South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
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SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
SCDOR vs. Elton Lamar Jackson

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles

PARTIES:
Appellant:
South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles

Respondents:
Elton Lamar Jackson
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
07-ALJ-21-0381-AP

APPEARANCES:
n/a
 

ORDERS:

ORDER

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter is an appeal by the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (Department) from a Final Order and Decision of the South Carolina Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings (DMVH). The DMVH’s Final Order and Decision was issued following a hearing held pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1030 (Supp. 2006). The Department claims that the DMVH hearing officer erred when she concluded that the Department failed to establish that Respondent Elton Lamar Jackson was a “habitual offender” as defined in S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020 (2006). Upon review of this matter, DMVH’s Final Order and Decision is reversed as set forth below.

BACKGROUND

On November 1, 2006, the Department sent Jackson a Notice of Suspension informing him that, as of December 1, 2006, his driver’s license would be suspended for a period of five years pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1090 (Supp. 2006). The Notice of Suspension explained that Jackson was being declared a habitual offender as a result of committing three Driving Under Suspensions (DUS) offenses in a three-year period. The Notice of Suspension included the following table to describe the offenses:

Viol Date

Conv Date

Ticket #

Violation Description

09/21/2006

10/18/2006

C667979

Driving Under Suspension

08/18/2006

09/05/2006

48889DQ

Driving Under Suspension

07/16/2004

09/01/2004

1115120

Driving Under Suspension

After receiving the Notice of Suspension, Jackson requested a hearing with the DMVH to challenge the suspension. A hearing was held on June 21, 2007. Prior to the hearing, the Department offered into evidence, among other things, the following documents:

·                     a copy of a Uniform Traffic Ticket issued by the South Carolina Department of Public Safety (DPS) that shows that Jackson was cited for DUS on September 21, 2006 and that Jackson was convicted of the offense on October 18, 2006;

·                     a copy of a Uniform Traffic Ticket issued by DPS that shows that Jackson was cited for DUS on August 18, 2006 and that Jackson was convicted of the offense on September 5, 2006;

·                     a copy of a document entitled “Official Notice of Convictions” issued by the Georgia Department of Motor Vehicle Safety (GDMVS) that shows that Jackson was cited for “Driving While License Withdrawn” (DWLW) on July 16, 2004 and that the “disposition date” of Jackson’s citation was September 1, 2004; and

·                     Jackson’s ten-year driving record, which shows all three of the aforementioned DUS convictions.

On July 12, 2007, the DMVH hearing officer issued a Final Order and Decision in which she rescinded Jackson’s suspension. Specifically, she found that the GDMVS document did not constitute “competent evidence” that Jackson was convicted of DWLW in Georgia on September 1, 2004. She explained:

In this case, the Petitioner submitted for their evidence a printout with information of a traffic ticket that was issued in the state of Georgia. The printout from Georgia, submitted by the DMV as evidence to declare the Respondent an habitual offender, can not be used to declare him as a habitual offender in that it does not show the disposition of the traffic ticket issued from Georgia. It does not show whether the Respondent was found not guilty or found guilty. Also, there is no certified documentation from the Petitioner or the presiding court of any clerical errors, if any, or any certified explanation as to the notation that was written on the printout.[1] Therefore, I find that the Petitioner’s evidence is not competent evidence.

The Department now appeals.

ISSUE ON APPEAL

Did the DMVH hearing officer err by rescinding Jackson’s suspension on the grounds that the GDMVS document did not constitute competent evidence that Jackson was convicted of DWLW in Georgia on September 1, 2004?[2]

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The DMVH is authorized by law to determine contested cases arising from the Department. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2007). Therefore, the DMVH is an “agency” under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005). As such, the APA’s standard of review governs appeals from decisions of the DMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2007); see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1995). The standard used by appellate bodies, including the ALC, to review agency decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2007).[3] This section provides:

The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) affected by other error of law;

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2007).

A decision is supported by “substantial evidence” when the record as a whole allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion reached by the agency. Bilton v. Best Western Royal Motor Lodge, 282 S.C. 634, 641, 321 S.E.2d 63, 68 (Ct. App. 1984). A decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable minds may differ on the judgment. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981). The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters v. S.C. Land Resources Conservation Comm’n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995).

In applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the administrative agency are presumed to be correct. Rodney v. Michelin Tire Co., 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996) (citing Kearse v. State Health and Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200, 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995)). The party challenging an agency action has the burden of proving convincingly that the agency’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. Waters, 321 S.C. at 226, 467 S.E.2d at 917.

DISCUSSION

S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1030 (Supp. 2006) provides in pertinent part:

If the [Department of Motor Vehicles] determines after review of its records that [a] person is an habitual offender as defined in Section 56-1-1020, the department must revoke or suspend the person’s driver’s license. . . . A resident of South Carolina found to be an habitual offender may appeal the decision to the Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure.

S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020 (2006) defines a “habitual offender” to include, among others, a person who, in a three-year period, accumulates three of more convictions for “[d]riving a motor vehicle while his license, permit, or privilege to drive a motor vehicle has been suspended or revoked, except a conviction for driving under suspension for failure to file proof of financial responsibility.” Pursuant to Section 56-1-1090, the length of a habitual offender suspension is five years, unless the suspension period is reduced to two years as permitted by subsection (c) of Section 56-1-1090.

In this case, the Department argues that the DMVH hearing officer erred by finding that the GDMVS document offered by the Department to show that Jackson was convicted of DWLW in Georgia did not constitute “competent evidence.” I agree.

DMVH Rule 14(C) provides that “[f]or matters in which the Department of Motor Vehicles is not required to appear at the hearing pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660, any records submitted by the Department as documentary evidence prior to the hearing must be in the form of certified copies.”[4] Here, in order to prove that Jackson was convicted of DWLW on September 1, 2004, the Department offered into evidence a copy of a document entitled “Official Notice of Convictions” that was issued by the GDMVS and addressed to the Department. The document is certified by R.K. Johnson, an official custodian of records for the GDMVS, as a “duly authenticated copy of the records from the computer files of the [GDMVS].” The document shows that “Elton Lamar Jackson” was cited for DWLW on July 16, 2004 and that the “disposition date” of Jackson’s citation was September 1, 2004. The driver’s license number set forth for Jackson in the GDMVS document is the same as the driver’s license number set forth for Jackson in his ten-year driving record.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the hearing officer erred by determining that the GDMVS document did not constitute “competent evidence” that Jackson was convicted of DWLW in Georgia on September 1, 2004. Since the GDMVS document is entitled “Official Notice of Convictions,” the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that Jackson was convicted of DWLW on September 1, 2004. Moreover, because the document is a certified copy of the records of GDMVS, it constitutes competent evidence under DMVH Rule 14(C). Finally, the mere fact that the document contains a few unidentified handwritten notes is immaterial. The handwritten notes do not contradict any of the typed information in the GDMVS document and they are not necessary to linking Jackson to the Georgia DWLW conviction.

ORDER

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the DMVH’s Final Order and Decision is REVERSED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________________

Ralph K. Anderson, III

Administrative Law Judge

July 2, 2008

Columbia, South Carolina



[1] The GDMVS document contains a few handwritten notes from an unknown source.

[2] There is no dispute between the parties as to the other two DUS offenses referenced in the Department’s Notice of Suspension.

[3] Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2007), administrative law judges must conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in Section 1-23-380(A).

[4] Under Section 1-23-660, the Department is not required to appear at “habitual offender” hearings. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2006).


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