ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
THIS MATTER is an appeal by the South Carolina Department of
Motor Vehicles (“Department”) from a Final Order and Decision of the South
Carolina Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings (“DMVH”). The DMVH’s Final Order
and Decision was issued following an administrative hearing held pursuant to
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1090(c) (Supp. 2006). The Department contends that the
reduction of the Habitual Offender suspension of Respondent Daniel Scott Gibson
(“Respondent”) based on good cause is clearly erroneous or is arbitrary or
capricious or is characterized by an abuse of discretion. The Administrative Law Court (“ALC” or “Court”) has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2006). Upon consideration of the briefs, the DMVH’s
Final Order and Decision is reversed as set forth below.
background
Between
March 2000 and November 2002, Respondent was convicted three times for reckless
driving violations falling within the scope of S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020(a).
On February 2, 2003, Respondent was adjudicated a “habitual offender” pursuant
to section 56-1-1020, and, in accordance with section 56-1-1090(a) (Supp. 2006),
his driver’s license was suspended for a five-year period beginning February 2,
2003 and ending February 2, 2008. Despite the habitual offender suspension,
Respondent was involved in a Reportable Accident while driving in June 2003 and
was also cited for Disobeying an Official Traffic Device in July 2005.
On
March 30, 2007, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1090(c) (Supp. 2006),
Respondent filed a petition with the DMVH for a reduction of his habitual
offender suspension. In the petition, Respondent indicated that the reduction
was needed so that he could drive himself to work and his children to school
when his wife was unable to do so. Along with his petition, Respondent submitted
to the DMVH a copy of his ten year driving record. In addition to the aforementioned
offenses, Respondent’s driving record also contains numerous other safety
violations, which include: four (4) Reportable Accidents, three (3) Speeding
offenses (which includes one occasion of driving 70 m.p.h. in a 40 m.p.h. speed
zone), Careless and Negligent Driving, Disobeying an Official Traffic Device,
Operating an unsafe vehicle, and several suspensions for Failure to Pay Traffic
Ticket.
The
DMVH notified the parties than an administrative hearing regarding Respondent’s
petition would be held on April 23, 2007. On March 29, 2007, the Department
filed an Objection To Request For Reduction of Habitual Offender Suspension,
that stated S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1090(c) (Supp. 2006) provided it the
authority to determine the guidelines for granting sentence reductions, as set
forth in Policy VS-001. The DMV cited Guideline (B)(4)(c) and stated that
Respondent was not eligible for a reduction because of his habitual suspension
violations.
The
hearing was held, as scheduled, on April 23, 2007. At the hearing, Respondent
appeared with his attorney and a witness. Respondent testified about the
circumstances surrounding the two violations that occurred during his habitual
offender suspension and acknowledged that he was violating the law. Respondent
concluded his testimony by indicating that he paid his driver’s license reinstatement
fees and that he fulfilled all the other requirements of his suspension except
for waiting out the remainder of the term of the suspension. The DMVH hearing
office asked Respondent a rhetorical question regarding these points and stated
that he had no further questions for the Respondent. Respondent’s manager
testified that a suspension reduction would improve Respondent’s employment
situation.
On
April 27, 2007, the DMVH hearing officer issued a Final Order and Decision in
which he ordered that Respondent’s habitual offender suspension be reduced. The
Department now appeals.
ISSUE
ON APPEAL
1. Did the Hearing
Officer err in determining that the Respondent had made a showing of good cause?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
DMVH is authorized by law to determine contested cases arising from the
Department. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2006). Therefore, the
DMVH is an “agency” under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005). As such, the APA’s standard of review
governs appeals from decisions of the DMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A) (Supp. 2006); see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human
Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1995). The
standard used by appellate bodies, including the ALC, to review agency
decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2006) (directing Administrative Law Judges
to conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in Section
1-23-380(A)). This section provides:
The court may not substitute its judgment
for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for
further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the
agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation
of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of
the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful
procedure;
(d) affected by other
error of law;
(e) clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(f) arbitrary
or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006).
A
decision is supported by “substantial evidence” when the record as a whole
allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion reached by the agency. Bilton
v. Best Western Royal Motor Lodge, 282 S.C. 634, 641, 321 S.E.2d 63, 68
(Ct. App. 1984). A decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable
minds may differ on the judgment. Lark, 276 S.C. at 136, 276 S.E.2d
304, 307. The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent the agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters
v. S.C. Land Resources Conservation Comm’n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d
913, 917 (1996); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461
S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995).
In
applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the
administrative agency are presumed to be correct. Rodney v. Michelin Tire
Co., 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996) (citing Kearse
v. State Health and Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200, 456 S.E.2d
892, 893 (1995)). The party challenging an agency action has the burden of
proving convincingly that the agency’s decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence. Waters, 321 S.C. at 226, 467 S.E.2d at 917.
DISCUSSION
Good
Cause
State
policy maximizes highway safety by denying driving privileges to those who
demonstrate repeated indifference to the safety of others as well as disrespect
for the laws of the State. S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1010. Under S.C. Code Ann.
§56-1-1100 it is a felony punishable by up to five years in prison to operate a
motor vehicle in this state while under an habitual offender suspension.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, under section 56-1-1090, the State has seen fit
to allow the reduction of an habitual offender suspension from five years to
two years for “good cause shown.”
No
clearly objective standard of what constitutes “good cause” is found, but South Carolina law suggests that the facts must extend beyond those that are merely personal
in nature and common to the population in general (italicized portion
added by this Court). See Faile v. South Carolina Employment Sec.
Commission, 267 S.C. 536, 541-542 (1976) (finding that the meaning of “good
cause” within the provisions of S.C. Unemployment Compensation Law did not
contemplate benefits for an employee that was compelled to quit her job solely
based on personal circumstances.); see also Ex parte Capital
U-Drive-It, 369 S.C. 1, 13 (2006) (finding that appellant did not establish
good cause to keep his family court records sealed where he claimed the records
contained extremely personal, private, and confidential matters.). Determining
whether good cause is shown involves a balancing of the needs of the parties as
they weigh against public policy. See Doe v. Ward Firm, P.A., 353
S.C. 509, 514 (2003) (finding good cause to examine the medical records of the
biological parents based on the compelling needs of the adopted child, and by balancing
the privacy rights of the parties against the best interest of the child).
Ultimately,
the finding of good cause, or lack thereof, must be made by the Court on a case
by case basis.
Here,
Respondent Gibson advances as “good cause” personal needs (driving child to day
care, getting to work and needs of his job) that could be argued in similar
cases by most other citizens in his age group.
Respondent’s
driving record evidences a history of disrespect of the laws of the State and
the safety of other drivers. Prior to being adjudicated a habitual offender,
Respondent was involved in four (4) Reportable Accidents, cited for speeding
three (3) times – on one occasion Respondent was driving 70 mph in a 40 mph
zone, Careless and Negligent Driving, Disobeying an Official Traffic Device,
Operating an unsafe vehicle, and several suspensions for Failure to Pay Traffic
Ticket. After his habitual offender suspension commenced, Respondent was
convicted of driving offenses on two separate occasions - once for a Reportable
Accident and once for Disobeying an Official Traffic Device. Most
disconcerting and indicative of Respondent’s history of offending the laws of
the State, is the evidence in the record of his attempt to obstruct justice. The
South Carolina Traffic Collision Report for the Reportable Accident occurring
on June 16, 2003, indicated that Respondent and his wife attempted to further
disobey and evade the law by driving their cars to another location to
fictitiously report another accident in order to justify the damage.
After
reviewing the record in its entirety, no conclusion can be drawn other than :
(a) no “good cause” was shown that would support a suspension reduction; and,
(b) that the finding that Respondent Gibson showed good cause is clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; and, (c) that no reasonable person would find “good cause” based
on the facts presented here and that the decision is arbitrary and capricious
and characterized by an abuse of discretion.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the DMVH’s Final
Order and Decision is REVERSED and the habitual offender suspension of
Respondent Gibson reinstated.
AND IT IS SO
ORDERED.
________________________
John
D. McLeod
Administrative
Law Judge
November 28, 2007
Columbia, South Carolina
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