ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
This matter is an appeal by the South Carolina Department of
Motor Vehicles (Department) from an Order of Dismissal of the South Carolina
Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings (DMVH). The DMVH’s Order of Dismissal was
issued following a hearing held pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-363 (Supp.
2006). The Department claims that the DMVH erroneously rescinded the
suspension of Respondent’s registration privileges. The Administrative Law
Court (ALC) has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Section 56-9-363
and S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2007). Upon review of this matter, the
DMVH’s Order of Dismissal is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the DMVH
for a new hearing.
BACKGROUND
On
July 14, 2006, the Department sent Respondent written notice that, as a result
of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on May 13, 2006, his registration
privileges in South Carolina would be suspended pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §
56-9-351 (2006), effective August 13, 2006.
On August
8, 2006, pursuant to Section 56-9-363, Respondent requested a hearing to
challenge the suspension. A hearing was commenced on September 11, 2006. On September
20, 2006, the DMVH Hearing Officer issued an Order of Dismissal, pursuant to
ALC Rule 23, in which he rescinded Respondent’s suspension. In his Order of Dismissal, the
DMVH Hearing Officer stated that the Department had failed to provide the DMVH
with “any evidence (i.e., South Carolina Traffic Collision Report Form) or
testimony corroborating the Respondent’s vehicle having been involved in an
accident/collision.”
The Department now appeals the DMVH’s Order of Dismissal.
ISSUE
ON APPEAL
1. Did
the DMVH hearing officer err by dismissing this case on the grounds that the
Department failed to provide the DMVH with evidence demonstrating that
Respondent’s vehicle had been involved in an accident?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
DMVH is authorized by law to determine contested cases arising from the
Department. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2007). Therefore, the
DMVH is an “agency” under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005). As such, the APA’s standard of review
governs appeals from decisions of the DMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380 (Supp. 2007); see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385
(1995). The standard used by appellate bodies, including the ALC, to review agency
decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2007).
This section provides:
The court may not
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency
or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify
the decision [of the agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions
are:
(a) in
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in
excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made
upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected
by other error of law;
(e) clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or
characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2007).
DISCUSSION
The
statutes at issue here were enacted by the Legislature to discourage
individuals who are involved in motor vehicle accidents from evading their financial responsibilities with respect to such accidents.
Section 56-9-351 provides that:
Within sixty days of receipt of a report of
a motor vehicle accident within this State which has resulted in bodily injury
or death or damage to the property of any one person in the amount of two
hundred dollars or more, the Department of Motor Vehicles shall suspend the
license of each operator or driver if he is the owner of the motor vehicle
involved in the accident and all registrations of each owner of a motor vehicle
involved in the accident.
S.C. Code Ann. §
56-9-351 (2006). Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-352 (2006), Section
56-9-351 does not apply in several different situations, including, among
others, where the vehicle in question was insured at the time of the accident.
S.C.
Code Ann. § 56-9-363 (Supp. 2006) grants those who become subject to suspension
pursuant to Section 56-9-351 the right to a hearing. Specifically, it provides
that:
Any person whose
driving privilege becomes subject to suspension or is suspended under the
provisions of this article may request an administrative hearing with the
Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings prior to the suspension or within thirty
days after written notice of the suspension in order that he might prove that
no reasonable possibility exists that a civil court might enter a judgment
against him as a result of the accident in question.
S.C. Code Ann.
§ 56-9-363 (Supp. 2006).
Here,
the Department argues that the DMVH hearing officer erred by rescinding the
suspensions of Respondent’s registration privileges. Specifically, the
Department argues that the hearing officer erred “when he failed to consider
the Accident Report filed by the Department a month earlier.”
I agree.
The
Record clearly demonstrates that, on August 9, 2006, the Department sent to the
DMVH a copy of a South Carolina Collision Report Form that showed that a
vehicle belonging to Respondent had been involved in an accident on May 13,
2006 that caused $550 worth of damage to Respondent’s vehicle and $1,500 worth
of damage to another vehicle. Therefore, the DMVH hearing officer’s finding
that the DMVH had not been provided with any evidence demonstrating that Respondent’s
vehicle had been involved in an accident was clearly erroneous. Accordingly,
the DMVH’s Order of Dismissal is reversed and, because this case was summarily
dismissed without a full hearing, this matter is remanded to the DMVH for a new
hearing.
ORDER
IT
IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the DMVH’s Order of Dismissal is REVERSED,
and that this matter is remanded to the DMVH for a new hearing.
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
Ralph
K. Anderson, III Administrative
Law Judge
March 2, 2008
Columbia, South Carolina
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