ORDERS:
FINAL ORDER AND DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the South Carolina Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 9-21-60 (Supp. 2005) upon request for a contested case hearing filed by Cindy L. Taylor (Petitioner). Petitioner contests the Final Agency Determination issued by Respondent South Carolina Budget and Control Board, South Carolina Retirement Systems (Respondent or Retirement Systems), which found Petitioner’s disability retirement application was not timely because Petitioner was not “in service” at the time she filed her application. The matter was stayed pending the Court’s en banc consideration of the meaning of “in service.” The Court issued the en banc decision on August 21, 2006 in Anderson v. S.C. Budget and Control Bd., S.C. Retirement Sys., 06-ALJ-30-0008-CC that addressed that issue. The Retirement Systems thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. After notice to the parties, a hearing was conducted on October 31, 2006.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 68 of the Rules of Procedure for the Administrative Law Court provides that “[t]he South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure may, where practicable, be applied in proceedings before the Court to resolve questions not addressed by these rules.” Rule 56(c), SCRCP, provides that summary judgment shall be granted if it is shown “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” See also Gadson v. Hembree, 364 S.C. 316, 613 S.E.2d 533 (2005); Cisson Constr., Inc. v. Reynolds & Assoc., Inc., 311 S.C. 499, 429 S.E.2d 847 (Ct. App. 1993). In determining whether summary judgment is proper, the court must construe all ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising from the evidence against the moving party. Byers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 310 S.C. 5, 425 S.E.2d 23 (1992).
Because it is a drastic remedy, summary judgment should be cautiously invoked to ensure that a litigant is not improperly deprived of a trial on disputed factual issues. Helena Chem. Co. v. Allianz Underwriters Ins. Co., 357 S.C. 631, 594 S.E.2d 455 (2004). Summary judgment is also not appropriate where further inquiry into the facts of the case is desirable to clarify the application of the law. Wogan v. Kunze, 366 S.C. 583, 623 S.E.2d 107 (2005). On the other hand, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but a response by affidavit or otherwise as provided in the rules must set forth specific facts creating a genuine issue for trial. Rule 56(e), SCRCP; Moody v. McLellan, 295 S.C. 157, 163, 367 S.E.2d 449, 452-53 (Ct. App. 1988). Furthermore, summary judgment should be granted “when plain, palpable and undisputed facts exist on which reasonable minds cannot differ.” Bayle v. S.C. Dep’t of Transp., 344 S.C. 115, 120, 542 S.E.2d 736, 738 (Ct. App. 2001).
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties have stipulated to the following Findings of Fact:
1. Petitioner’s last job in state service was as a teacher for Spartanburg County School District 7. While Petitioner was a teacher with Spartanburg County School District 7, she participated as a member of the South Carolina Retirement System (“SCRS”), which is one of the retirement systems managed by Respondent South Carolina Retirement Systems.
2. On April 21, 2005, Petitioner called the Retirement Systems’ Customer Service and inquired about disability benefits. The Customer Service representative explained that an application must be filed prior to leaving employment. The Customer Service representative, however, mailed a disability application to Petitioner and requested she file it as soon as possible with a letter explaining why it was not filed prior to termination.
3. On April 22, 2005, Petitioner called Customer Service again. Petitioner indicated she was expecting a disability package to be mailed to her, which she intended to file along with an explanation why she did not file earlier. Petitioner also informed the Customer Service representative that she was terminated without notice by her employer and asked about any recourse to appeal.
4. On June 9, 2005, Petitioner’s attorney submitted a written request to Petitioner’s School District and the Retirement Systems requesting a disability retirement packet. On June 10, 2005, the Retirement Systems mailed a disability retirement packet to Petitioner’s attorney and provided “Please make sure that [Petitioner’s] application (form 6151S) is submitted as soon as possible.”
5. On July 7, 2005, the Retirement Systems received the completed disability retirement application along with other supporting documents.
6. On July 27, 2005, the Retirement Systems received the Employer’s Disability Employment Status Report wherein Petitioner’s employer certified Petitioner’s last day physically worked was May 27, 2004, and date of termination was March 30, 2005.
7. On August 3, 2005, the Retirement Systems sent a Notification of Disability Ineligibility to Petitioner explaining that based on the date of termination provided by the employer, Petitioner was not a member “in service” at the time she filed her application for disability retirement benefits.
8. On November 14, 2005, the Retirement Systems received a request to appeal the determination that Petitioner was ineligible.
9. On December 15, 2005, the Retirement Systems issued a staff decision concluding Petitioner was not in service at the time of application.
10. On February 6, 2006, the Director of the Retirement Systems received a request for a Final Agency Determination.
11. On April 20, 2006, the Director of the Retirement Systems issued a Final Agency Determination concluding Petitioner was not in service at the time of application and, therefore, was not eligible to apply for disability retirement benefits.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, I conclude the following as a matter of law:
1. The Court has jurisdiction to decide the issues in this case pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 9-21-60 (Supp. 2005) of the South Carolina Retirement Systems Claims Procedures Act.
2. The Retirement Systems contends that this case should be summarily dismissed because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the Retirement Systems is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the sole issue of whether Petitioner met the statutory requirements of eligibility to file an application for disability retirement benefits. The statute at issue provides in pertinent part that:
Upon the application of a member in service or of his employer, a member in service on or after July 1, 1970, who has had five or more years of earned service or a contributing member who is disabled as a result of an injury arising out of and in the course of the performance of his duties regardless of length of membership on or after July 1, 1985, may be retired by the board not less than thirty days and not more than nine months next following the date of filing the application on a disability retirement allowance if the system, after a medical examination of the member, certifies that the member is mentally or physically incapacitated for the further performance of duty, that the incapacity is likely to be permanent, and that the member should be retired.
S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-1540 (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added). The central issue in this case is whether Petitioner was a “member in service” at the time she filed her application for disability retirement benefits. The Court addressed this issue en banc in the decision of Anderson v. S.C. Budget and Control Bd., S.C. Retirement Sys., 06-ALJ-30-0008-CC. In Anderson, the Court concluded the words “member in service” as applied to an employee seeking disability retirement benefits, plainly mean “a person having the status of an employee by virtue of a contract of employment that is in effect at the time the application for disability benefits is filed, specifically including those on accrued annual leave or sick leave.” This conclusion is equally applicable in the case sub judice.
Pursuant to ALC Rule 70(F), “[t]he issue(s) addressed in en banc decisions by the administrative law judges are binding upon all individual administrative law judges in all subsequent cases, unless a majority of the judges determine otherwise.” Thus, not only has the central issue of this case been determined in the Anderson decision, the Court’s conclusion in that decision is binding on the facts of this case.
Here, there is no genuine issue of material fact in this case. Petitioner terminated employment on March 30, 2005, but did not file an application for disability retirement benefits until July 7, 2005. Petitioner, therefore, was not an employee of Spartanburg County School District 7 and thus was not a “member in service” at the time she filed her application for disability retirement benefits. Furthermore, as mentioned by the court in Anderson, the Retirement Systems allows a ninety-day grace period for filing for disability retirement benefits. Petitioner, however, did not apply for benefits within this extended application period. Therefore, based on the undisputed facts, the Retirement Systems is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
3. Petitioner nevertheless argued it would be inequitable to bar her claim for disability retirement benefits because she had no knowledge of the timeframe before the limitations period had run. However, the disability statute clearly requires an application be filed by a “member in service.” The general rule is where a statute creating a right of action also includes a time limitation, the limitation is part of the right, and the failure to exercise such right within the time limitation extinguishes the right. Hemingway v. Shull, 286 F. Supp. 243 (1968). That requirement also acts as a statute of limitations for filing an application for disability retirement benefits. “A statute of limitations has been defined as the action of the state in determining that after the lapse of a specified time a claim shall not be enforceable in a judicial proceeding. Thus, any law which creates a condition of the enforcement of a right to be performed within a fixed time may be defined as a statute of limitations.” 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 2 (2000). Furthermore, “[t]here is universal acceptance of the logic of Statutes of Limitations that litigation must be brought within a reasonable time in order that evidence be reasonably available and there be some end to litigation.” City of N. Myrtle Beach v. Lewis-Davis, 360 S.C. 225, 231, 599 S.E.2d 462, 464 (Ct. App. 2004) quoting Webb v. Greenwood County, 229 S.C. 267, 92 S.E.2d 688 (1956). Therefore, “[s]tatutes of limitations are not simply technicalities. On the contrary, they have long been respected as fundamental to a well-ordered judicial system.” City of N. Myrtle Beach, 599 S.E.2d at 465.
Additionally, the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed a similar argument in the case of Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. S.C. Second Injury Fund, 277 S.C. 604, 291 S.E.2d 667 (1982). The main issue in that case was whether the insurance company was barred from reimbursement due to its failure to comply with statutory requirements. The insurance company asserted the discovery rule should apply to allow the claim for reimbursement because the company had no knowledge before the limitations period had run. The Supreme Court held, “[t]here must be some finality with a limitations period, and unless the legislature extends the period by including the discovery rule, we believe the better view is not to read it into a statute of this nature.” Id. at 607, 291 S.E.2d at 668.
In the case of disability retirement benefits, the requirement that the member be “in service” (or apply within 90 days of that termination) provides a certainty for the Retirement Systems when assessing its potential liabilities to determine the actuarial soundness of its retirement plans. It is necessary for the Retirement Systems to be able to rely on a deadline provided by statute in order to actuarially project the number of disability retirement applications that may be filed and to determine its potential liabilities therefrom. Moreover, Section 9-1-1540 does not provide for a discovery rule to apply to when Petitioner learns of the availability of disability retirement benefits. Petitioner’s argument, therefore, that she was not aware of the availability of disability retirement benefits until after she was terminated is not a defense to her failure to timely file an application. Disability retirement benefits are provided by statute, and the same statutes granting those benefits provide a timeframe for seeking those benefits. Moreover, ignorance of the law is no excuse. Gregory v. Gregory, 292 S.C. 587, 358 S.E.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1987).
4. Petitioner further argued that the Retirement Systems should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense because the Retirement Systems did not inform Petitioner of the ninety-day grace period. “The doctrine of estoppel will not be applied to deprive the State of the due exercise of its police power or to thwart its application of public policy.” S.C. Coastal Council v. Vogel, 292 S.C. 449, 357 S.E.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1987). Estoppel also can not be applied against the State based upon “unauthorized or erroneous conduct or statements of its officers or agents which have been relied on by a third party to his detriment.” Id. However, that does not mean that the State is immune from the application of the estoppel doctrine. For instance, the State may be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense “when the delay that otherwise would give operation to the statute has been induced by the defendant's conduct.” Harvey v. S.C. Dept. of Corr., 338 S.C. 500, 527 S.E.2d 765 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Dillon County School Dist. Number Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 286 S.C. 207, 332 S.E.2d 555 (Ct.App.1985). “This conduct may be either an express representation that the claim will be settled without litigation or actions suggesting a lawsuit is unnecessary.” Id. (quoting Moates v. Bobb, 322 S.C. 172, 175, 470 S.E.2d 402, 403 (Ct.App.1996)).
Here, however, the Retirement Systems did not induce Petitioner’s delay in filing an application for disability retirement benefits. In fact, the Retirement Systems contended from the beginning that Petitioner’s application was not filed by the deadline provided by statute. Furthermore, on several occasions during the ninety-day period, the Retirement Systems emphasized the need for Petitioner to file the application “as soon as possible.” Rather, than make intentional affirmative representation that the Retirement Systems would accept Petitioner’s application at anytime, the Retirement Systems Representatives repeatedly insisted Petitioner submit the application as soon as possible with an explanation of why she did not file the application prior to termination. There is also no evidence that any Representative was authorized to assert that the Department could accept an application outside of their required timeframe. Moreover, even if the Retirement Systems Representative had made such a representation, the Department would not be required to accept the application because a Representative does not have discretion to waive the statutory requirements. See Goodwine v. Dorchester Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 336 S.C. 413, 519 S.E.2d 116 (Ct. App. 1999).
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Ralph King Anderson, III
Administrative Law Judge
December 13, 2006
Columbia, South Carolina
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