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1090(a), his driver’s license was
suspended for a five-year period beginning April 18, 2003 and ending April 18,
2008. On July 28, 2004, over a year after his habitual offender suspension had
commenced, Respondent was stopped for Driving Under the Influence. He was
later convicted of this offense on September 21, 2004.
In
May 2006, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1090(c) (Supp. 2006), Respondent
filed a petition with the DMVH for a reduction of his habitual offender suspension.
Along with his Petition, Respondent submitted to the DMVH a copy of his
ten-year driving record. DMV was not served with notice of Respondent’s reduction
request. Additionally, the DMVH styled Respondent’s request as an ex pare
proceeding.
The
hearing was held, as scheduled, on June 6, 2006. During that hearing,
Respondent testified that during the time of his convictions, he was in and out
of jail, off and on drugs. However, he has completely changed since the birth
of his daughter some five months earlier. AHO Holland subsequently issued an
order granting Respondent’s reduction. The Department now appeals.
ISSUES
ON APPEAL
1. Did the DMVH hearing officer’s failure to follow Department Policy
VS-001 constitute reversible error?
2. Did the DMVH hearing officer abuse her discretion by reducing
Respondent’s habitual offender suspension?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
DMVH is authorized by law to determine contested cases arising from the
Department. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2006). Therefore, the
DMVH is an “agency” under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005). As such, the APA’s standard of review
governs appeals from decisions of the DMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A) (Supp. 2006); see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human
Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1995). The
standard used by appellate bodies, including the ALC, to review agency
decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2006) (directing Administrative Law Judges
to conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in Section 1-23-380(A)).
This section provides:
The court may not substitute its judgment
for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for
further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the
agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of
constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the
statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful
procedure;
(d) affected by other
error of law;
(e) clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or
capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006).
A
decision is supported by “substantial evidence” when the record as a whole
allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion reached by the agency. Bilton
v. Best Western Royal Motor Lodge, 282 S.C. 634, 641, 321 S.E.2d 63, 68
(Ct. App. 1984). A decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable
minds may differ on the judgment. Lark, 276 S.C. at 136, 276 S.E.2d
304, 307. The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent the agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters
v. S.C. Land Resources Conservation Comm’n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d
913, 917 (1996); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461
S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995).
In
applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the
administrative agency are presumed to be correct. Rodney v. Michelin Tire
Co., 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996) (citing Kearse
v. State Health and Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200, 456 S.E.2d
892, 893 (1995)). The party challenging an agency action has the burden of
proving convincingly that the agency’s decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence. Waters, 321 S.C. at 226, 467 S.E.2d at 917.
DISCUSSION
Department
Policy VS-001
Section
56-1-1090(c) states in pertinent part:
[U]pon petition to the Division of Motor
Vehicle Hearings and for good cause shown, the hearing officer may restore to [a
person declared to be a habitual offender] the privilege to operate a motor
vehicle in this State upon terms and conditions as the department may prescribe,
subject to other provisions of law relating to the issuance of drivers’
licenses. The petition permitted by this item may be filed after two years
have expired from the date of the decision of the department finding the person
to be an habitual offender. At this time and after hearing, the hearing officer
may reduce the five-year period of [subsection] (a) to a two-year period for
good cause shown.
S.C. Code Ann. §
56-1-1090(c) (Supp. 2006) (emphasis added). In 2005, the Department issued
Department Policy VS-001. Section III(B)(4)(c) of Department Policy VS-001
states:
Once the Department
has received a complete, accurate application, a reduction will be granted if
the following conditions have been met . . . The applicant must not have driven
a motor vehicle since the beginning date of the habitual offender suspension.
NOTE: The applicant will have stated under oath that he/she has not driven at
all during the habitual offender suspension. If a review of the driving record
shows that s/he drove (e.g., a traffic ticket or accident report), the
applicant will not be eligible for a reduction.
The
Department argues that, based on Respondent’s July 28, 2004 offense, the DMVH
hearing officer’s reduction of Respondent’s habitual offender suspension violated
Section III(B)(4)(c) of Department Policy VS-001 and therefore constituted
error. According to the Department, the DMVH hearing officer was required to
follow Department Policy VS-001 because Section 56-1-1090(c) “assigned to the
[Department] the responsibility to set standards for the granting of [habitual
offender suspension] reductions.”
On
March 23, 2007, the ALC issued an En Banc Order addressing this very issue. See S.C. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles v. Cain, 06-ALJ-21-0790-AP (S.C. Admin. Law
Ct. March 23, 2007). In that En Banc Order, the ALC held that Department
Policy VS-001 does not have the force or effect of law, and that a DMVH hearing
officer’s failure to follow Department Policy VS-001 does not per se constitute
error. Pursuant to ALC Rule 70(F), the holding of the En Banc Order is binding
upon all individual administrative law judges in all subsequent cases. Therefore,
the DMVH’s Final Order and Decision will not be reversed on this ground.
Abuse
of Discretion
The
Department also argues that, based on Respondent’s July 28, 2004 offense, the
DMVH hearing officer abused her discretion by reducing Respondent’s habitual
offender suspension.
An
abuse of discretion occurs when a court’s decision is controlled by an error of
law or is without evidentiary support. Mictronics, Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t of
Revenue, 345 S.C. 506, 510, 548 S.E.2d 223, 225 (Ct. App. 2001). The
burden is on the appellant to show that there is an abuse of discretion. Johnson
v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 317 S.C. 415, 421, 453 S.E.2d 908, 912 (Ct. App.
1995).
Here,
Respondent offered evidence demonstrating that: (i) after his July 28, 2004 offense,
Respondent realized the importance of complying with South Carolina’s motor
vehicle laws; (ii) Respondent has been violation free for two years; and (iii) Respondent
accepted responsibility for his past mistakes.
Based on this evidence, I conclude that the DMVH hearing
officer did not abuse her discretion by reducing Respondent’s habitual offender
suspension. Ordinarily, there is no abuse of discretion where an agency’s
determination is supported by substantial evidence. See Porter v.
S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 328 S.C. 222, 233, 493 S.E.2d 92, 98 (1997) (holding,
in a public utility rate-setting case, that “there is no abuse of discretion
where substantial evidence supports the finding of a just and reasonable rate”).
As discussed above, a decision is supported by “substantial evidence” when the
record as a whole allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion reached
by the agency. Bilton, 282 S.C. at 641, 321 S.E.2d at 68. Here, a
reasonable person could conclude that good cause was shown for the reduction of
Respondent’s suspension.
Therefore, the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in this case.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the DMVH’s Final Order
and Decision is AFFIRMED.
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
Carolyn C. Matthews
Administrative
Law Judge
July 17, 2008
Columbia, South Carolina
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