ORDERS:
ORDER
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
The
above-captioned matter is before this Court pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-11-710(C)
(2005) and S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 2006) for an administrative
appeal. In this matter, Appellant Anne Forbes seeks review of a decision of Respondent
South Carolina Budget and Control Board, Employee Insurance Program (“EIP”)
denying her claim for disability income benefits under the State of South
Carolina Long Term Disability Plan (“Plan”). Specifically, on September 5,
2006, the Long Term Disability Appeals Committee of the EIP (“EIP Appeals Committee”)
informed Ms. Forbes that her medical records as submitted “did not contain
documentation demonstrating that she was disabled from performing her [job]
throughout and beyond the 90-day waiting period,” as required under the Plan.
(R. at 335).
After
timely notice to the parties, oral arguments in this matter were held on March
7, 2007, at the South Carolina Administrative Law Court in Columbia, South
Carolina. Based upon the Record on Appeal, the parties’ briefs and oral arguments,
and upon the applicable law, I find that EIP’s decision in upholding the denial
of long term disability benefits to Ms. Forbes must be reversed.
BACKGROUND
Procedural
Background
Appellant
is a forty-nine-year-old woman who applied for disability benefits through
EIP. Appellant began employment on May 15, 1995, as the Treasurer for the Town
of Kiawah Island, South Carolina, and ceased employment on February 28, 2004
because of her medical conditions. (R. at 14). On June 2, 2004, Standard
Insurance Company (“The Standard”), the third-party claims administrator for
the Plan, informed Ms. Forbes that her claim for long term disability benefits
had been denied based upon its conclusion that her medical conditions were not
completely limiting. (R. at 184). Specifically, The Standard stated that “we
currently lack compelling evidence of limitations and restrictions so severe as
to preclude [Appellant] from performing [her job] with reasonable continuity.”
(R. at 184). This decision was based in part on the opinion of Dr. Theodore
Kleikamp, a Physician Consultant,
who reviewed Ms. Forbes’ medical records and later determined that her
conditions were not completely limiting.
Thereafter,
on January 28, 2005, The Standard acknowledged receipt of additional
documentation from Ms. Forbes; however, The Standard notified her of its
decision to affirm the initial decision to deny her claim for long term
disability benefits under the Plan. (R. at 294). The Standard informed Ms. Forbes
that it would be forwarding its file on her to a Benefits Review Specialist
from the Quality Assurance (“QA”) Unit to ensure an objective review of its
decision to deny her claim. Subsequently, by letter dated April 8, 2005, The
Standard’s QA Unit notified Ms. Forbes that after reviewing her claim, it
affirmed the earlier decision to deny her claim for long term disability
benefits. (R. at 310-12). This decision was based in part on the opinion of
Dr. Bradley Fancher, a Physician Consultant,
who reviewed Ms. Forbes’ medical records and later determined that her
conditions were not completely limiting.
As
a result of The Standard’s final decision, Ms. Forbes appealed to EIP for
review of the decision. (R. at 324). On July 18, 2006, the EIP Appeals
Committee met to consider Ms. Forbes’ request for review. On September 5,
2006, the EIP Appeals Committee issued a final agency determination, based upon
Ms. Forbes’ medical records as submitted, the relevant provisions of the Plan,
and the medical opinions of The Standard’s Physician Consultants, and concluded
that the “facts and circumstances of [Ms. Forbes’] claim do not qualify her for
disability income benefits under the Plan.” (R. at 338). Specifically, the
EIP Appeals Committee determined that:
1. Appellant
ceased work on February 27, 2004, due to gastrointestinal problems, and she had
undergone several surgeries as a result of the gastrointestinal problems. (R.
at 335).
2. After
the surgeries performed in April of 2003 and October of 2003, Appellant would
need approximately two (2) to four (4) weeks to recover from the surgeries.
(R. at 335).
3. Appellant
returned to work on January 15, 2003, and continued to work until February 28,
2004, the date she ceased work and then pursued a claim for disability benefits
under the Plan. Because she returned to work during this time period, her
conditions were not completely limiting.
4. Medical
documentation in Appellant’s file did not indicate that she was disabled due to
headaches. Further, there was no other documentation in the file which
indicated a medical condition that would have prevented Appellant from working
in her job, with the exception of recovery time following any hospitalizations.
On
October 4, 2006, Ms. Forbes filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court to
challenge EIP’s final agency determination.
Ms.
Forbes’ Medical History
Based
upon the medical records as submitted and the opinion of Appellant’s primary
treating physician, David W. Seignious, M.D., Appellant suffers from
gastrointestinal problems, gastro-esophageal reflux disease (“GERD”), severe migraine headaches, and depression. (R. at 279-80). As a result of
Appellant’s gastrointestinal condition, Dr. Casey Fitts performed a Nissen
fundoplication on her in 1998; however,
Appellant’s symptoms continued to deteriorate, and a second Nissen
fundoplication was performed on Appellant in 1999 by Dr. Fitts. (R. at 84). Complications
arose during Appellant’s second Nissen fundoplication, and a cholecystectomy
was performed on Appellant in which her gallbladder was removed. (R. at 84). A
pyloroplasty procedure was also
performed on Appellant by Dr. Fitts in May of 2000. (R. at 91). Appellant
continued to have “abdominal bloating, and discomfort, and constipation” and
“experienced poor bowel movements, requiring enemas, and developed fecal
incontinence.” (R. at 78, 279). Appellant also developed colonic inertia, and in October of 2002, Dr. Daniel Smith, of Emory University Hospital in
Georgia, performed a subtotal colectomy and ileorectal anastomosis on Appellant
in which a large portion of her colon was removed. (R. at 209-10). Thereafter,
Appellant experienced several small bowel obstructions that resulted in a “more
severe small bowel obstruction in October [of] 2003,” which required emergency
surgery for immediate relief. (R. at 80, 99, 172). Additionally, Appellant
reported having bowel movements approximately eight (8) times per day which has
resulted in fecal incontinence during sexual intercourse as well as during
work. (R. at 73, 78, 79, 80).
At
the time of this appeal, in addition to her incontinence condition, Appellant
continues to have “severe and sudden onsets of abdominal pain and abdominal
distention, occasional nausea, uncontrollable flatus, and belching.” (R. at 279).
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
Pursuant
to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-11-710(C) (2005), this Court’s appellate review of EIP’s
final decision is governed by the standards provided in S.C. Code Ann. §
1-23-380 (Supp. 2006). Section 1-23-380 provides that this Court “may not substitute
its judgment for the judgment of the [Board] as to the weight of the evidence
on questions of fact.” S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(5), (B) (Supp. 2006).
However, this Court, pursuant to Section 1-23-380(A)(5) (Supp. 2006),
may
reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions
are:
(a)
in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b)
in excess of the statutory authority of the [Board];
(c)
made upon unlawful procedure;
(d)
affected by other error of law;
(e)
clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record; or
(f)
arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Id.; see
also Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981)
(stating “‘[s]ubstantial evidence’ is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the
evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which,
considering the Record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the
conclusion that the administrative agency reached or must have reached in order
to justify its action.” Id. at 135, 276 S.E.2d at 306. Accordingly,
“[t]he ‘possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence
does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by
substantial evidence.’” Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 319
S.C. 348, 461 S.E.2d 388 (1995) (citing Palmetto Alliance, Inc. v. South
Carolina Public Service Commission, 282 S.C. 430, 432, 319 S.E.2d 695, 696
(1984)). Further, an abuse of discretion occurs when an
administrative agency’s ruling is based upon an error of law, such as
application of the wrong legal principle; or, when based upon factual
conclusions, the ruling is without evidentiary support; or, when the trial
court is vested with discretion, but the ruling reveals no discretion was
exercised; or, when the ruling does not fall within the range of permissible
decisions applicable in a particular case, such that it may be deemed arbitrary
and capricious. Cf. State v. Allen, 370
S.C. 88, 634 S.E.2d 653 (2006) (application of standard to circuit court)
(citing Fontaine v. Peitz, 291 S.C. 536, 539, 354 S.E.2d 565, 566 (1987)).
DISCUSSION
In
her appellate brief, Appellant contends that EIP’s decision to deny benefits
was: (1) clearly erroneous in view of the whole record; and, (2) arbitrary and
capricious and an abuse of discretion, in that:
1. Respondent ignored the medical records and
affidavit of Appellant’s physician, Dr. David W. Seignious;
2. Respondent failed to give any
weight to the report of Robert E. Brabham, Ph.D., the Vocational Consultant
assigned by the South Carolina State Retirement Systems to evaluate Appellant’s
eligibility for disability retirement benefits;
3. Respondent inappropriately and
erroneously focused on fragments of the record in an attempt to support its
finding that Appellant was not disabled; and,
4. Respondent gave great weight
and credence to the opinions of The Standard’s Physician Consultants, whom have
never treated Appellant, over the medical records and opinion of her primary
treating physician.
(Appellant’s Br.
3-8).
Appellant
raises a number of grounds for her appeal of EIP’s decision in this matter, and
these grounds for appeal can generally be resolved into three broad categories:
(1) EIP’s determination that Appellant’s medical condition was not completely
limiting, as required by the Plan’s Definition of Disability; (2) EIP’s over-reliance
upon The Standard’s Physician Consultants’ opinions; and, (3) EIP’s discounting
of Dr. Seignious’ patient notes and affidavit. Each of these claims will be
addressed in turn.
The Plan’s
Definition of Disability
EIP
argues that Appellant’s medical conditions failed to satisfy the Plan’s Definition
of Disability, and as a result, she is not entitled to long term disability
benefits under the Plan. Specifically, EIP cites the Plan’s Definition of Disability
as support for its decision to deny Appellant’s disability benefits claim and
contends that Appellant’s medical conditions are not completely limiting:
A. Own
Occupation Definition of Disability
During the Benefit
Waiting Period and the Own Occupation Period you are required to be Disabled
only from your Own Occupation.
You are Disabled
from your Own Occupation if, as a result of Physical Disease, Injury,
Pregnancy or Mental Disorder, you are unable to perform with reasonable
continuity the Material Duties of your Occupation.
Own Occupation means
any employment, business, trade, profession, calling or vocation that involves
Material Duties of the same general character as your regular and ordinary
employment with the Employer. Your Own Occupation is not limited to your job
with your Employer. Material Duties
means the essential task, functions and operations, and the skills, abilities,
knowledge, training and experience, generally required by employers from those
engaged in a particular occupation.
(R. at 384)
(emphasis added).
In the
application of this definition of disability in its agency determination, EIP
largely relies upon the medical opinion of The Standard’s Physician Consultant,
Dr. Theodore Kleikamp, to determine whether or not Appellant’s medical
conditions are a limitation upon her job as a treasurer. (R. at 335).
According to the Plan’s definitions, a claimant is considered disabled, as the
result of various conditions, if the claimant is “unable to perform with
reasonable continuity the Material Duties of your Own Occupation.” (R. at
384) (emphasis added). Hence, under EIP’s rationale, such a claimant’s
condition would be completely limiting. “Reasonable continuity” is not defined
in any portion of the Plan as submitted and contained in the record; however, “continuity”
is generally defined as “an uninterrupted connection, succession, or union” or
an “uninterrupted duration or continuation especially without essential
change.”
EIP
states in its determination that Ms. Forbes’ medical conditions were, in its
opinion, clearly not a limitation on her ability to perform her job. (R. at
335). As evidence of such an assertion, EIP points to Ms. Forbes’ work history
– specifically, that she worked from January 15, 2003, through February 28,
2004; thus, EIP asserts the
fact that she was present at work during this time period substantiates its
determination that her medical conditions were not completely limiting. In
response to EIP’s decision and reasoning, Appellant equally points to her work
and payroll history as evidence to the contrary. (R. at 62-3). Specifically,
during the last four (4) pay periods Appellant was employed, she received nearly
her full pay in only two (2) of the four (4) pay periods due to absences on
account of her medical conditions. (R. at 62). In fact,
for the February 12, 2004 pay period, Appellant received approximately
one-third (1/3) of her normal pay. (R. at 62). This tribunal is confounded that
EIP would render a determination that denies disability benefits to Appellant
based upon its reasoning that Appellant was able to work. This is especially
true as the record contains substantial evidence that Appellant was not able to
perform her duties with reasonable continuity as she consistently missed
work throughout the concluding period of her employment. (R. at 384). By
definition, it is obvious that Appellant’s employment history during this
period was not: 1) reasonably successive; 2) uninterrupted in duration or
connection; and, 3) a continuation without essential change.
For
example, in Dr. Brabham’s report, Appellant has indicated
that in the final three years of employment with The Town of Kiawah Island, she
never completed a full day of work as a result of her medical conditions. (R.
at 301). It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine that Appellant was
able to work with “reasonable continuity” during the Benefit Waiting period,
especially given the fact that she missed more days of work than she was
actually present, and of the days she was present, she never completed a full day of work. Further, and most significantly, EIP fails to acknowledge that
Appellant was terminated from her position for excessive absences, which
Appellant incurred as a result of her medical conditions. (R. at 302). Given the
reason for Appellant’s termination and relevant pay/employment history, EIP’s
determination – that Appellant was able to perform her job with reasonable
continuity – is clearly contradicted by the record.
The
Standard’s Physician Consultants
One
of the prevailing questions presented in this appeal is, as Appellant states,
whether EIP’s decision to uphold the denial of Ms. Forbes’ claim for long term
disability benefits was “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence on the whole record” regarding her medical
conditions. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(5)(e) (Supp. 2006). On that
question, there is a lack of reliable evidence in the record to substantiate
EIP’s decision that Appellant is ineligible to receive long term disability
benefits. EIP is tasked with determining if a claimant is eligible to receive
long term disability benefits and does so by relying upon the claimant’s
medical records, as provided by the claimant, as well as the medical opinions
of Physician Consultants, with whom The Standard has contracted. Therefore, if
EIP is required to render a truly objective and fair determination of the claim
at issue, it is imperative that all information presented to EIP must be
accurate, reliable, and sufficiently detailed for an in-depth consideration of
the claimant’s claim.
On
that point, Appellant challenges the reliability of the Physician Consultants’
opinions as a basis for the denial of Appellant’s claim in light of the actual
evidence set forth in the medical records upon which they relied. Upon
consideration of Appellant’s assertion and review of the record in this case,
this tribunal finds that a Physician Consultant’s memo contains clearly
inaccurate statements when juxtaposed with the Appellant’s medical records.
For example, in Dr. Fancher’s memo, he states that “[t]here certainly would be
medical ways to treat the claimant’s condition if incontinence was a problem.
It does not appear that any of the usual modalities have been employed.” (R.
at 307). Further, in regards to Appellant’s incontinence problem, EIP, in its appellate
brief, echoes Dr. Fancher’s statement regarding Appellant’s treatment of her
incontinence condition by stating that “[t]here is no evidence in the Record
that [Appellant] ever followed Dr. Lahr’s recommendation that she use enemas to
avoid incontinence.” (Respt.’s Br. at 6). Contrarily, in a procedure report
from Dr. Lahr’s office dated August 25, 2003, under the heading “current medications,” there is a notation that states “1-2 Fleets enemas/month.” (R.
at 73) (emphasis added). Even more notable, Dr. Thomas Appleby, an associate of
Dr. Casey Fitts, reported in Appellant’s patient notes on January 26, 2003,
that Appellant was in fact using enemas.
[Appellant] reports
that she is able to give herself multiple enemas with her head down and
backside up. She is able to take care of these at home. However, yesterday,
she was out and could not do this. She did give herself about three enemas
with results yesterday.
(R. at 94). Additionally,
the Physician Consultants suggested that Appellant should try surgery to
minimize or maintain her medical conditions in such a way that she would still
be capable of working. (R. at 170). However,
Appellant’s own doctors have specifically considered this surgery with
Appellant and advised against it, although Appellant was eager to have this
surgery performed as she was hopeful it would diminish or possibly even relieve
her of her current symptoms. (R. at 80). EIP is
essentially suggesting that she be denied benefits because the “usual
modalities,” i.e., treatment options, have not been tried or considered by
Appellant in order to mitigate her symptoms.
These
arguments are unfounded when viewed in light of the record which clearly
evidences her utilization of enemas and contains documentation from her doctor advising
against the cysto-enterorectocele surgery. Further, it is entirely conceivable
that her doctor may never advise Appellant that she is a candidate for the
surgery due to the gravity of her reoccurring symptoms resulting from her medical
conditions and multiple prior surgeries. Hence, it would be
entirely speculative for the Physician Consultants to conclude that a prospective
surgery would provide relief for Appellant in order for her to continue
working.
Dr.
Seignious, Ms. Forbes’ Primary Treating Physician
Appellant
also contends that EIP “ignored” Dr. Seignious’ affidavit and patient notes
when considering Appellant’s claim for disability benefits. (Appellant’s Br.
4). As stated previously, EIP is authorized to determine if a claimant is
eligible to receive long term disability benefits. However, EIP’s judgment in
the instant matter must be questioned when it renders a decision based upon an
incomplete record; and, EIP was clearly in a position to address the problem
with Appellant before rendering its decision. For instance, EIP, in its
Respondent Brief, states
Unfortunately,
Dr. Seignious’ handwritten chart notes are very difficult to read; therefore,
Appellant’s [sic] Brief will attempt to summarize the notes as much as possible
and will not attempt to directly quote Dr. Seignious’ notes.
(Respt.’s
Br. at 6, n.4). Therefore, the question then becomes whether EIP could have
rendered a fair, yet objective, determination of claimant’s appeal when its
decision is based upon records that EIP has conceded it had difficulty reading.
Further, EIP, in its determination process, considered the medical opinions of
the Physician Consultants who rendered their decisions based upon the notes of
Appellant’s treating physician, Dr. Seignious. In fact, Drs. Kleikamp and
Fancher both indicated the difficulty they encountered in assessing Appellant’s
conditions as documented in Dr. Seignious’ patient notes.
EIP’s reliance upon Physician Consultants’ opinions, which were based upon
their review of medical notes that each conceded he had difficultly reading, is
incompatible with a fair and sustainable final decision and proper exercise of
its authority and discretion. This is even more pronounced when considering
the fact that Dr. Seignious is Appellant’s primary treating physician, and he
is in a position to provide an accurate and thorough account of Appellant’s
medical history as it relates to her disability claim.
Given
EIP’s unsustainable conclusion regarding Appellant’s ability to perform her job
with reasonable continuity, the overwhelming evidence substantiating the nature
and breadth of Ms. Forbes’ medical conditions, and EIP’s reliance upon the medical
opinions of Physician Consultants who were insufficiently informed because of
the aforementioned problems in deciphering Appellant’s medical records, this
tribunal cannot find that EIP’s decision to uphold the denial of long term
disability benefits to Ms. Forbes is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
As such, this Court agrees with Appellant that EIP’s decision was clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative and
substantial evidence on the whole record, was arbitrary and capricious, and was
an abuse of discretion.
ORDER
For
the reasons set forth above,
IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that EIP’s final agency determination upholding the
denial of Appellant’s claim for long term disability benefits is REVERSED.
AND
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
JOHN D.
GEATHERS
Administrative
Law Judge
1205 Pendleton
Street, Suite 224
Columbia, South
Carolina 29201-3731
May 3, 2007
Columbia, South Carolina
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