ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
This
matter comes before the Administrative Law Court (“ALC” or “Court”) for a
contested case hearing pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-310 et seq.
(2005 & Supp. 2007), 1-23-600(B) (Supp. 2007), 61-2-260 (Supp. 2007), and 61-4-525
(Supp. 2007). Norwood Corner Mart, LLC, d/b/a Norwood Corner Mart (“Petitioner”),
seeks an off-premises beer and wine permit for its location at 1446 Poplar Street, #C, Cayce, Lexington County, South Carolina (“location”). A protest to
the application was filed with the South Carolina Department of Revenue (“Department”).
Because of the protest, the hearing was required.
A
hearing in this matter was held on May 7, 2008 at the offices of the ALC in Columbia, South Carolina. Both parties and Protestant Lieutenant Jeffrey Simmons appeared
at the hearing. Evidence was introduced and testimony was given. After
carefully weighing all the evidence, I find that Petitioner’s request for an
off-premises beer and wine permit should be granted with restrictions.
FINDINGS
OF FACT
Having
observed the witnesses and reviewed the exhibits presented at the hearing and
closely passed upon their credibility, and having taken into consideration the
burden of persuasion by the parties, I make the following Findings of Fact by a
preponderance of the evidence:
1. Petitioner seeks an
off-premises beer and wine permit for its business located at 1446 Poplar Street, #C, Cayce, Lexington County, South Carolina. The location is inside the
city limits of Cayce.
2. Norwood
Corner Mart, LLC, d/b/a Norwood Corner Mart, is a limited liability company in
good standing with the South Carolina Secretary of State. It has a reputation
for peace and good order in the community.
3. Larry
Norwood (“Mr. Norwood”) is the sole owner of Norwood Corner Mart, LLC, d/b/a
Norwood Corner Mart. Mr. Norwood is over the age of twenty-one (21) and is of
good moral character. He is a legal resident of the United States and the
State of South Carolina. He has maintained his principal place of abode in
this state for at least thirty (30) days prior to making this application. He
has never held a permit or license to sell beer, wine or alcoholic beverages.
4. Notice
of the application was lawfully posted at the location and in a newspaper of
general circulation.
5. The location
opened on January 1, 2008 and operates as a convenience store, selling a
limited line of groceries and other items. Its hours of operation are from 7:00
a.m. to 7:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday. However, if the permit is granted,
Petitioner intends to stay open until 9:00 p.m. every night. Most of
Petitioner’s customers, which include children and adults, walk to the store
from the surrounding neighborhoods.
6. The location is in
a strip mall along with other businesses that include a Laundromat, a barber
shop and a hair salon.
7. Mt. Zion Missionary Baptist Church of Cayce and a police substation are located across Poplar Street from the location. Calvary Holiness Church of God is located approximately one
block from the location and several residences, including a subsidized apartment
housing complex, are also nearby.
8. There is no music
either inside or outside at the location.
9. There is adequate
lighting outside the location, with streetlights on both corners and lights
affixed to the building.
10. Petitioner has not
had any law enforcement problems at the location since it began operation with
the exception of a break-in through the back door of the location after hours. While
open for business, Mr. Norwood will periodically patrol the outside of the
location to ensure that no loitering occurs. He also intends to post signs at
the location to warn against loitering outside the location. In addition, he is
installing a security system. The security system will have four cameras, two
on the outside and two on the inside of the location. With this system
installed, he will be able to monitor the inside of the store as well as the
areas in front of and to the rear of the building.
11. Mr. Norwood is
currently the sole employee at the location. He intends to check the
identification of customers who wish to purchase beer and wine to verify that
they are at least twenty-one (21) years of age. He will have a calendar at the
register to assist him in verifying a customer’s age. He also intends to post
signs in the store to notify customers that they must be twenty-one (21) in
order to purchase beer and wine. If additional employees are hired to work at
the location, they would undergo training in alcohol sales.
12. Lieutenant Jeffrey
S. Simmons (“Protestant”) of the Cayce Department of Public Safety appeared at
the hearing and expressed concern about the proximity of the location to nearby
churches and residences. In addition, Lieutenant Simmons believes that the
availability of beer and wine in such close proximity to known distribution
points for narcotics in the area will add to the existing narcotics problems.
CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW
Based
upon the above Findings of Fact, I conclude the following as a matter of law:
1. S.C.
Code Ann. § 1-23-600 (Supp. 2007) grants jurisdiction to the Administrative Law Court to hear contested cases under the Administrative Procedures Act.
2. S.C.
Code Ann. § 61-2-260 (Supp. 2007) grants the Administrative Law Court the
responsibility to determine contested cases matters governing alcoholic
beverages, including beer, wine and liquor.
3. S.C.
Code Ann. § 61-4-520 (Supp. 2007) sets forth the requirements for the issuance
of a beer and wine permit. Included in the criteria is the requirement that the
proposed location be a suitable one.
4. The
factual determination of whether or not an application is granted or denied is
usually the sole prerogative of the executive agency charged with rendering
that decision. Palmer v. S.C. ABC Comm’n, 282 S.C. 246, 317 S.E.2d 476
(Ct. App. 1984). As the trier of fact, an administrative law judge is
authorized to determine the fitness of an applicant for alcohol permits and
licenses using broad but not unbridled discretion. Byers v. S.C. ABC Comm’n,
281 S.C. 566, 316 S.E.2d 705 (Ct. App. 1984).
5. The
weight and credibility assigned to evidence presented at the hearing of a
matter is within the province of the trier of fact. See S.C. Cable
Television Ass’n v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 308 S.C. 216, 222, 417
S.E.2d 586, 589 (1992); see also Doe v. Doe, 324 S.C. 492, 502,
478 S.E.2d 854, 859 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a trial judge, when acting as
a finder of fact, “has the authority to determine the weight and credibility of
the evidence before him”). Furthermore, a trial judge who observes a witness
is in the best position to judge the witness’s demeanor and veracity and to
evaluate the credibility of his testimony. See Woodall v. Woodall,
322 S.C. 7, 10, 471 S.E.2d 154, 157 (1996).
6. Although
“proper location” is not statutorily defined, the Administrative Law Court is
vested, as the trier of fact, with the authority to determine the fitness or
suitability of a particular location. Fast Stops, Inc. v. Ingram, 276
S.C. 593, 281 S.E.2d 181 (1981). The determination of suitability of location
is not necessarily a function solely of geography. It involves an infinite
variety of considerations related to the nature and operation of the proposed
business and its impact upon the community within which it is to be located. Kearney v. Allen, 287 S.C. 324, 338 S.E.2d 335 (1985). In determining the
suitability of a location, it is proper for this Court to consider any evidence
that demonstrates any adverse effect the proposed location will have on the
community. Palmer, supra. It is also relevant to consider the
previous history of the location. Smith v. Pratt, 258 S.C. 504, 189
S.E.2d 301 (1972); Taylor v. Lewis, et al., 261 S.C. 168, 198
S.E.2d 801 (1973). Furthermore, in considering the suitability of a location,
it is relevant to consider whether the testimony in opposition to the granting
of a license is based on opinions, generalities and conclusions, or whether the
case is supported by facts. Id.
7. Unless
there is sufficient evidence of an adverse impact on the community, the
application must not be denied if the statutory criteria are satisfied. The
fact that a Protestant objects to the issuance of a permit is not a sufficient
reason by itself to deny the application. See 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating
Liquors § 166 (2004).
8. Permits
and licenses issued by this state for the sale of liquor, beer and wine are not
property rights. Rather, they are privileges granted in the exercise of the
State’s police power to be used and enjoyed only so long as the holder complies
with the restrictions and conditions governing them. The Administrative Law
Court, as the tribunal authorized to grant the issuance of a permit, is
likewise authorized to revoke or suspend the permit for cause. See Feldman
v. S.C. Tax Commission, 203 S.C. 49, 26 S.E.2d 22 (1943).
9. Furthermore,
S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 7-200.1(I) (Supp. 2007), authorizing the imposition of
restrictions on permits, provides:
Any written
stipulation and/or agreement which is voluntarily entered
into by an applicant for a permit or license between the applicant and the
Department, if accepted by the Department, will be incorporated into the basic
requirements for the enjoyment and privilege of obtaining and retaining the
permit or license and shall have the same effect as any and all laws and any
and all other regulations pertaining to the permit or license.
Knowing violation of
the terms of the stipulation or agreement shall constitute sufficient grounds
to revoke said license.
10. The
Department may seek revocation or suspension of permits for the sale of beer
and wine “on its own initiative or on complaint signed and sworn to by two or
more freeholders resident for the preceding six months in the community in
which the licensed premises are located or by a local peace officer, all of
whom are charged with the duty of reporting immediately to the department a
violation of the provisions of Section 61‑4‑580…” S.C. Code Ann. §
61-4-590 (Supp. 2007).
11. After
considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, I conclude
that Petitioner’s application for an off-premises beer and wine permit should
be granted with one restriction. Petitioner is taking precautions to ensure
that no law enforcement problems occur at the location by installing security
cameras at the location. He also intends to ensure that no loitering occurs
outside the location and will check the identification of all customers wishing
to purchase beer and wine to ensure that they are twenty-one (21) years of
age.
The
Protestant expressed objection to the permit based upon its proximity to nearby
churches and residences and due to concern that the availability of beer and
wine will contribute to the narcotics problem in the area. However, no one from
the nearby churches or residences protested the application. Further, no
evidence was presented to show that the availability of beer and wine at this
specific location would contribute to the narcotics problems in the area.
However, due to the nature of the area, I find that Petitioner’s hours of
operations should be restricted to 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., Monday through
Saturday.
Accordingly,
I conclude that Petitioner meets all statutory requirements for the issuance of
an off-premises beer and wine permit. Moreover, I conclude that the location will not have an adverse impact on the
surrounding community and is suitable for an off-premises beer and wine permit
so long as it conforms to the restriction set forth below.
ORDER
Based
upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that the application for an off-premises beer and wine
permit submitted by Norwood Corner Mart, LLC, d/b/a Norwood Corner Mart for its
location at 1446 Poplar Street, #C, Cayce, South Carolina is GRANTED contingent upon Petitioner signing a written agreement with the South
Carolina Department of Revenue agreeing to the restrictions set forth below:
RESTRICTION
Petitioner’s
hours of operation shall not exceed 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., Monday through
Saturday.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
May 15, 2008 Marvin
F. Kittrell
Columbia, South Carolina Chief
Judge
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