ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
This matter is an appeal by the South Carolina Department of
Motor Vehicles (“Department”) from a Final Order and Decision of the South
Carolina Division of Motor Vehicle Hearings (“DMVH”). The DMVH’s Final Order
and Decision was issued following an administrative hearing held pursuant to
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1090(c) (Supp. 2006). The Department contends that the
DMVH hearing officer ignored DMV Policy VS-001 and erroneously reduced the
driver’s license suspension of Respondent James Wesley White (“Respondent”). The
Administrative Law Court (“ALC” or “Court”) has jurisdiction to hear this
matter pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2006). Upon consideration
of the briefs, the DMVH’s Final Order and Decision is affirmed as set forth
below.
background
Between
1994 and 2002, Respondent’s driving record indicates that his license was
revoked once for Leaving Scene of Accident-Bodily Injury and was suspended on
numerous occasions for violations, which include Driving Under the Influence
(DUI), Operation of Uninsured Vehicle, Failure to Maintain Proof of Financial
Responsibility, Failure to Pay Traffic Ticket, Driving Under Suspension (six
suspensions), and Habitual Offender (1996). On May 3, 2003, Respondent was found
to be a “habitual offender” pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1020. In
accordance with S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1090(a), his driver’s license was
suspended for a five-year period beginning May 3, 2003 and ending May 3, 2008.
On
December 9, 2005, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1090(c) (Supp. 2006), Respondent
filed a petition with the DMVH for a reduction of his habitual offender suspension.
The petition indicates that Respondent has 5 children with 2 residing in the
household. The petition also shows that Respondent has maintained continuous
employment since being released from incarceration. Along with his petition, Respondent
submitted to the DMVH a copy of his ten-year driving record, which indicated
that Respondent had not committed a motor vehicle offense since May 11, 2002.
The
DMVH notified the parties that an administrative hearing regarding Respondent’s
petition would be held on March 28, 2006. On February 14, 2006, the Department
had filed a Notice of Appeal, that referred to S.C. Code § 56-1-1090(c), Policy
VS-001 and Guideline (B)(4)(e). The Department stated that § 1090(c) provided
it the authority to determine the guidelines for granting sentence reductions,
as set forth in Policy VS-00. Under Guideline (B)(4)(e) the Department also
stated that Respondent’s prior habitual offender suspension made him ineligible
for a reduction.
The
hearing was held, as scheduled, on March 28, 2006. Respondent appeared
represented by counsel. At the hearing, the DMVH hearing officer questioned
Respondent about his three DUS violations occurring during the short period of
time from November 2001 through May 2002. Respondent stated that there had
been discrepancy with his North Carolina driving record, which led South Carolina to believe he was driving with a suspended license. In actuality, Respondent
explained that he served seven days in jail to clear his North Carolina
license, but the paperwork had not been processed on the South Carolina
computer system. Respondent also indicated that his last conviction of a DUS
was May 11, 2002. The hearing officer also inquired into Respondent’s mean of
getting to work, whether Respondent would be able to procure car insurance, and
Respondent’s ability to meet his legal duty of paying child support.
On January 19, 2007, the DMVH hearing officer issued a Final
Order and Decision in which he ordered that Respondent’s habitual offender
suspension be reduced. The Department now appeals.
ISSUE
ON APPEAL
1. Did the DMVH improperly fail to consider DMV Policy VS-001 regarding
qualifications for a habitual offender suspension reduction?
2. Was there an abuse of discretion by the hearing office by reducing the
habitual offender suspension of Respondent?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
DMVH is authorized by law to determine contested cases arising from the
Department. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660 (Supp. 2006). Therefore, the
DMVH is an “agency” under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005). As such, the APA’s standard of review
governs appeals from decisions of the DMVH. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A) (Supp. 2006); see also Byerly Hosp. v. S.C. State Health & Human
Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1995). The
standard used by appellate bodies, including the ALC, to review agency
decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006). See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(B) (Supp. 2006) (directing Administrative Law Judges
to conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in Section
1-23-380(A)). This section provides:
The court may not substitute its judgment
for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for
further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the
agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of
constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the
statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful
procedure;
(d) affected by other
error of law;
(e) clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(f) arbitrary
or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.
S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006).
A
decision is supported by “substantial evidence” when the record as a whole
allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion reached by the agency. Bilton
v. Best Western Royal Motor Lodge, 282 S.C. 634, 641, 321 S.E.2d 63, 68
(Ct. App. 1984). A decision will not be set aside simply because reasonable
minds may differ on the judgment. Lark, 276 S.C. at 136, 276 S.E.2d
304, 307. The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent the agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters
v. S.C. Land Resources Conservation Comm’n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d
913, 917 (1996); Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461
S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995).
In
applying the substantial evidence rule, the factual findings of the
administrative agency are presumed to be correct. Rodney v. Michelin Tire
Co., 320 S.C. 515, 519, 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996) (citing Kearse
v. State Health and Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 318 S.C. 198, 200, 456 S.E.2d
892, 893 (1995)). The party challenging an agency action has the burden of
proving convincingly that the agency’s decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence. Waters, 321 S.C. at 226, 467 S.E.2d at 917. Pursuant to ALC
Rule 37(B)(1), the Court shall consider the issues set forth in the brief and
may disregard broad general statements.
DISCUSSION
Department
Policy VS-001
Section
56-1-1090(c) states in pertinent part:
[U]pon petition to the Division of Motor
Vehicle Hearings and for good cause shown, the hearing officer may restore to [a
person declared to be a habitual offender] the privilege to operate a motor
vehicle in this State upon terms and conditions as the department may
prescribe, subject to other provisions of law relating to the issuance of
drivers’ licenses. The petition permitted by this item may be filed after two
years have expired from the date of the decision of the department finding the
person to be an habitual offender. At this time and after hearing, the hearing
officer may reduce the five-year period of [subsection] (a) to a two-year
period for good cause shown.
S.C. Code Ann. §
56-1-1090(c) (Supp. 2006) (emphasis added). In 2005, the Department issued
Department Policy VS-001. Section III(B)(4)(c) of Department Policy VS-001
states:
Once the Department
has received a complete, accurate application, a reduction will be granted if
the following conditions have been met . . . The applicant must not have driven
a motor vehicle since the beginning date of the habitual offender suspension.
NOTE: The applicant will have stated under oath that he/she has not driven at
all during the habitual offender suspension. If a review of the driving record
shows that s/he drove (e.g., a traffic ticket or accident report), the applicant
will not be eligible for a reduction.
The
Department argues that, based on Respondent’s October 9, 2004 offense, the DMVH
hearing officer’s reduction of Respondent’s habitual offender suspension
violated Section III(B)(4)(c) of Department Policy VS-001 and therefore
constituted error. According to the Department, the DMVH hearing officer was
required to follow Department Policy VS-001 because Section 56-1-1090(c) “assigned
to the [Department] the responsibility to set standards for the granting of [habitual
offender suspension] reductions.”
On
March 23, 2007, the ALC issued an En Banc Order addressing this very issue. See S.C. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles v. Cain, 06-ALJ-21-0790-AP (S.C. Admin. Law
Ct. March 23, 2007). In that En Banc Order, the ALC held that Department
Policy VS-001 does not have the force or effect of law, and that a DMVH hearing
officer’s failure to follow Department Policy VS-001 does not per se constitute
error. Pursuant to ALC Rule 70(F), the holding of the En Banc Order is binding
upon all individual administrative law judges in all subsequent cases. Therefore,
the DMVH’s Final Order and Decision will not be reversed on this ground.
Abuse
of Discretion
The
Department also argues that the DMVH hearing officer abused her discretion by
reducing Respondent’s habitual offender suspension by limiting the scope of
review to Respondent’s conduct following his habitual offender suspension of
May 3, 2003.
An
abuse of discretion occurs when a court’s decision is controlled by an error of
law or is without evidentiary support. Mictronics, Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t of
Revenue, 345 S.C. 506, 510, 548 S.E.2d 223, 225 (Ct. App. 2001). The
burden is on the appellant to show that there is an abuse of discretion. Johnson
v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 317 S.C. 415, 421, 453 S.E.2d 908, 912 (Ct. App.
1995).
Here,
Respondent offered evidence demonstrating that: (i) Respondent accepted
responsibility for his past mistakes by paying all his delinquent North
Carolina fines; (ii) Respondent recognized the seriousness of his South
Carolina DUS, which is evidenced by his efforts to reconcile his North Carolina
and South Carolina driving records; (iii) Respondent has committed neither a
major driving offense since May 11, 2002, nor an inherently dangerous motor vehicle
offense in the past thirteen years; (iv) Respondent was employed; and (v)
Respondent was complying with his legal obligation to pay child support.
Based on this evidence, I conclude that the DMVH hearing
officer did not abuse her discretion by reducing Respondent’s habitual offender
suspension. Ordinarily, there is no abuse of discretion where an agency’s
determination is supported by substantial evidence. See Porter v.
S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 328 S.C. 222, 233, 493 S.E.2d 92, 98 (1997)
(holding, in a public utility rate-setting case, that “there is no abuse of
discretion where substantial evidence supports the finding of a just and
reasonable rate”). As discussed above, a decision is supported by “substantial
evidence” when the record as a whole allows reasonable minds to reach the same
conclusion reached by the agency. Bilton, 282 S.C. at 641, 321 S.E.2d
at 68. Here, a reasonable person could conclude that good cause was shown for
the reduction of Respondent’s suspension.
Therefore, the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in this case.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the DMVH’s Final
Order and Decision is AFFIRMED.
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
John
D. McLeod
Administrative
Law Judge
November 5, 2007
Columbia, South Carolina
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