ORDERS:
ORDER
The
court held a hearing in this matter on Wednesday, August 29, 2007, at the Administrative Law Court (“ALC”) in Columbia, South Carolina. The Petitioner did not
appear at the hearing and did not notify the court that she would not be
appearing or would be late. After waiting approximately twenty minutes for the
Petitioner to appear, the court deemed the Petitioner
in default for failure to appear pursuant to ALC Rule 23. By letter dated August 30, 2007, the Petitioner requested another hearing. In her letter she
asserts that she was twenty-five minutes late to the hearing due to providing
care to a family member that morning as well as difficulties in locating the
ALC.
ALC
Rule 29(D) provides that “[a]ny party may move for reconsideration of a final
decision of an administrative law judge in a contested case, subject to the
grounds for relief set forth in Rule 60(B)(1 through 5), SCRCP, . . . .” Accordingly,
in considering a motion for such reconsideration or rehearing, it is
appropriate for the court to refer to the grounds for relieving a party from a
final judgment or order set forth in Rule 60(b), SCRCP. Under Rule 60(b) a
party may be relieved from a final judgment or order based upon the party’s
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and excusable neglect.” Rule 60(b)(1),
SCRCP. However, in determining whether to grant a motion for rehearing under
Rule 60(b), the court should consider “(1) the promptness with which relief is
sought, (2) the reasons for the failure to act promptly, (3) the existence of a
meritorious defense, and (4) the prejudice to the other party.” Mictronics,
Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 345 S.C. 506, 511, 548 S.E.2d 223, 226 (Ct.
App. 2001).
In
applying those factors to the case at hand, the Petitioner’s request for a
rehearing must be denied. Although the Petitioner promptly requested the
rehearing and explained why she was late to the hearing, the Petitioner has not
demonstrated that she has a meritorious claim. The parties’ Pre-Hearing
Statements show that Petitioner applied for and was granted the homestead tax
exemption in 2007. The Petitioner further applied for a refund of property
taxes from 1999-2006 based on her claim that she qualified for a homestead
exemption from 1999-2006. The Respondent, Greenwood County Auditor, granted
the Petitioner’s refund request for the 2006 tax year; however it denied her
claim for tax years 1999-2005 because refunds based upon eligibility for the
homestead exemption may only be granted for one year prior to the year in which
the exemption is granted. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 12-37-252(B), (D) (2000
& Supp. 2006).
Section
12-37-252(D) clearly states that “when a person
applies for the [homestead] exemption . . . and was qualified for this
exemption in the prior tax year in addition to the current tax year, the person
may be certified for the exemption, not to extend beyond the immediate
preceding tax year.” Section 12-37-252(B) further requires that when a person
claims a refund for a homestead tax exemption it “does not extend beyond the
immediate preceding tax year.” The statute clearly and unambiguously states
that a homestead exemption tax refund cannot extend beyond the previous tax
year. While the Petitioner appears to challenge the fairness of this
provision, she has not presented any argument that will provide the Petitioner
the relief she seeks. Nor does she appear to dispute any material facts. Accordingly,
the court finds, based on the parties’ Pre-Hearing Statements, that the Petitioner does not have a meritorious claim in
the case, and that the Respondent would be entitled to summary judgment in any
event. Therefore, the court finds that the Petitioner has not presented
sufficient grounds for a motion for rehearing. Therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion for rehearing is denied.
IT
IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
PAIGE J. GOSSETT
Administrative Law Judge
October 1, 2007
Columbia, South Carolina
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