ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
This
matter is an appeal by the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles
(Department) from a Final Order and Decision of the South Carolina Division of Motor
Vehicle Hearings (DMVH). The DMVH’s Final Order and Decision was issued following
a hearing held pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1030. The Department claims
that the DMVH hearing officer erred when he concluded that Respondent Elena
Alexandria Carter (Carter) was not a “habitual offender” as the term is defined
in S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020 (2006). The Administrative Law Court (ALC or
Court) has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-660 (Supp. 2006). Upon review of this matter, the DMVH’s Final Order and
Decision is affirmed as set forth below.
BACKGROUND
On May
1, 2006, the Department sent Carter a Notice of Suspension informing her that, as
of May 31, 2006, her driver’s license would be suspended for a period of five
years pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1090. The Notice of Suspension stated
that Carter had accumulated three Driving Under Suspension (DUS) convictions in
a three-year period.
Thereafter, Carter
requested a hearing with the DMVH to challenge the suspension. A hearing was
held on July 5, 2006. At the hearing, Carter testified that the suspension
that lead to her third DUS conviction resulted solely from her insurance being
cancelled after she failed to pay her premium. Carter also testified that,
prior to the date of her third DUS violation, she had obtained insurance from a
different insurance company. According to Carter, she was insured on February
28, 2006, the date of her third DUS violation. The Department neither appeared
at the DMVH hearing nor filed anything with the DMVH.
On October 23, 2006, the DMVH hearing officer issued a
Final Order and Decision in which he rescinded Carter’s suspension.
Specifically, he held that Carter’s third DUS conviction fell within the
exception set forth in Section 56-1-1020(a)(4). He thus concluded that Carter was
not a “habitual offender” as defined in Section 56-1-1020. The Department now
appeals.
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
The DMVH is authorized
by law to determine contested cases arising from the Department. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2006). Therefore, the DMVH is an “agency”
under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005). As such, the APA’s standard of review governs appeals from decisions
of the DMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2006); see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319
S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1995). The standard used by appellate
bodies, including the ALC, to review agency decisions is provided by S.C. Code
Ann. §1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006).
This section provides:
The court may not
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency
or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify
the decision [of the agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are:
(a) in
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in
excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made
upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected
by other error of law;
(e) clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(f) arbitrary
or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006).
A decision is supported
by “substantial evidence” when the record as a whole allows reasonable minds to
reach the same conclusion reached by the agency. Bilton v. Best Western
Royal Motor Lodge, 282 S.C. 634, 641, 321 S.E.2d 63, 68 (Ct. App. 1984). A
decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable minds may differ on
the judgment. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304,
307 (1981). The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent the agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters
v. S.C. Land Resources Conservation Comm’n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d
913, 917 (1996); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461
S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995).
In
applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the
administrative agency are presumed to be correct. Rodney v. Michelin Tire
Co., 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996) (citing Kearse
v. State Health and Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200, 456 S.E.2d
892, 893 (1995)). The party challenging an agency action has the burden of
proving convincingly that the agency’s decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence. Waters, 321 S.C. at 226, 467 S.E.2d at 917.
Discussion
Section
56-1-1020 and the Meaning of “Proof of Financial Responsibility”
Section 56-1-1020 provides in
pertinent part:
An habitual offender shall mean any person whose record as
maintained by the Department of Motor Vehicles shows that he has accumulated
the convictions for separate and distinct offenses described in subsections
(a), (b) and (c) committed during a three-year period; provided, that where
more than one included offense shall be committed within a one-day period such
multiple offenses shall be treated for the purposes of this article as one
offense:
(a) Three or more convictions, singularly or in combination
of any of the following separate and distinct offenses arising out of separate
acts:
(1) Voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter or
reckless homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle;
(2) Operating or attempting to operate a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotics or drugs;
(3) Driving or operating a motor vehicle in a reckless
manner;
(4) Driving a motor vehicle while his license, permit,
or privilege to drive a motor vehicle has been suspended or revoked, except a
conviction for driving under suspension for failure to file proof of financial
responsibility . . .
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020 (2006) (emphasis
added). Both Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 of the Motor Vehicle Code require that
“proof of financial responsibility” be given in certain situations. For
instance, S.C. Code Ann. § 56-10-535 (2006) requires a person convicted of
certain traffic violations to furnish “proof of financial responsibility.” Moreover,
certain types of license and registration suspensions are required to continue
on indefinitely until “proof of financial responsibility” is given. See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. §§ 56-9-500, 56-9-510, 56-10-510, 56-10-530 (2006).
While neither Chapter
1 nor Chapter 10 of the Motor Vehicle Code defines the term “proof of financial
responsibility,” Chapter 9 provides the following definition of the term:
Proof of ability to respond to damages for
liability, as provided in Section 38-77-150, or, on account of accidents
occurring after the effective date of this proof, arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle in the amount of fifteen thousand
dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident
and, subject to this limit for one person, in the amount of thirty thousand
dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one
accident and in the amount of ten thousand dollars because of injury to or
destruction of property of others in any one accident.
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-20 (2006).
S.C. Code Ann. §
56-9-540 (2006) sets forth three methods by which “proof of financial
responsibility” may be given for the purposes of Chapter 9 of the Motor Vehicle
Code. Under Chapter 10 of the Motor Vehicle Code, the manner in which “proof
of financial responsibility” may be furnished depends on the circumstance. See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 56-10-510 (2006) (proof of financial responsibility
must be furnished in the manner prescribed in Section 56-10-10, et seq.); S.C.
Code Ann. § 56-10-530 (proof of financial responsibility must be furnished in
the manner prescribed in Section 56-9-350, et seq.); S.C. Code Ann. § 56-10-535
(2006) (proof of financial responsibility must be furnished in the manner
prescribed by the director).
Applicability
of Exception Set Forth in Section 56-1-1020(a)(4)
Here, the
Department argues that the DMVH hearing officer erred by determining that
Carter’s third DUS conviction fell within the exception set forth in Section
56-1-1020(a)(4). As discussed below, I find the Department’s argument
unpersuasive.
The thrust of the
Department’s argument appears to be that the exception set forth in Section
56-1-1020(a)(4) should be interpreted to apply only to those DUS convictions in
which the underlying suspension is described on the motorist’s driving record
as “SUSP: Code 002 – Failure to Maintain Proof of Financial Responsibility.” However,
the Department fails to provide any explanation as to why the exception should
be construed in this way. Moreover, the exception uses the word “file” rather
than the word “maintain,” and it does not specifically describe, by statutory
section, the types of suspensions that are applicable to it.
Furthermore, Carter’s
driving record is not a part of the Record, and the Department’s brief does not specify the statutory section(s) under
which suspensions given the description “SUSP: Code 002 – Failure to Maintain Proof
of Financial Responsibility” are imposed. Therefore, even if this Court were
to agree with the Department’s interpretation of Section 56-1-1020(a)(4), the Department
has failed to sufficiently demonstrate that Carter’s suspension for insurance
cancellation fell within the category, “SUSP: Code 002 – Failure to Maintain Proof
of Financial Responsibility.”
In this Court’s
view, the Record supports the conclusion that Carter’s third DUS conviction
fell within the terms of the Section 56-1-1020(a)(4) exception. Carter
testified, and the Department appears to concede, that Carter received the suspension that lead to her third DUS conviction solely
because her insurance company cancelled her insurance. Carter further
testified that she rectified her insurance problem by obtaining insurance from
a different insurance company and that she was in fact insured on February 28,
2006, the date of her third DUS violation. Carter’s testimony on this matter
was not contradicted, and the Department has not in any way challenged its
veracity. Therefore, based on the Record, it is not unreasonable to conclude
that, on the date of her third DUS violation, Carter’s driver’s license was, for
all intents and purposes, suspended solely due to her failure to file “proof of
financial responsibility.” See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-500 (2006) (providing
that a license suspended “under any law of this State” must “remain suspended
... and shall not at any time thereafter be renewed nor shall any license be
thereafter issued to that person ... until he shall give and thereafter
maintain proof of financial responsibility.”) (emphasis added); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 56-10-240 (2006) (allowing person who has his
driver’s license suspended for cancellation of insurance to “appeal” his suspension
to the Director of the Department of Insurance, and stating that person’s
suspension must be voided if he demonstrates on appeal that he has liability
insurance coverage sufficient to meet applicable “financial responsibility”
requirements).
For these reasons,
the DMVH hearing officer’s Final Order and Decision is affirmed.
ORDER
IT
IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the DMVH’s Final Order and Decision is affirmed.
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
Ralph K. Anderson, III
Administrative
Law Judge
November 15, 2007
Columbia, South Carolina
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