ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
This matter is an appeal by the South Carolina Department of
Motor Vehicles (Department) from a Final Order and Decision of the South
Carolina Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings (DMVH). The DMVH’s Final Order and
Decision was issued following a hearing held pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1030
(Supp. 2006). The Department claims that the DMVH hearing officer erred when
he rescinded Respondent’s habitual offender suspension on the grounds that the
Department failed to prove that it notified Respondent of the suspension in
accordance with the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. 1-23-370(c) (2005). Upon
review of this matter, the DMVH’s Final Order and Decision is reversed as set
forth below.
BACKGROUND
On June
21, 2006, the Department prepared a Notice of Suspension informing Respondent that,
as a result of accumulating two (2) Driving Under Suspension convictions and
one (1) Unlawful Alcohol Concentration conviction in a three-year period,
Respondent was being declared a “Habitual Offender” by the Department.
The Notice of Suspension further stated that Respondent’s driver’s license would
be suspended for a period of five years beginning on July 21, 2006, unless Respondent
requested a hearing pursuant to Section 56-1-1030 by or before that date.
On
July 18, 2006, Respondent requested a hearing to challenge the suspension. A hearing
was held on August 21, 2006. At the hearing, Respondent testified that he did
not receive notification of his habitual offender suspension by mail, but
rather learned of the suspension while checking on an ancillary matter at the Department’s
offices. The Department did not present any evidence to demonstrate that it
mailed the Notice of Suspension to Respondent.
On October
11, 2006, the DMVH hearing officer issued a Final Order and Decision in which
he rescinded Respondent’s suspension. Specifically, he held:
After reviewing the facts of the case and
the applicable law, I find and conclude that the Respondent’s driver’s license
number is 007791366 as maintained by the Petitioner, did commit three separate
and distinct traffic violations within a three year period. Respondent was
convicted of all three separate and distinct violations. However, there was no
proof that Respondent received official notice by mail as required by APA
Section 1-23-370(c). Failure to notify Respondent by mail prejudiced
Respondent.
The Department now appeals.
ISSUE
ON APPEAL
Did the DMVH hearing officer err by
rescinding Respondent’s habitual offender suspension on the grounds that the
Department failed to prove that it complied with Section 1-23-370(c)?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The DMVH is authorized
by law to determine contested cases arising from the Department. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2007). Therefore, the DMVH is an “agency”
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005). As such, the APA’s standard of review governs appeals from decisions
of the DMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2007); see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319
S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1995). The standard used by appellate
bodies, including this Court, to review agency decisions is provided by S.C.
Code Ann. §1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2007).
This section provides:
The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of
the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court
may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further
proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the agency] if
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the
agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of
the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or
characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2007).
DISCUSSION
S.C.
Code Ann. § 1-23-370(c) (2005) provides in pertinent part:
No revocation, suspension, annulment, or
withdrawal of any license is lawful unless, prior to the institution of agency
proceedings, the agency gave notice by mail to the licensee of facts or
conduct which warrant the intended action, and the licensee was given an
opportunity to show compliance with all lawful requirements for the retention
of the license.
(emphasis
added).
The
Department argues that the DMVH hearing officer erred by rescinding
Respondent’s suspension on the grounds that the Department failed to prove its
compliance with Section 1-23-370(c) since Respondent received
actual notice of his suspension prior to July 21, 2006. I agree.
A similar issue was recently addressed by the
South Carolina Supreme Court in James v. State, 372 S.C. 287, 641 S.E.2d
899 (2007). In that case, the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life
without the possibility of parole (LWOP) pursuant to South Carolina’s
recidivist statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-45 (2003). The defendant subsequently
filed a petition for post-conviction relief. In his petition, the defendant
argued that his trial counsel was ineffective in not objecting to his sentence
on the basis of the State’s failure to provide him with written notice of its
intention to seek LWOP as required by § 17-25-45(H). The PCR court denied the defendant
relief, finding that both the defendant and his trial counsel were aware of the
State’s intention to seek LWOP well in advance of the defendant’s trial. On
appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the PCR court, holding:
The purpose of §
17-25-45(H) is to assure that a defendant and his counsel have actual notice
that the State is seeking a sentence under the recidivist statute at least ten
days prior to trial. Accordingly, so long as the defendant and his counsel, at
least ten days prior to trial, possess actual notice of the State’s intention
to seek a sentence under South Carolina’s recidivist statute, the statute has
been satisfied.
Id. at 294-95, 641 S.E.2d
at 903.
In the present case, the purpose of Section 1-23-370
is to assure that a licensee receives actual notice of his suspension prior to
the suspension’s scheduled start date so that: (i) he does not unwittingly
violate the suspension; and (ii) he has the opportunity to administratively
challenge the suspension. The Record in this case demonstrates
that Respondent received actual notice of his suspension prior to the
suspension’s scheduled start date. Moreover, the Record also shows that Respondent was provided with an administrative hearing to
challenge his suspension. Therefore, pursuant to the reasoning set forth in James,
any failure by the Department to fully comply with Section 1-23-370(c)
did not warrant the rescission of Respondent’s
suspension. The case relied on by Respondent for the proposition that actual
notice was not sufficient, State v. Johnson, 347 S.C. 67, 552 S.E.2d 339
(Ct. App. 2001), was overruled by the Supreme Court in James. See James, 372 S.C. at 295, 641 S.E.2d at 903 (expressly overruling Johnson); see also Harris v. State, --- S.E.2d ----, 2008 WL 648517, at * 8
(2008) (recognizing that James overruled Johnson).
Because I find that the determination of the above issue is
dispositive, I need not address the Department’s remaining argument. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518
S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not review remaining
issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).
ORDER
IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that the DMVH’s Final Order and Decision is REVERSED.
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
Ralph K. Anderson, III
Administrative
Law Judge
May 1, 2008
Columbia, South Carolina
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