South Carolina              
Administrative Law Court
Edgar A. Brown building 1205 Pendleton St., Suite 224 Columbia, SC 29201 Voice: (803) 734-0550

SC Administrative Law Court Decisions

CAPTION:
SCDMV vs. Elena Alexandria Carter

AGENCY:
South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles

PARTIES:
Appellant:
South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles

Respondents:
Elena Alexandria Carter
 
DOCKET NUMBER:
06-ALJ-21-0875-AP

APPEARANCES:
n/a
 

ORDERS:

ORDER

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter is an appeal by the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (Department) from a Final Order and Decision of the South Carolina Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings (DMVH). The DMVH’s Final Order and Decision was issued following a hearing held pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1030. The Department claims that the DMVH hearing officer erred when he concluded that Respondent Elena Alexandria Carter (Carter) was not a “habitual offender” as the term is defined in S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020 (2006). The Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2006). Upon review of this matter, the DMVH’s Final Order and Decision is affirmed as set forth below.

BACKGROUND

On May 1, 2006, the Department sent Carter a Notice of Suspension informing her that, as of May 31, 2006, her driver’s license would be suspended for a period of five years pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1090. The Notice of Suspension stated that Carter had accumulated three Driving Under Suspension (DUS) convictions in a three-year period.

Thereafter, Carter requested a hearing with the DMVH to challenge the suspension. A hearing was held on July 5, 2006. At the hearing, Carter testified that the suspension that lead to her third DUS conviction resulted solely from her insurance being cancelled after she failed to pay her premium. Carter also testified that, prior to the date of her third DUS violation, she had obtained insurance from a different insurance company. According to Carter, she was insured on February 28, 2006, the date of her third DUS violation. The Department neither appeared at the DMVH hearing nor filed anything with the DMVH.

On October 23, 2006, the DMVH hearing officer issued a Final Order and Decision in which he rescinded Carter’s suspension. Specifically, he held that Carter’s third DUS conviction fell within the exception set forth in Section 56-1-1020(a)(4). He thus concluded that Carter was not a “habitual offender” as defined in Section 56-1-1020. The Department now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The DMVH is authorized by law to determine contested cases arising from the Department. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2006). Therefore, the DMVH is an “agency” under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005). As such, the APA’s standard of review governs appeals from decisions of the DMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2006); see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1995). The standard used by appellate bodies, including the ALC, to review agency decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006).[1] This section provides:

The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) affected by other error of law;

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006).

A decision is supported by “substantial evidence” when the record as a whole allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion reached by the agency. Bilton v. Best Western Royal Motor Lodge, 282 S.C. 634, 641, 321 S.E.2d 63, 68 (Ct. App. 1984). A decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable minds may differ on the judgment. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981). The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters v. S.C. Land Resources Conservation Comm’n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995).

In applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the administrative agency are presumed to be correct. Rodney v. Michelin Tire Co., 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996) (citing Kearse v. State Health and Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200, 456 S.E.2d 892, 893 (1995)). The party challenging an agency action has the burden of proving convincingly that the agency’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence. Waters, 321 S.C. at 226, 467 S.E.2d at 917.

Discussion

Section 56-1-1020 and the Meaning of “Proof of Financial Responsibility”

Section 56-1-1020 provides in pertinent part:

An habitual offender shall mean any person whose record as maintained by the Department of Motor Vehicles shows that he has accumulated the convictions for separate and distinct offenses described in subsections (a), (b) and (c) committed during a three-year period; provided, that where more than one included offense shall be committed within a one-day period such multiple offenses shall be treated for the purposes of this article as one offense:

(a) Three or more convictions, singularly or in combination of any of the following separate and distinct offenses arising out of separate acts:

(1) Voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle;

(2) Operating or attempting to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotics or drugs;

(3) Driving or operating a motor vehicle in a reckless manner;

(4) Driving a motor vehicle while his license, permit, or privilege to drive a motor vehicle has been suspended or revoked, except a conviction for driving under suspension for failure to file proof of financial responsibility . . .

S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020 (2006) (emphasis added). Both Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 of the Motor Vehicle Code require that “proof of financial responsibility” be given in certain situations. For instance, S.C. Code Ann. § 56-10-535 (2006) requires a person convicted of certain traffic violations to furnish “proof of financial responsibility.” Moreover, certain types of license and registration suspensions are required to continue on indefinitely until “proof of financial responsibility” is given. See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. §§ 56-9-500, 56-9-510, 56-10-510, 56-10-530 (2006).

While neither Chapter 1 nor Chapter 10 of the Motor Vehicle Code defines the term “proof of financial responsibility,” Chapter 9 provides the following definition of the term:

Proof of ability to respond to damages for liability, as provided in Section 38-77-150, or, on account of accidents occurring after the effective date of this proof, arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle in the amount of fifteen thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident and, subject to this limit for one person, in the amount of thirty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident and in the amount of ten thousand dollars because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one accident.

S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-20 (2006).

S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-540 (2006) sets forth three methods by which “proof of financial responsibility” may be given for the purposes of Chapter 9 of the Motor Vehicle Code. Under Chapter 10 of the Motor Vehicle Code, the manner in which “proof of financial responsibility” may be furnished depends on the circumstance. See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 56-10-510 (2006) (proof of financial responsibility must be furnished in the manner prescribed in Section 56-10-10, et seq.); S.C. Code Ann. § 56-10-530 (proof of financial responsibility must be furnished in the manner prescribed in Section 56-9-350, et seq.); S.C. Code Ann. § 56-10-535 (2006) (proof of financial responsibility must be furnished in the manner prescribed by the director).

Applicability of Exception Set Forth in Section 56-1-1020(a)(4)

Here, the Department argues that the DMVH hearing officer erred by determining that Carter’s third DUS conviction fell within the exception set forth in Section 56-1-1020(a)(4). As discussed below, I find the Department’s argument unpersuasive.

The thrust of the Department’s argument appears to be that the exception set forth in Section 56-1-1020(a)(4) should be interpreted to apply only to those DUS convictions in which the underlying suspension is described on the motorist’s driving record as “SUSP: Code 002 – Failure to Maintain Proof of Financial Responsibility.” However, the Department fails to provide any explanation as to why the exception should be construed in this way. Moreover, the exception uses the word “file” rather than the word “maintain,” and it does not specifically describe, by statutory section, the types of suspensions that are applicable to it.

Furthermore, Carter’s driving record is not a part of the Record,[2] and the Department’s brief does not specify the statutory section(s) under which suspensions given the description “SUSP: Code 002 – Failure to Maintain Proof of Financial Responsibility” are imposed. Therefore, even if this Court were to agree with the Department’s interpretation of Section 56-1-1020(a)(4), the Department has failed to sufficiently demonstrate that Carter’s suspension for insurance cancellation fell within the category, “SUSP: Code 002 – Failure to Maintain Proof of Financial Responsibility.”[3]

In this Court’s view, the Record supports the conclusion that Carter’s third DUS conviction fell within the terms of the Section 56-1-1020(a)(4) exception. Carter testified, and the Department appears to concede,[4] that Carter received the suspension that lead to her third DUS conviction solely because her insurance company cancelled her insurance. Carter further testified that she rectified her insurance problem by obtaining insurance from a different insurance company and that she was in fact insured on February 28, 2006, the date of her third DUS violation. Carter’s testimony on this matter was not contradicted, and the Department has not in any way challenged its veracity. Therefore, based on the Record, it is not unreasonable to conclude that, on the date of her third DUS violation, Carter’s driver’s license was, for all intents and purposes, suspended solely due to her failure to file “proof of financial responsibility.” See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-500 (2006) (providing that a license suspended “under any law of this State” must “remain suspended ... and shall not at any time thereafter be renewed nor shall any license be thereafter issued to that person ... until he shall give and thereafter maintain proof of financial responsibility.”) (emphasis added);[5] see also S.C. Code Ann. § 56-10-240 (2006) (allowing person who has his driver’s license suspended for cancellation of insurance to “appeal” his suspension to the Director of the Department of Insurance, and stating that person’s suspension must be voided if he demonstrates on appeal that he has liability insurance coverage sufficient to meet applicable “financial responsibility” requirements).

For these reasons, the DMVH hearing officer’s Final Order and Decision is affirmed.

ORDER

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the DMVH’s Final Order and Decision is affirmed.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________________

Ralph K. Anderson, III

Administrative Law Judge

November 15, 2007

Columbia, South Carolina



[1] Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2006), administrative law judges must conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in Section 1-23-380(A).

[2] Carter’s driving record was never presented to the DMVH hearing officer. Although the Department did attach a copy of Carter’s driving record to its Notice of Appeal, this was insufficient, on its own, to make her driving record a part of the Record. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2006) (setting forth limited circumstances under which a party may be allowed to present additional evidence in an appeal of an agency’s final decision). Because Carter’s driving record is not a part of the Record, it cannot be considered by this Court. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(4) (Supp. 2006) (“The review [of an agency’s decision] . . . must be confined to the record.”); ALC Rule 36(G) (“The Administrative Law Judge will not consider any fact which does not appear in the Record.”).

[3] The Department seems to argue that “proof of financial responsibility,” as used in Section 56-1-1020(a)(4), means only Form SR-22, which is the notification filed with the Department to show proof of future financial responsibility as required by Section 56-9-550. See 26 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 90-002 (Supp. 2006). However, certain sections of the Motor Vehicle Code use the term “proof of financial responsibility” much more broadly. See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 56-10-225(B) (2006) (“The owner of a motor vehicle must maintain proof of financial responsibility in the motor vehicle at all times, and it must be displayed upon demand of a police officer or any other duly person authorized by law.”) (emphasis added). In addition, even Chapter 9 of the Motor Vehicle Code allows for “proof of financial responsibility” to be shown in ways other than by filing a Form SR-22. See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-540 (2006).

[4] In its brief, the Department states that Carter’s license was suspended from December 22, 2005 to April 10, 2006 as a result of her insurance being cancelled. The Department has not contended that Carter’s license was suspended during this period for any other reason.

[5] Although Section 56-9-500 is subject to a few exceptions, the Department has not contended, and it does not appear, that Section 56-9-500 is inapplicable to suspensions that are implemented as a result of an insurance cancellation.


~/pdf/060875.pdf
PDF

Brown Bldg.

 

 

 

 

 

Copyright © 2024 South Carolina Administrative Law Court