ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
This
matter is an appeal by the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles
(Department) from a Final Order and Decision of the South Carolina Division of
Motor Vehicle Hearings (DMVH). The DMVH’s Final Order and Decision was issued following
a hearing held pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1030 (Supp. 2006). The
Department claims that the DMVH hearing officer erred when she concluded that
the Department failed to establish that Respondent Elton Lamar Jackson was a
“habitual offender” as defined in S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020 (2006). Upon review
of this matter, DMVH’s Final Order and Decision is reversed as set forth below.
BACKGROUND
On November
1, 2006, the Department sent Jackson a Notice of Suspension informing him that,
as of December 1, 2006, his driver’s license would be suspended for a period of
five years pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1090 (Supp. 2006). The Notice of
Suspension explained that Jackson was being declared a habitual offender as a
result of committing three Driving Under Suspensions (DUS) offenses in a
three-year period. The Notice of Suspension included the following table to
describe the offenses:
Viol Date |
Conv Date |
Ticket # |
Violation
Description |
09/21/2006 |
10/18/2006 |
C667979 |
Driving Under
Suspension |
08/18/2006 |
09/05/2006 |
48889DQ |
Driving Under
Suspension |
07/16/2004 |
09/01/2004 |
1115120 |
Driving Under
Suspension |
After receiving the
Notice of Suspension, Jackson requested a hearing with the DMVH to challenge
the suspension. A hearing was held on June 21, 2007. Prior to the hearing, the
Department offered into evidence, among other things, the following documents:
· a copy of a Uniform Traffic Ticket issued by the South Carolina
Department of Public Safety (DPS) that shows that Jackson was cited for DUS on
September 21, 2006 and that Jackson was convicted of the offense on October 18,
2006;
· a copy of a Uniform Traffic Ticket issued by DPS that shows that
Jackson was cited for DUS on August 18, 2006 and that Jackson was convicted of
the offense on September 5, 2006;
· a copy of a document entitled “Official Notice of Convictions” issued
by the Georgia Department of Motor Vehicle Safety (GDMVS) that shows that
Jackson was cited for “Driving While License Withdrawn” (DWLW) on July 16, 2004
and that the “disposition date” of Jackson’s citation was September 1, 2004;
and
· Jackson’s ten-year driving record, which shows all three of the
aforementioned DUS convictions.
On July 12, 2007, the DMVH hearing
officer issued a Final Order and Decision in which she rescinded Jackson’s suspension. Specifically, she found that the GDMVS document did not constitute “competent
evidence” that Jackson was convicted of DWLW in Georgia on September 1, 2004. She
explained:
In this case, the Petitioner submitted for their evidence a
printout with information of a traffic ticket that was issued in the state of Georgia. The printout from Georgia, submitted by the DMV as evidence to declare the
Respondent an habitual offender, can not be used to declare him as a habitual
offender in that it does not show the disposition of the traffic ticket issued
from Georgia. It does not show whether the Respondent was found not guilty or
found guilty. Also, there is no certified documentation from the Petitioner or
the presiding court of any clerical errors, if any, or any certified
explanation as to the notation that was written on the printout.
Therefore, I find that the Petitioner’s evidence is not competent evidence.
The Department now appeals.
ISSUE
ON APPEAL
Did the DMVH hearing officer err by rescinding Jackson’s suspension on the grounds that the GDMVS document did not constitute competent
evidence that Jackson was convicted of DWLW in Georgia on September 1, 2004?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The DMVH is authorized
by law to determine contested cases arising from the Department. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2007). Therefore, the DMVH is an “agency”
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005). As such, the APA’s standard of review governs appeals from decisions
of the DMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2007); see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319
S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1995). The standard used by appellate
bodies, including the ALC, to review agency decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann.
§1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2007).
This section provides:
The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of
the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court
may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further
proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the agency] if
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the
agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of
the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or
characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion.
S.C. Code Ann.
§ 1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2007).
A decision is supported
by “substantial evidence” when the record as a whole allows reasonable minds to
reach the same conclusion reached by the agency. Bilton v. Best Western
Royal Motor Lodge, 282 S.C. 634, 641, 321 S.E.2d 63, 68 (Ct. App. 1984). A
decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable minds may differ on
the judgment. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304,
307 (1981). The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent the agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters
v. S.C. Land Resources Conservation Comm’n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d
913, 917 (1996); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461
S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995).
In applying the
substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the administrative agency
are presumed to be correct. Rodney v. Michelin Tire Co., 320 S.C. 515,
519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996) (citing Kearse v. State Health and Human
Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200, 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995)). The
party challenging an agency action has the burden of proving convincingly that
the agency’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. Waters,
321 S.C. at 226, 467 S.E.2d at 917.
DISCUSSION
S.C. Code Ann. §
56-1-1030 (Supp. 2006) provides in pertinent part:
If the [Department of Motor Vehicles] determines after review
of its records that [a] person is an habitual offender as defined in Section
56-1-1020, the department must revoke or suspend the person’s driver’s license.
. . . A resident of South Carolina found to be an habitual offender may appeal
the decision to the Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings in accordance with its
rules of procedure.
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020 (2006)
defines a “habitual offender” to include, among others, a person who, in a
three-year period, accumulates three of more convictions for “[d]riving a motor
vehicle while his license, permit, or privilege to drive a motor vehicle has
been suspended or revoked, except a conviction for driving under suspension for
failure to file proof of financial responsibility.” Pursuant to Section
56-1-1090, the length of a habitual offender suspension is five years, unless
the suspension period is reduced to two years as permitted by subsection (c) of
Section 56-1-1090.
In this case, the Department
argues that the DMVH hearing officer erred by finding that the GDMVS document offered
by the Department to show that Jackson was convicted of DWLW in Georgia did not constitute “competent evidence.” I agree.
DMVH Rule 14(C)
provides that “[f]or matters in which the Department of Motor Vehicles is not
required to appear at the hearing pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660, any
records submitted by the Department as documentary evidence prior to the
hearing must be in the form of certified copies.”
Here, in order to prove that Jackson was convicted of DWLW on September 1, 2004,
the Department offered into evidence a copy of a document entitled “Official
Notice of Convictions” that was issued by the GDMVS and addressed to the
Department. The document is certified by R.K. Johnson, an official custodian
of records for the GDMVS, as a “duly authenticated copy of the records from the
computer files of the [GDMVS].” The document shows that “Elton Lamar Jackson”
was cited for DWLW on July 16, 2004 and that the “disposition date” of Jackson’s citation was September 1, 2004. The driver’s license number set forth for
Jackson in the GDMVS document is the same as the driver’s license number set
forth for Jackson in his ten-year driving record.
Based on the foregoing,
the Court concludes that the hearing officer erred by determining that the
GDMVS document did not constitute “competent evidence” that Jackson was
convicted of DWLW in Georgia on September 1, 2004. Since the GDMVS document is
entitled “Official Notice of Convictions,” the only reasonable conclusion to be
drawn is that Jackson was convicted of DWLW on September 1, 2004. Moreover,
because the document is a certified copy of the records of GDMVS, it
constitutes competent evidence under DMVH Rule 14(C). Finally, the mere fact
that the document contains a few unidentified handwritten notes is immaterial.
The handwritten notes do not contradict any of the typed information in the
GDMVS document and they are not necessary to linking Jackson to the Georgia DWLW
conviction.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the DMVH’s Final Order
and Decision is REVERSED.
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
Ralph K. Anderson, III
Administrative
Law Judge
July 2, 2008
Columbia, South Carolina
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