ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
This matter is an appeal by the South Carolina Department of
Motor Vehicles (“Department”) from a Final Order and Decision of the South
Carolina Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings (“DMVH”). The DMVH’s Final Order
and Decision was issued following an administrative hearing held pursuant to
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2951(B)(2) (2006). The Department claims that the DMVH
erroneously rescinded the driver’s license suspension of Respondent Charles E.
Medlin (“Medlin”). The Administrative Law Court (“ALC” or “Court”) has
jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp.
2006). Upon consideration of the briefs, the DMVH’s Final Order and Decision
is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
On
January 7, 2007, Trooper Michael Hassen (“Hassen”) of the South Carolina
Highway Patrol was working on Highway 49 in York county, when he initiated a
stop on a vehicle he observed traveling sixty six miles per hour in a fifty
five miles per hour zone. Following the stop, the Trooper requested that the
driver of the vehicle submit to field sobriety tests, and Medlin agreed. Following
the conduct of three such tests, Medlin was placed under arrest for Driving
under the Influence and transported to the York County Detention Center, where he was presented with an opportunity to submit to a datamaster test, which he
refused. Accordingly, Medlin was given a notice of license suspension, from
which respondent requested an administrative hearing. Trooper Hassen and Medlin
attended the hearing on February 28, 2007. The hearing officer determined that
the Trooper did not have probable cause to arrest Appellant on suspicion of
drunk driving. While I find that there was probable cause for the stop because
Appellant was exceeding the speed limit, I find that the hearing officer’s
decision that the Department did not meet their burden of proof was supported
by substantial evidence.
ISSUES
ON APPEAL
Whether Substantial Evidence supports the Hearing
Officer’s decision that Department did not meet its burden of proving that
Appellant was Driving Under the Influence?
STANDARD OF
REVIEW & DISCUSSION
The
DMVH is authorized by law to determine contested cases arising from the
Department. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2006). Therefore, the
DMVH is an “agency” under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005). As such, the APA’s standard of review
governs appeals from decisions of the DMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380 (Supp. 2006); see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385
(1995). The standard used by appellate bodies, including the ALC, to review
agency decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006).
This section provides:
The court may not
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency
or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify
the decision [of the agency] if substantial rights of the Appellant have been
prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are:
(a) in
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in
excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made
upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected
by other error of law;
(e) clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(f) arbitrary
or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006).
A
decision is supported by “substantial evidence” when the record as a whole
allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion reached by the agency. Bilton
v. Best Western Royal Motor Lodge, 282 S.C. 634, 641, 321 S.E.2d 63, 68
(Ct. App. 1984). A decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable
minds may differ on the judgment. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130,
136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981). The fact that the record, when considered as
a whole, presents the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from
the evidence does not prevent the agency’s findings from being supported by
substantial evidence. Waters v. S.C. Land Resources Conservation Comm’n,
321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council,
319 S.C. 348, 353, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995).
In
applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the
administrative agency are presumed to be correct. Rodney v. Michelin Tire
Co., 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996) (citing Kearse
v. State Health and Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200, 456 S.E.2d
892, 893 (1995). The party challenging an agency action has the burden of
proving that the agency’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. Waters,
321 S.C. at 226, 467 S.E.2d at 917.
Although
the officer did have probable cause to stop Medlin for excessive speeding, I find
that substantial evidence supports the hearing officer’s decision. Hassen testified
that he detected an odor emanating from respondent’s car, but also stated that
there were two occupants in the car. Hassen failed to testify as to Mr.
Medlin’s breath or any odor after the Respondent exited the vehicle. Hassen
never described the appearance or demeanor of the respondent as unusual or
indicating the use of alcohol, e.g. speech slurred, eyes bloodshot, clothes
unkempt, trouble finding his driver’s license or registration, belligerent or
giddy attitude. The Department contends that Respondent admitted to having
bloodshot eyes while under arrest. However, upon inspection of the Record,
Respondent testified that his medication causes his eyes to be bloodshot.
Based
on the record as a whole, I conclude that the DMVH hearing officer’s
determination that Hassen and the Department failed to meet their burden of
proof was not clearly erroneous. As discussed above, the factual findings of an administrative agency are presumed to be correct, and an agency’s
decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable minds may differ on
the judgment. In this case, a reasonable person could conclude that the there
was a lack of evidence that Medlin was driving under the influence.
Accordingly, I hold that the hearing officer’s conclusion was supported by
substantial evidence.
ORDER
It
is hereby ordered that the DMVH’s Final Order and Decision is AFFIRMED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
Carolyn C. Matthews
Administrative
Law Judge
June 12, 2008
Columbia, South Carolina
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